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A Few Words from the
Editor
Over the past few years, I have had occasion to follow
the vagaries of the publishing industry closely. I feel licensed to
declare with sad confidence that our culture is in no less trouble on the
creative front than elsewhere. The Internet has supposedly revolutionized
publishing; it has, in any event, certainly killed writing. The claim is
made that anyone can now put his or her opus before the entire world’s
eyes, and this is true. In fact, it’s the cusp of the problem. When
anybody can say anything, the practical upshot is not that everybody is
saying everything, but that nobody says much more than nothing. There is
no focus, no valuation of study and apprenticeship and maturing. We see
only a headlong sprint to the "world forum" with the most
narcissistic and undigested of preoccupations. One Web site which claims
to post new writing for the delectation of prospective agents and
publishers features an essay about a young woman who "cut myself but
wasn’t depressed", and also a treatise by a young man about
"the meaning of everything". The usual sanguinary rhapsodies
about psychopathic killers and imaginatively pinched cartoons about
extra-terrestrials are abundantly represented here; but, mirabile dictu,
they have registered few "hits". Could it be that the last two
decades’ obsession with serial killings and intergalactic feuds is
growing ho-hum? To judge from the prospering fortunes of "reality
TV", this is precisely the case. We can no longer reliably titillate
ourselves with extravagant escapism—the urge to slash our wrists is just
too imperative, and the hunger for a guru who can snatch away the blade
too vesane.
Which is what some of us have said all along would
happen to a society nourished on the cotton candy of special effects and
daydreams: it goes crazy, flirts with suicide, and lunges after impromptu
savior-figures. The trouble with our publishers is that, rather than raise
a paternal hand and smile, "No, this is what you need—classics
that have reared generations before you," they smell cash in the air
and close like a shark on blood. As much as the contemporary academy, in
my opinion, the publishing industry is the pandar to our spiritual stupra
(and MS Word’s pseudo-paternal red lines remind me that we have long
forgotten Homer’s Pandarus in our cultural adoration of the lowest
common denominator). Indeed, publishing is less and less distinguishable
from the solar system of Movies and TV and from that of video games: all
are merging into one annihilating black hole. The Web site I mentioned
above proudly features samples from its ten works most read by publishers
and those pandars of pandars, literary agents. At the very top of the list
is an insipid ramble straight out of Xena, or maybe Super Mario:
an Aztec virgin (or other paleo-Meso-American of unspecified type) is
being sacrificed to a jaguar or the Jaguar God or some god of jaguar
emissaries. Whatever, as the kids say. (What an appropriate comment in an
age when details are always lacking, out of focus, and—in any case—powerless
to redeem the whole!) The selection visibly bristles with brief
one-sentence paragraphs, which in turn slide easily over the mind in
somnolent clichés. ("The crowd sighed as one.") The
"editors" of this refuge for the narrative arts explicitly
recommend submitted samples of only a few hundred words taken from the
work’s opening. I guess that’s kind of like judging a symphony by its
first five seconds. (Dit-dit-dit-daah… "Sorry, Ludwig.
Next!")
If I dare to publish my own gloomy ruminations here, it
isn’t simply to share my "gut feelings" with the planet. The
fact is that at least three of our contributors in this issue possess
manuscripts of novels that may well never receive a bona fide
hearing from publishers eager to discover the next "chicken
soup" classic. ("Chicken soup for the soul nauseated on chicken
soup"?) I have taken the liberty of putting one more chapter from Mr.
Moseby’s work before our readership because, first, it’s a darn good
one, and second because the lapse of such psychologically rich portraits
as this beneath the radar of popular culture and profit-crazed publishing
illustrates the conclusion of my own piece: i.e., that the fine arts are
dead, or peu s’en faut. I am also leading up to the announcement
that Arcturus Press will soon cease to exist. Many of our readers know of
my association with that ill-starred venture. I mention its demise here to
forestall any rumor that Praesidium is also on the rocks. On the
contrary, the journal continues to pay for itself. In fact, I intend to
pursue a federal tax-exemption (again) which would allow us to expand our
audience greatly—and even to publish books at what would have to be
considered a loss, from a strictly commercial perspective. For there is
a third alternative, you see, to pandaring or starving: you emphasize, in
a manner which even a sinecured bureaucrat can understand, that you are an
educator. Publishers know about this option. They’re not afraid of
starving, only of not being able to dine like lords.
In a way which he couldn’t possibly have foreseen,
Professor Chaves has provided us an entry into these concerns. His long
essay on philosophical realism as the necessary basis of faith is the
cornerstone of the current issue, and it occurs to me that one might pose
oneself the following question. If we cannot, as a culture, find a reality
beyond our egotistical interests, peeves, manias, and manèges, how
can we claim to be a people of faith (as we do, apparently, on all the
polls)? I myself happen to disagree with the substance of Dr. Chaves’s
argument in ways that my essay explains; but the two of us, it’s clear,
believe in a bedrock reality which rejects senselessness and urges
responsibility. Each of us, to the best of his or her ability, having
tossed a propitiatory morsel to these sharks and jaguars and institutional
"facilitators" all around us, must move forward. ~J.H.
back to Contents
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Kicking the Stone
and Viewing the Icon: Realist Epistemology Between Heaven
and Earth
by
Jonathan Chaves
Jonathan Chaves earned his PhD in
Chinese Literature from Columbia University. He is professor of Chinese
language and literature at The George Washington University (Washington,
D.C.), and has published books and articles on classical Chinese poetry,
and traditional Chinese literary theory. He also studies the relationship
between poetry and painting in China, and guest-curated an exhibition on
this subject, "The Chinese Painter as Poet", for the Art Gallery
of The China Institute in America, New York City, in Fall 2000. One of his
books, Pilgrim of the Clouds (Weatherhill, 1978), was nominated for
the National Book Award in the translation category.
"It’s the first effect of not believing in God
that you lose your common sense and can’t see things as they are."
Father Brown in G.K. Chesterton, "The Oracle of the Dog" (1926)
I. The Void
It must be obvious to anyone who follows the
vicissitudes of contemporary intellectual life that we live in an age of
virtually complete relativism and even nihilism. Of course, it has been
realized nearly throughout the history of philosophy that an absolute
relativism is a contradiction in terms. When Aquinas, drawing upon
Aristotle, states that "the existence of truth in general is
self-evident", he is agreeing at least with this portion of the third
Objection in Pt. 1, Q.2, Art.1 of the Summa Theologica, "Whether
the Existence of God is Self-Evident":
… whoever denies the existence of truth grants that
truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition
"Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true,
there must be truth. 1
But even such rock-solid demonstrations as this no
longer trouble those of our intellectuals who consider themselves to live
in a radically new age, an age of what they now like to call
"postmodernism" (by the time this is written, they may well have
come up with a new name for it, as this is also an age of neologism run
amuck).
This use of this term, actually an obvious oxymoron,
appears to derive from a prior assumption that there has passed an age of
"modernism", dating from the Enlightenment, and characterized by
an attempt to comprehend everything—all truth—through the application
of pure reason. But now, in our greater knowledge and sophisticated
wisdom, we have come to doubt not only the adequacy of reason to
understand everything, but its potential grasp of anything; indeed,
we now realize that the very desire to comprehend truth was misguided and
perhaps even the source of evil. And since there may well be no solid
truth, since the universe (or universes—there could be a vast number of
them) may in fact be so amorphous or polymorphous that nearly any view of
"reality" (the word must now be placed in quotation marks) is
equally sustainable, we are well quit of the entire enterprise of
philosophy construed as truth-seeking. Instead, we are free to engage
open-endedly in intellectual or, better, aesthetic play, never expecting
any actual outcome, enjoying the process for its own quirky sake. Such,
for example, is the "liberal irony" of Richard Rorty.
It is as though Thomas Love Peacock’s "Mr.
Flosky" had transported himself from Nightmare Abbey,
multiplied by thousands, and reincarnated as countless college professors,
"deconstructionist" literary critics, and intellectuals in
general in our own time:
The enthusiasm for abstract truth is an exceedingly
fine thing, so long as the truth, which is the object of the enthusiasm,
is so completely abstract as to be altogether out of the reach of human
faculties; and in that sense, I have myself an enthusiasm for truth, but
in no other, for the pleasure of metaphysical investigation lies in the
means, not in the end; and if the end could be found, the pleasure of
the means would cease. 2
But Mr. Flosky was invented by Peacock in 1818, a fact
which alone should caution us as to the validity of periodization in the
reductionist intellectual historiography of the self-anointed
"postmodernists". If all the "modernists" of the day
were diligently attempting to apply universal reason to every aspect of
life, where did the anti-rationalist Mr. Flosky come from? Not from
Peacock’s pure imagination: it is well known that he is modeled on
Coleridge, and the ultimate source of his thought is revealed when Flosky
proudly proclaims that he has "christened my eldest son Emanuel Kant
Flosky".
The fact of the matter is that
"postmodernism" is a misnomer, a chimera of no substance. Those
features which it is alleged to possess have all along been part and
parcel of the modern era, the era in which we are still living, however
one may date its point of origin, and however much our jaded
intelligentsia may yearn for radical change.
The true nature of modernity has been discerned by no
one with greater depth and clarity than G.K. Chesterton. When Chesterton’s
priest-detective, Father Brown, learns that a witness in a murder case
thinks that a dog has preternaturally identified the killer, he tells him,
because he couldn’t talk, you made up his story for
him, and made him talk with the tongues of men and angels. It’s part
of something I’ve noticed more and more in the modern world, appearing
in all sorts of newspaper rumours and conversational catchwords; a
something that’s arbitrary without being authoritative. People readily
swallow the untested claims of this, that or the other. It’s drowning
all your old rationalism and scepticism, it’s coming in like a sea;
and the name of it is superstition. 3
Similarly, in "The Miracle of Moon Crescent",
Father Brown gently castigates a group of modern "materialists"
who were all too ready to accept a supernatural explanation for a certain
all too natural event:
You swore you were hard-shelled materialists, and as
a matter of fact you were all balanced on the very edge of belief—of
belief in almost anything. There are thousands balanced on it today; but
it's a sharp, uncomfortable edge to sit on. You won’t rest till you
believe something; that’s why Mr. Vandam went through new religions
with a tooth-comb... 4
"Today" was sometime during the years
1923-1926, when Chesterton was working on The Incredulity of Father
Brown (1926), the collection which includes both of the stories cited
here. Do these sound like the words of a man surrounded by pure
rationality? Chesterton even predicts what is indeed the likely next move
for our own "postmodernists": indiscriminate spirituality and
"religiosity".
True, the modern era has represented itself in
large measure as purely rational. But Richard Weaver, in Ideas Have
Consequences (1948), is able to speak of nothing less than a
"distrust of reason with which our age seems fatally
stricken", 5 and to state further that "our surrender to
irrationality has been in progress for a long time."6 He even goes so
far as to maintain that the "very notion of eternal verities is
repugnant to the modern temper",7 this because "the soul of
modern man craves orgiastic disorder."8 Thus the "philosophic
position of modernism" is in fact "the sheerest
relativism".9 Here is a perfect analysis of the mind of so-called postmodern
man, yet written in 1948 and revealingly using the only correct,
meaningful terms, "modern", "modernism".
But to reach the inevitable conclusion that the
"modernism" spoken of by the "postmodernists" is in
fact a straw man constructed by them for the mere polemical purpose of
later deconstructing (i.e., destroying) it, it is not necessary to
depend on the deep insights of men like Chesterton or Weaver who were
able, almost miraculously, to stand apart from their times and to see them
clearly. In 1924, as Chesterton was producing the stories that would be
published in The Incredulity of Father Brown, André Breton issued
his Manifesto of Surrealism calling for "pure psychic automism"
in writing (and even then, not with complete originality, if one recalls
Rimbaud’s dérangement des sens). 10 Here is an explicit call in the
realm of elite culture for the very "orgiastic disorder" which,
instead of Olympian rationality, actually lurks at the bottom of the
modern soul, as Weaver correctly noted, and which will, starting in the
1960’s, dramatically explode in the realm of popular culture as well.
"The term ‘post-modern’ is an empty
label," writes Thomas Molnar in 1994. 11 "It reassures those who
have come to dislike modernity for the right or wrong reason, and hope
they may go forward... to something better: modernity preserved, but
adding resacralization." But this is a most unlikely outcome,
because, as Molnar brilliantly observes, "All this is part of the
modernist scenario, the rebellion against being." And the denial of
being is a false path toward the sacred.
This rebellion, this rejection of ontology, naturally
shakes the foundations of epistemology, and renders it finally impossible.
This is the modernist crisis, and it cannot be confronted, let alone
resolved, on the basis of the self-flattering delusion that we have
entered a radically new age.
II. The Flight
It seems natural to deduce that modern intellectuals
actually desire to discover emptiness—the Void—underlying
everything. The really interesting question becomes: Why? Weaver is
characteristically cogent on this crucial point:
We must not overlook the fact that in the vocabulary
of modernism, "pious" is a term of reproach or ridicule… [M]odernism
encourages the exact opposite of this, which is rebellious-ness; and
rebellion, as the legend of the Fall tells us, comes from pride. Pride
and impatience, these are the ingredients of that contumely which denies
substance because substance stands in the way. 12
In the way of what? Presumably in the way of achieving
total freedom from restraint of any sort, the freedom which is the goal of
Nietzsche’s philosophy, the freedom which is already the motivating
force behind the suicide of Kirilov in Dostoyevsky’s The Possessed (1871,
before Nietzsche's major works had been published). This is precisely the
"rebellion against being" of which Molnar speaks, equivalent in
turn to Max Picard’s "flight from God".
In fact, even earlier, in the 18th century, Dr. Johnson
had identified the sin of pride (or vanity) as the motive behind
scepticism. In 1763, he was recorded by Boswell as holding forth in these
terms:
Hume, and other sceptical innovators, are vain men,
and will gratify themselves at any expense. Truth will not afford
sufficient food to their vanity; so they have betaken themselves to
errour. Truth, Sir, is a cow which will yield such people no more milk,
and so they are gone to milk the bull. If I could have allowed myself to
gratify my vanity at the expense of truth, what fame might I have
acquired. Every thing which Hume has advanced against Christianity had
passed through my mind long before he wrote. 13
Dostoyevsky and Johnson may be exposing the pride or
vanity which underpins and drives what might be called the Faustian urge,
issuing in turn in the gnosticism which Voegelin has so insightfully
identified as the core of much modern thought: a desire to repudiate common
knowledge, and to assert a hidden, secret knowledge accessible only to
cognoscenti. That common knowledge may actually be true is irrelevant.
Intellectual pride trumps the disinterested search for truth; what is
actually being sought now is the Philosopher’s Stone.
But if intellectual pride be the underlying motive, the
actual process of moving towards ontological nihilism has manifested
itself in a most obscure, labyrinthine fashion. On the surface, it has
appeared that the Enlightenment represented an opening to being, a
careful study of the world, unimpeded by "superstition". But as
Stanley Jaki has pointed out,
Locke... declared the mind a tabula rasa and
postulated the radical priority of sensations. Anyone aware of the
difference between sensations felt by the subject and things, or
objects, that give rise to sensations, will easily realize that Locke’s
starting point was merely a dialectical rewording of the Cartesian
stance. The reasoning of Locke could provide no more assurance about the
existence of things supposedly activating the senses acting on the mind
than could the system of Descartes make appear plausible the mind’s
grasp of sensations, let alone of things. 14
Here we discern an anticipation of Kant’s crucial
distinction between noumenon and phenomenon. As Jaki puts it, by
"phenomena" Kant "meant sensory impressions. The absolute
priority of mind over things, this starting point of Descartes, received
thereby its most radical form, but no less complete was now the
impossibility of knowing things or noumena."
Arguing more elaborately, but reaching a parallel
conclusion, Emmet Kennedy, at a recent symposium on "The
Enlightenment and Postmodernism" held at the University of Göteborg,
Sweden, noted that "the Scientific Revolution focussed more and more
on properties, operations and relations [rather] than essences. Thus Locke
writes in Bk. III: ‘Our faculties carry us no further toward the
knowledge and distinction of substances, than a collection of those
sensible ideas which we observe in them….’ This is not to say that
Locke dissolves substances into properties. He believes in substances, but
does not believe we can know them in themselves. All we know of them is
how they affect us." 15
As Kennedy goes on to show, "the common opinion of
[British] Empiricism" is wrong in failing to discern that, like
Cartesian dualism or Kantian Idealism, epistemologically it too represents
a move within, to the perceiving subject. All three major
philosophical streams, therefore, are flowing towards ultimate
subjectivism in epistemology and radical uncertainty as to the reality of
the external world, and this explains the extremely bizarre development
explored by Jaki—that starting with Niels Bohr (1885-1962), many of our
leading scientists, although brilliant at physics, have become
quite incompetent at metaphysics (or have failed to see the point
of demarcation between the two):
The dominating trend of the philosophical
interpretation of modern science was set by Bohr.… The hallmark of
[his] pragmatism was the resolute avoidance of any question about
reality as such. That in atomic physics the wave and particle aspects
were equally useful... was certainly true. But was this a justification
for Bohr’s warnings against questions concerning reality and what is
always implied by it, causality? 16
Similarly, Jaki analyzes a crucial epistemological
error in the interpretation of Heisenberg’s "Uncertainty
Principle":
it was true, as first recognized by Heisenberg, that
the combination of quanta and wave functions make impossible in
principle the simultaneous measurement with perfect accuracy of pairs of
canonical conjugates [such as] momentum and position, energy and time. But
was it philosophical to argue that what could not be measured exactly
could not exist and take place exactly? [emphasis added]
In other words, measurement—an aspect of
epistemology--has been confused with being, or ontology.
The upshot of this move for modern man has been a
radical distrust, not merely of God’s existence—long since rejected by
bien pensant intellectuals—but of the physical world’s
existence! In the absence of any Aristotelian conception of formal or
final cause, the discovery that the physical world appears to be
constituted of infinitesimal particles or even "waves" of
energy, combined with the growing subjectivism of mainstream philosophy
since the 17th century, puts modern man in the position of a visitor to an
art gallery who approaches a painting from afar. At first, he sees only a
distant blur. Drawing closer and reaching middle distance, he sees what
the artist intended him to see: a landscape, perhaps, with an old woman
walking along a canal lined with autumnal trees, beneath a sky of
cloud-fragments hovering in pale blue air. But then our gallery visitor
becomes curious; he draws still closer to the painting, even pressing his
nose against its very surface. Now all he sees are splotches of color,
daubs of brush-stroked paint. Still not satisfied, however, that he has
gotten to the "real" painting, he removes it from the wall and
places it on the floor, and begins to inspect it through a portable
electron microscope he has brought along for this purpose. Ah, at last!
Here is the real painting! Nothing but particles and energy waves,
in fact, nothing at all, the Void. The Buddhist claim that all phenomena
are empty must be true.
But actually the conclusion reached by the viewer of
the painting is wrong. He saw the true painting when he was standing at
middle distance. His problem is an epistemological one: he lacks any
significant conception of form or cause. Aristotle might have reminded him
that
one thing cannot be made out of something else ad
infinitum; as, for example, flesh out of earth, earth out of air,
air out of fire, and so on without ever stopping.… Nor... can there be
an infinite process downward from a start in something higher; as if,
for instance, water were made from fire, earth from water and so forever
something new being produced…. [T]he final cause is an end and the
sort of end that exists not for the sake of something else but all other
things exist for it. So, if there is a final cause of this kind, the
process of change and becoming will not be infinite. 17
Thus the particles and "quanta" are not
the essence of the painting. It does not exist for the sake of them;
they exist for the sake of it. This is why antiquity could
contemplate with serenity the idea that everything is made up of
particles, already articulated by Democritus before Aristotle, and later
poetically formulated by Lucretius. Aristotle himself here is not denying
that things may be constituted of basic elements, merely that there cannot
be an infinite regression, as well, of course, as maintaining that the
constituent elements do not constitute the essence of the substance. He
holds, as is well known, that a full account of a thing requires attention
to four causes of the thing—the material, formal, efficient, and
final; and to the four aspects of its substance, the essence, the
universal, the genus, and the substratum.
At what point, then, were these aspects rejected,
leaving us unprepared to account fully for being? This is a question which
can be, and has been, argued endlessly. Aristotle himself calls attention
to "those who insist on the infinite series [of elements constituting
matter, who] do not realize that they are destroying the nature of the
good. No man would start to do anything, if he did not expect to reach
some end. Nor would there be any intelligence in the universe…." 18
Would these have been the Sophists, ancient forerunners of Johnson’s
vain men, or Richard Weaver’s modern cravers of "orgiastic
disorder"? Could it be that the unmistakable modern fascination with
the Neo-Heraclitan view that "all is change" is a recurrence of
this ancient, perennial willfulness, based on the false premise that if
nothing is fixed, we are limitlessly free? Is "destroying the nature
of the good" precisely the point?
Many would prefer to see the watershed as being the
Enlightenment, as implied by Kennedy and Jaki. Or should we be schooled by
Weaver’s famous argument that it was the triumph of Nominalism over
Realism in the 14th century? The key figure here was, of course, William
of Ockham (before 1300-c.1349-50), who maintained (in the paraphrase of
Gilson), that "the Ideas are ideas of individuals, not of species,
because only singulars are producible outside of the mind…. [T]here are
no Ideas of genera, differences nor of any other universals. Manifestly,
since an infinity of things are producible by God, he has an infinity of
Ideas of this infinity of singulars." 19
Now Ockham, of course, fully believed in the reality
both of God and of the world. But, as far as the world is concerned, his
philosophical move effectively leaves us with only the
"singulars", or individual entities. From this point on,
categories of any sort will inevitably appear to be arbitrary constructs,
rather than innate properties of being, and it may well be that the
doubting even of the individual entities, as in Bishop Berkeley, will flow
naturally from this shift. Thus with Nominalism one is well on the way
toward onto-logical—and therefore epistemological—diminution.
3. The Stone
If one concludes that Nominalism in all its guises and
aspects has generally supported a tendency toward relativism and nihilism,
unfolding in the course of centuries and becoming, certainly after the
Enlightenment, the mainstream of modern philosophy, the question arises:
might it be that the opponent of Nominalism—Realism—would in fact have
been a wiser option? No one states this case more lucidly than Étienne
Gilson (1884-1978), writing in 1937:
The most tempting of all the false first principles
is: that thought, not being, is involved in all my
representations. Here lies the initial option between idealism and
realism, which will settle once and for all the future course of our
philosophy, and make it a failure or a success.… Man is not a mind
that thinks, but a being who knows other beings as true, who loves them
as good, and who enjoys them as beautiful.… [S]ince being is the
first principle of all human knowledge, it is a fortiori the first
principle of all metaphysics. [Gilson’s emphasis] 20
Gilson speaks here as himself a leading modern advocate
of Realist metaphysics; Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), in his book on
Aquinas, goes even further and claims that we are compelled "in the
last analysis to choose between the two terms of this alternative:
integral realism in the sense of Saint Thomas [Aquinas], or pure
irrationality." 21
Those of us who agree that Gilson and Maritain are
correct, and that we require nothing less than a full-scale rehabilitation
of Realist metaphysics in our time, will want to reexamine the whole
history of modern philosophy for intellectual and literary ancestors. Dr.
Johnson, for example, keeps Realism alive in the 18th century, and
demonstrates to all of us the true starting point of good metaphysics in
one of the most famous episodes recorded in Boswell's Life, an
event dating from 1763:
After we came out of the church, we stood talking for
some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the
non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely
ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not
true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity
with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against
a large stone, till he rebounded from it,--"I refute it thus."
This was a stout exemplification of the first truths... without
admitting which, we can no more argue in metaphysics than we can argue
in mathematicks without axioms. 22
When Spinoza said, "The Scholastics start from
things, Descartes from thought," 23 he was correctly identifying with
his words the same starting point for Realist metaphysics that Johnson
identifies with his foot: the real objects of the physical world. Boswell
himself too deserves credit for noting, possibly for the first time in
history, the extraordinary dilemma of nearly all modern intellectuals who
in fact act as if they were Realists—and perhaps actually are
Realists by intuition—but feel disarmed from any advocacy for Realism by
the apparent impossibility of refuting Nominalist-Idealist arguments.
(Beneath even this, of course, may further lie an actual craving for the
Void, an aspect that will become more apparent in the course of later
centuries.)
Thomas Love Peacock, as we have seen, at least attempts
to use the weapons, if not of actual metaphysical argumentation, then at
least of satiric humor, to parody views which, like Johnson, he finds
absurd. Johnson himself had already applied humor to the case when, in
1780, "being in company with a gentleman who thought fit to maintain
Dr. Berkeley’s ingenious philosophy, that nothing exists but as
perceived by some mind; when the gentleman was going away, Johnson said to
him, ‘Pray, Sir, don’t leave us; for we may perhaps forget to think of
you, and then you will cease to exist.’" 24 Peacock’s Mr. Flosky,
whom we have already met and seen to be based on Coleridge conflated with
Kant, maintains that
There is a secret in all this, which I will elucidate
with a dusky remark. According to Berkeley, the esse of things is
percipi. They exist as they are perceived. But, leaving for the
present, as far as relates to the material world, the materialists,
hyloists [who believe matter to be God], and antihyloists, to settle
this point among them, which is indeed a subtle question, raised among
those out o’ their wits, and those i’ the wrong: for only we
transcendentalists are in the right: we may very safely assert that the esse
of happiness is percipi. It exists as it is perceived...
But after continuing in the same vein for a while
longer, "Mr. Flosky suddenly stopped: he found himself
unintentionally trespassing within the limits of common sense." 25
Thus, going further than Boswell, Peacock recognizes
that even the actual thinkers who maintain epistemological pessimism as
regards "the material world" cannot help but betray their own
professed philosophy at times, even in the process of argumentation. It
may well be "common sense" that the mind can create its
own happiness or unhappiness, which are indeed at least in part states of
mind; but the leap to asserting the irreality of the physical world is a
false one. Flosky, good modern philosopher that he is, would not be caught
dead articulating mere "common sense"; like the true Gnostic, he
will only uphold doctrines whose arcane truth is inaccessible to the
"common" folk. His counterpart, Mr. Skionar, also a parody of
Coleridge/Kant, in Peacock’s later Crotchet Castle (1831),
defines "transcendentalism" as "The philosophy of
intuition, the development of universal conviction; truths which are
inherent in the organization of the mind, which cannot be obliterated,
though they may be obscured, by superstitious prejudice on the one hand,
and by the Aristotelian logic on the other." 26 Peacock, evidently an
adherent of the "common sense" which, as Maritain argues, is
entirely consistent with Thomist metaphysics ("The fundamental
rectitude of common sense... is wounded by these errors [of agnosticism,
naturalism, and ‘angelism’]")27—although Peacock himself may not
have realized this—sees the Transcendentalist-Idealists, inheritors of
the Nominalist fallacy, as laying claim to some mysterious higher truth
which stands at odds with "superstition" (i.e., undoubtedly the
dogma of the Church) on the one hand, and "Aristotelian logic"
on the other; they apparently yearn for some sort of non-dogmatic
spirituality bearing no discernable relationship to the world around us
but rather grounded in the mind. Peacock has, in fact, intuited avant
la lettre the answer to the remarkable paradox of the co-existence in
modern thought of radical subjectivism and a monistic yearning for
undifferentiated wholeness.
It is only later in the 19th century, however, that we
witness the first heroic attempt to define an optimistic, Realist
epistemology for the modern age in the form of what might be described as
an epistemological or, better, metaphysical apologia, John Henry
Newman’s An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, published in
1870. 28
Newman starts from the point already expressed in the
negative by Boswell: "[W]e are satisfied [Berkeley’s] doctrine is
not true," even though we can find no way to refute it logically.
Newman puts the case in the positive sense when he writes, "Assent on
reasonings not demonstrative is too widely recognized an act to be
irrational, unless man's nature is irrational… nor has any philosophical
theory the power to force on us a rule which will not work for a
day." 29 He notes that even Locke, one of the architects of
Enlightenment thought, acknowledged that "most of the propositions we
think, reason, discourse, nay, act upon, are such as we cannot have
undoubted knowledge of their truth; yet some of them border so near upon
certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them, but assent
to them as firmly, and act according to that assent as
resolutely as if they were infallibly demonstrated." Thus,
Newman states, Locke "affirms and sanctions the very paradox to which
I am committed myself."30 He explicitly suggests that even contemporary
Nominalist philosophers "have themselves as little misgiving about
the truths which they pretend to weigh out and measure, as their
unsophisticated neighbors; but they think it a duty to remind us, that
since the full etiquette of logical requirements has not been satisfied,
we must believe those truths at our peril."31
Here, then, is a full description of one of the key
causes of the modern triumph of Nominalism: it is not that our
philosophers actually doubt the reality of the world, but rather that they
feel duty-bound as sophisticated thinkers to withhold assertion of any
truth that cannot be absolutely proved, an attitude inherited apparently
from Kant, Descartes, and ultimately the ancient Sophists. It is this that
prevents our philosophers from formally asserting as epistemological
axioms what they and we are in fact certain to be the case: to use
just a few of Newman’s excellent examples, "that there are really
existing cities on definite sites, which go by the names of London, Paris,
Florence and Madrid," "that Great Britain is an island,"
which we are certain of even though we personally have never seen it as a
whole (one might update this example by citing a contemporary one—that
men have landed on the moon, which we accept absolutely even though we
were not personal eye witnesses to the event); and that certain
propositions are equally false, as "that we had no parents,"
something we reject out of hand "though we have no memory of our
birth; that we shall never depart this life," which we equally deny
"though we can have no experience of the future." 32 In the case of
a full-blown Nominalist such as Bishop Berkeley, of course, universal
scepticism, contradicting our actual deep certainty, moves beyond Ockham
and extends to the point of doubting the reality of objects (Ockham’s
"singulars") that we do in fact directly sense.
And so emerges the single most weird and ironic aspect
of modern intellectual life: the things of which we are in fact most
certain cannot be posited as the starting points of our epistemology!
We are doomed by the prevailing Nominalist orthodoxy to express doubt
about that which is in fact our most solid certainty!
Newman attempts to correct this fallacy by boldly
stating that "certitude is a natural and normal state of mind, and
not... one of its extravagances or infirmities." In attempting to
characterize what he calls "the principle of concrete reasoning"
which makes it possible for us to possess such certitude, he draws a
"parallel to the method of proof which is the foundation of modern
mathematical science":
We know that a regular polygon, inscribed in a
circle, its sides being continually diminished, tends to become that
circle, as its limit; but it vanishes before it has coincided with the
circle, so that its tendency to be the circle, though ever nearer
fulfillment, never in fact gets beyond a tendency. In like manner, the
conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen and predicted
rather than actually attained.
Newman summarizes or epitomizes the case in one of his
most memorable bons mots: "Proof is the limit of converging
possibilities." 33
Newman posits, as the faculty in the human mind which
renders possible this kind of reasoning, the "Illiative Sense, or
right judgment in ratiocination," a "faculty [which sometimes]
is nothing short of genius. Such seems to have been Newton’s perception
of truths mathematical and physical, though proof was absent." 34 (Note,
by the way, how Newman correctly uses the noun "perception" here
to mean the act of becoming aware of something which is in fact
objectively real, as opposed to the increasingly common subjectivist use
of the word today, under the influence of Nominalist/ Idealist relativism,
to mean little more than "opinion" or "view of".)
In speaking of an "Illiative Sense", Newman
would seem to be rehabilitating the ancient concept of a "higher
reason", a faculty which renders man capable of the direct, true
perception of things. Now, in answer to the question, "Whether the
Higher and Lower Reason are Distinct Powers?" Aquinas responds,
"Augustine says (De Trin. xii.4) that the higher and lower
reason are only distinct by their functions. Therefore they are not
two powers." 35 But even distinguishing by function significantly
expands the conception of human reason, derived from Aristotle, by
comparison with the Enlightenment conception that now prevails. By
"lower reason", Aquinas apparently means the ability to draw
logical conclusions from premises: "through one thing understood,
other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions,
and from first principles, conclusions…. [T]hus it [the human intellect]
necessarily compares one thing with another by composition and division;
and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the
process of reasoning."36 This, of course, is the entirety of
what the faculty of reason is essentially understood to do in the
Enlightenment and after. But Aquinas recognizes a higher function in
reason, by which "the human soul knows all things in the eternal
types, since by participation of these types we know all things. For the
intellectual light itself which is in us is nothing else than a
participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the
eternal types... By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are
made known to us."37
Without dividing human reason into discrete powers,
Aquinas ironically recognizes in it a range far greater than that defined
by the so-called "Age of Reason", a range that extends to the
height of actual "participation" in likeness to the mind of God,
the "uncreated light".
Aquinas’s most important statement on epistemology,
and therefore the essential foundation for any restructuring of Realist
metaphysics as it pertains to our knowledge of this world, is contained in
Pt.1, Q.84 Art. 6, "Whether Intellectual Knowledge is Derived from
Sensible Things?" 38 The short answer is, "Yes," and Spinoza
was therefore absolutely correct in stating that "the Scholastics
start from things." In this brilliant and crucially important
Article, Aquinas recognizes what might be described as an epistemological
spectrum from pure materialism to pure idealism. At the materialist end
lies Democritus, who "held that knowledge is caused by a discharge
of images," according to Aristotle as quoted by Aquinas, who goes
on to specify that "Democritus maintained that every operation is by
way of a discharge of atoms." Here we have an epistemology with which
latter-day materialists—Hume, Marx, or even Bohr (if we add
"quanta" to the atoms of Democritus)—would be quite
comfortable. At the other end of the spectrum lies Plato, who "held
that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things
affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms [i.e., the
Ideas] being participated by the intellect." Here is the seed of an
Idealist epistemology that might one day sprout into the philosophy of a
Descartes, a Kant, or a Croce.
But Aristotle, says Aquinas, "chose a middle
course". He agreed with Plato that intellect is immaterial, and must
be differentiated from "sense", "But he held that the sense
has not its proper operation without the co-operation of the body; so that
to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite [of
soul-and-body]." And so Aristotle agreed with Democritus that
"the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impressions
of the sensible on the sense... by some kind of operation." This
leads in turn to the stage at which the "active intellect"
"causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually
intelligible, by a process of abstraction." Thus "sensible
knowledge" is the "material cause" of intellectual
knowledge, but participation in the eternal types is necessary to abstract
from our knowledge of singulars. "Knowledge of the singular and
individual is prior, as regards us [i.e., our personal experience of the
world in space and time], to the knowledge of the universal; as sensible
knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and
intellect [i.e., as faculties or powers] the knowledge of the more common
precedes the knowledge of the less common." 39
This is the "moderate Realism" of Aquinas,
the keystone of the epistemological arch. It is the insight that inspired
G.K. Chesterton, in his wonderful book on Aquinas (1933), to capture
metaphorically Aquinas's entire anthropology:
for him [i.e., Aquinas] the point is always that Man
is not a balloon going up into the sky, nor a mole burrowing merely in
the earth; but rather a thing like a tree, whose roots are fed from the
earth, while its highest branches seem to rise almost to the stars. 40
4. "The Being"
The Realist metaphysician is thus able to assert the
reality of the world and the essential accuracy of our perception of it,
and therefore to uphold with confidence the use of our reason in worldly
matters. But the Realist does not limit reason to the world. He recognizes
as well "The use of it in Divine matters," the subtitle
of a poem called "Reason" by the "metaphysical" poet,
Abraham Cowley (1618-67; this use of the term "metaphysical" was
initiated by Dr. Johnson in his famous biography of Cowley). The final
stanza of this poem presents a view of reason entirely consistent with
that of Aquinas:
Though Reason cannot through Faiths
Myst’eries see,
It sees that There and such they be;
Leads to Heav’ens Door, and there does
humbly keep,
And there through Chinks and Key-holes
peep.
Though it, like Moses, by a sad command
Must not come in to th’ Holy Land,
Yet thither it infallibly does Guid,
And from afar ‘tis all Descry’d. 41
Cowley’s statement that Reason "leads to Heav’ens
Door" neatly captures what for centuries was the mainstream view
of the epistemological sequence leading from Creation to Creator, which
would eventually come to be developed into the "argument from
design." The articulation of this concept may be traced back to the
thirteenth chapter of Wisdom, 42 one of the "apocrypha"
written, according to Robert H. Pfeiffer, "during the last two
centuries before the Christian era,"43 and accepted as canonical by
both the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church (formalized at the
Council of Trent). The primary purpose of Ch. XIII is to argue the
foolishness of idolaters, those who, as St. Paul will put it,
"worship and serve the creature more than the Creator" (Rom.
1.25), or, even worse, worship dead images of wood or stone:
1. Surely vain are all men by nature, who are
ignorant of God, and could not out of the good things that are seen know
him that is: neither by considering the works did they acknowledge the
workmaster;
2. But deemed either fire, or wind, or the swift air,
or the circle of the stars, or the violent water, or the lights of
heaven, to be the gods which govern the world...
4. But if they were astonished at their power and
virtue, let them understand by them how much mightier he is that made
them.
5. For by the greatness and beauty of the creatures
proportionally the maker of them is seen.
Here is the "argument from design" in
embryonic form (and if for "fire" or "wind" one were
to substitute "quarks" and "quanta", one might even
see in the idolators the forerunners of certain modern physicists, at
least when they infringe upon properly metaphysical territory). The
Christian scriptural reformulation of this Jewish idea is found in Romans,
1.20: "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even
his eternal power and Godhead."
The Church Fathers, taking their cue from such
passages, developed this epistemological stance to a point little short of
its full articulation in Aquinas. To take only one example, St. Gregory of
Nazianzus (329-89) anticipates Aquinas’s view of human reason as a
"likeness" or "image" (he actually uses the word
"icon") of the divine mind, and thus capable of directly
perceiving truth. In one of his superb theological poems, "An Evening
Prayer", he writes (in the translation of John McGuckin),
You enlightened the mind of man
with reason and with wisdom
and so placed an ikon here below
of the brightness that is above. . . 44
It is man’s "rational nature" that
"shall sing out/that he [God] is the great king, the good
father," according to Gregory’s first "Hymn". 45
At the same time, like Aquinas, Gregory fully
recognizes the limits of reason; as Cowley will put it, "by a sad
command" reason must "humbly keep" at heaven’s door, it
"must not come in to th’ Holy Land." It is only in the
world to come that the "sad command" will be rescinded, and the
blessed will be able to see the full truth with perfect clarity for the
first time. Thus Gregory prays, in his great autobiographical poem,
"Concerning His Own Affairs" (in the prose translation of Denis
Molaise Meehan),
When released from this life and this impeded vision…
I greatly long to have a purer vision of the stable things. Then, not as
formerly, they will be unadulterated by association with obscure images
which can set the vision of the keenest mind astray. With the eye of a
mind made pure I shall gaze upon truth itself. But all that is still to
be.… 46
Gregory’s most extensive presentation of what might
be termed his epistemological standpoint is in his important "Second
Theological Oration". 47 Arthur James Mason summarizes the argument of
this work as follows:
the nature of God is beyond the power of man to
understand. We may assuredly know by the study of the world around us
that God is, but we cannot find out what He is. We can arrive at
negative truths concerning Him, that He is incorporeal and the like, but
not at any adequate positive conception.… 48
In his running paraphrase of the Greek text, Mason
epitomizes the full elaboration of Gregory’s argument:
The works of God are beyond our present
comprehension, much more Himself; we can only affirm for certain that He
exists…. Of His existence the order of nature assures us. We are
forced to think of a Creator when we look upon Creation, as the sight of
a lyre makes us think of the lyre-maker…. It is... very
unreasonable not to accept the natural proofs of God’s existence, and
in following them we are compelled to form certain great outlines of a
conception of God (e.g., creative power, rational method, etc.), which
we cannot doubt to be correct…. To begin with, God cannot be
corporeal: which would involve being dissoluble.… We thus reach a
negative truth about God... Intelligence "enters in with the
things" [ μετά
τών
πραγμάτων
είσέρχεται]
around us, because we learn by them…. [I]t [intelligence] is "in
partnership with sense," though capable of withdrawing itself from
the senses.49
It should be apparent from all this how close Gregory
already is to the position of Aquinas. Particularly intriguing, in the
writings of this theologian, is the idea that our intelligence (or reason)
actually "enters in with the things" of the world, as clear a
demonstration as one could wish of the intimate connection in Realist
metaphysics between the assertion of access to knowledge of the objective world—hence
the possibility of science—and access— limited for now, to be vastly
expanded after the eschaton—to knowledge of God.
When Aquinas answers "yes" to the question,
"Whether It Can Be Demonstrated that God Exists?" he grounds
himself at the outset in scripture:
The Apostle says: The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom.
i.20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be
demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
must know of anything is, whether it exists. 50
The argument from design is formally presented by
Aquinas as the last of the five ways in which "the existence of God
can be proved":
We see that things which lack intelligence, such as
natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting
always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best
results. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do
they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move
towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with
knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the
archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural
things are directed to their end; and this being we call God. 51
Epistemologically, then, "by way of discovery, we
come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal." 52
But this knowledge—and here Aquinas is again consistent with Gregory—must
remain imperfect in this world. In tackling directly the question,
"Whether Our Intellect Can Understand Immaterial Substances through
Its Knowledge of Material Things?" Aquinas responds,
From material things we can rise to some kind of
knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof….
Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation…. [I]mmaterial
substances [cannot be] known by us in such a way as to make us know
their quiddity; but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of
negation and by their relation to material things…. Hence through the
likeness derived from material things we can know something positive
concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though not
according to the specific nature. . . 53
In the case of God Himself, however, rational nature
alone can reach only negative knowledge by "remotion" (or
apophatic theology 54); "To see the essence of God is possible to the
created intellect by grace, and not by nature," and this only after
having become "separated from this mortal life."55
To encounter a second and opposite mode of
epistemological access to knowledge of God, it is necessary to make the
leap from the realm of philosophical metaphysics to that of pure theology.
This, of course, is God’s revelation of Himself to man. A key passage,
one which, as Gilson puts it, "runs through the whole history of
Christian thought," 56 is Exodus 3.14, in which God, in response to
Moses’s question as to the name of the one who is sending him to the
children of Israel in Egypt, reveals His name to Moses: "And God said
unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the
children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you." The Greek of the
Septuagint version, as translated by Sir Lancelot Charles Brenton, reads,
And God spoke to Moses saying, I am THE BEING
[ό ΄Ών]; and he said, Thus
shall ye say to the children of Israel, THE BEING has sent me to you.57
When Pseudo-Dionysius, writing in the 5th or 6th
century, explicates "The Divine Names" of God, in contemplating
this name, he writes,
The God who "is" [Ex. 3.14] transcends
everything by virtue of his power. He is the substantive Cause and maker
of being, subsistence, of existence, of substance, and of nature. He is
the Source and the measure of the ages. He is the reality beneath time
and the eternity behind being…. 58
In some of his phrasing, Pseudo-Dionysius comes very
close indeed to sounding more Neo-Platonic, in the mode of Plotinus
(205-70), than Christian, a fact which has led to elaborate discussions of
his orthodoxy. Gilson brilliantly distinguishes the identification
of the One (i.e., God) with Being in Augustine—and Christian thought in
general—from the subordination of being to an abstract One, as in
Plotinus, 59 and Pseudo-Dionysius in this passage certainly seems to imply
that God transcends being itself. But this is probably best interpreted as
the enthusiasm of the mystic, rather than a calculated position taken by a
systematic theologian; generally speaking, Pseudo-Dionysius succeeds in
establishing on the basis of Ex. 3.14 that God is the ground of being or
rather Being itself.
Aquinas, more theologically sound, considers "HE
WHO IS" to be "the most proper name of God",
For it [this name] does not signify form, but simply
existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence
itself, which can be said of no other, it is clear that among other
names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated
by its form,
and also because,
it signifies present [as opposed to past or future]
existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence
knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v). 60
Thus in Christianity, as in Judaism, the ultimate
ground of being turns out to be, not a philosopher’s abstraction, no
matter how exquisitely refined or exalted, but a supreme Person, HE WHO
IS, and through whom all things have their contingent being. Here, then,
is the true ontological ground of Realist metaphysics: God Himself.
5. The Icon
When the risen Christ appeared before the sceptic
Thomas—a "postmodernist", perhaps, in "premodernist"
times—and allowed the doubter to place his fingers in His wound, upon
Thomas’s finally exclaiming, "My Lord and my God," "Jesus
saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed;
blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed" (John
20.27-29). Raising the question of the relationship between sight (direct
sense perception) and belief for modern man, Newman writes, "Can I
believe as if I saw? Since such a high assent requires a present
experience or memory of the fact, at first sight it would seem as if the
answer must be in the negative; for... no one in this life can see
God" (John 1.18). 61
Here we approach a question which lies beyond the scope
of this article, namely the relationship between reason, grounded in
direct perception of reality in Realist metaphysics, as we have seen, and
faith. The general tendency in our time, certainly among the public at
large, is to assume a radical gulf separating the two, and to conclude
that all matters pertaining to God rest on pure faith. But if our subject
is epistemology—i.e., our means of knowing what we know, not only about
the physical world, but about anything—it behooves us to call
attention to the fact that in the history of Christian thought there have
been and there still are those who claim that we can at least see an image
(Greek eikôn, or "icon") representing God as he appeared
on earth in the person of Jesus Christ, and those who have gone further to
claim that some are able to see with transmuted sight God's uncreated
divine light, as He displayed it on the occasion of the Transfiguration.
These are precisely epistemological claims in the broad sense that we are
using that term here, because they are claims of access through the senses
to partial knowledge of God.
Historically, an enormous controversy about this matter
erupted in Byzantium between the so-called Iconoclasts—who opposed icons
and had them removed from the churches—and Iconodules, whose arguments
in favor of icons eventually prevailed, being declared orthodox at the
seventh Ecumenical Council at Nicaea in 787. The Council was deeply
influenced by the brilliant arguments in favor of icons developed by the
great St. John of Damascus (?675-749), ideas which were later further
elaborated by St. Theodore the Studite (759-826). Together, these men
wrote a crucially important chapter in the history of Realist
epistemology, by refining the description of how we can perceive the
intersection or interpenetration of the immaterial and material.
St. John of Damascus, later to become one of Aquinas’s
favorite theologians, eloquently pleads for the return of the icons to the
churches:
If you say that only intellectual worship is worthy
of God, then take away all corporeal things: lights, the fragrance of
incense, prayer made with the voice. Do away with the divine mysteries
which are fulfilled through matter: bread, wine, the oil of chrism, the
sign of the cross. All these things are matter…. Matter is filled with
divine grace through prayer addressed to those portrayed in images….
The apostles saw the Lord with bodily eyes; others saw the apostles, and
others the martyrs. I too desire to see them both spiritually and
physically and receive the remedy by which the ills of both soul and
body (for I am composed of both) may be healed. 62
St. John, specifically citing two texts already
examined here—Gregory’s "Second Theological Oration" and
Rom. 1.20—argues how it is possible to "see... both spiritually and
physically":
[V]isible things are corporeal models which provide a
vague understanding of intangible things…. Anyone would say that our
inability immediately to direct our thoughts to contemplation of higher
things makes it necessary that familiar everyday media be utilized to
give suitable form to what is formless, and make visible what cannot be
depicted, so that we are able to construct understandable analogies. If,
therefore, the Word of God, in providing for our every need, always
presents to us what is intangible by clothing it with form, does it not
accomplish this by making an image using what is common to nature and so
brings within our reach that for which we long but are unable to see? A
certain perception takes place in the brain, prompted by the bodily
senses, which is then transmitted to the faculties of discernment, and
adds to the treasury of knowledge something that was not there before.
The eloquent Gregory says that the mind which is determined to ignore
corporeal things will find itself weakened and frustrated [a reference
to Th. Or. 2]. Since the creation of the world the invisible
things of God are clearly seen [Rom. 1.20] by means of images. We see
images in the creation which, although they are only dim lights, still
remind us of God. For instance, when we speak of the holy and eternal
Trinity, we use the images of the sun, light, and burning rays…. 63
Similarly,
[W]e make images of every form we see, and our
apprehension of these forms is a kind of sight. If we sometimes
understand forms by using our minds, but other times from what we see,
then it is through these two ways that we are brought to understanding.
It is the same with the other senses: after we have smelled or tasted,
or touched, we combine our experience with reason, and thus come to
knowledge. 64
St. John identifies and analyzes no less than six types
of images, of which the first is the "natural image", and states
that "the Son of the Father is the first natural and precisely
similar image of the invisible God, for He reveals the Father in His own
person…. He is the image of the invisible God [Col. 1.15]…." 65
The commandment, "Thou shalt not make thee any
graven image" (Deut. 5.8), John plausibly takes as a prohibition
against making images of false gods or natural bodies such as the sun for
the purpose of idolatrous worship (already the concern, as we have seen,
of Wisdom 13). He points out that God Himself commands that the
tabernacle be made with "two cherubim of gold" which "shall
stretch forth their wings on high... and their faces shall look one to
another... cherubim of cunning work" (Ex. 25.18, 20; 26.1). 66 These are
certainly not the words of a God utterly opposed to the making of
legitimate images of actual heavenly beings. St. John therefore concludes
that because in Christ God did assume flesh and become man, the act of
depicting Christ, at least—the Father remaining beyond the reach of such
depiction—in paint, gold-leaf and wood replicates the actual
Incarnation, the mysterious taking on of matter by spirit.67
To the later objection that the image "may not
have the same form as the prototype because of insufficient artistic skill
[i.e., an objection on the grounds of insufficient "realism" in
the conventional sense of the word]," St. Theodore the Studite will
respond that "veneration is given to the image not insofar as it
falls short of similarity, but insofar as it resembles its prototype. In
this degree the image has the same form as the prototype; and the objects
of veneration are not two, but one and the same, the prototype in the
image." 68 Here St. Theodore uses the term "form" in an
essentially Aristotelian manner, centuries before Aquinas. He displays the
characteristic epistemological optimism of the true metaphysical Realist
(the epistemological cup is half full, not half empty), and he extends
this insight by maintaining that "the same form is in all the
representations though they are made with different materials."69 That
form "in the image" is "Christ plainly visible as its
prototype."70 Hence the worshipper viewing the icon and praying as he
does so is in fact seeing and worshipping the very image of God, as
the apostles saw His image in the Person of the living God-man, Christ
[cf. John 14.8-9].
It is therefore entirely appropriate that,
circum-scribed by the halo of many Byzantine icons of Christ, either as
child or as man, is a cross inscribed with the very words of the name
revealed to Moses by the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob: ό
΄Ών , "The Being."
It is because Eastern Orthodox Christianity inherited
this theological tradition that icons become such important windows
affording through the medium of matter a glimpse of the immaterial world,
heavenly doors through which we are able not merely to "peep"
(as in Cowley’s poem) but to gaze upon the visage of the divine, as if
"endowed with life”.
This phrase (Greek 'έmyucoV, lit. "ensouled")
is in fact used by the 11th century Byzantine writer, Michael Psellos, in
his extraordinary ecphrastic homily on a pictorial representation of the
Crucifixion.71 Psellos knows that his auditors have not (in the translation
of Elizabeth A. Fisher) "altogether risen above the body, but you
long to gaze upon him [Christ] with your very eyes and to see, if
possible, Christ himself hanging naked upon the tree…." Psellos
promises to satisfy this yearning by showing his auditors the actual
scene, in the form of a painting. But the painting "seems to be the
product not of art but of nature," or rather of a collaboration
between the craftsman and God Himself:
God inspires with his grace not only creatures but
also images which lack life…. These likenesses seem to be the product
of the human hand, but God actually fashions them without our knowing
it... and presents them in visible form by using the hand of the
craftsman as his vehicle for the picture. 72
Thus, "The whole image seems to be endowed with
life…. [T]he dead body [of Christ] in the picture... will appear endowed
with life…. [L]ife exists in the image from two sources, both from
artistic skill, which has produced a perfect replica, and also from grace.…" 73
The icon thus becomes a means of nothing less than
Revelation, providing access to knowledge (and therefore an
epistemological mode) of the intersection of natural and supernatural life
in the Person of the incarnate Christ, and participation in the
"trampling down of death by death", as the crucified Christ
takes on new life in anticipation of the Resurrection.
Can the viewer of the icon "believe as if he
saw"? Michael Psellos answers, "Yes." And Leonid Ouspensky
echoes this affirmation for our own age:
For an Orthodox man of our times an icon, whether
ancient or modern, is not an object of aesthetic admiration or an object
of study; it is living, grace-inspired art which feeds him... for now,
as before, it corresponds to a definite concrete reality, a definite
living experience, which is at all times alive in the Church. 74
6. The Light
It is possible to step beyond even the claim that
through icons one can see at least an image of God to the even more
remarkable claim that one can actually see, in this life, God’s uncreated
divine light, if one’s senses are transmuted through the action of
the Holy Spirit. Visionary experience of God is described by various
mystics in Western Christianity. One thinks of such figures as St. Bernard
of Clairvaux (1090-1153) or Jakob Boehme (1575-1624). In the case of
Richard Rolle (c.1300-1349), senses other than that of sight are involved:
Rolle feels, hears and tastes divine calor, canor and dulcor
(heat, song, sweetness). 75
But for a fully developed theology of this
extraordinary claim, one must turn to Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and
particularly to the great St. Gregory Palamas (1296-1359). The Triads
of Palamas were composed to defend the claim of the hesychasts—hermit
monks of Mt. Athos—that through certain ascetic practices, including the
repetition of the "Jesus prayer" ("Lord Jesus Christ, Son
of God, have mercy on me, a sinner"), they were able to achieve sight
of God’s uncreated divine light, the same light He displayed to Peter,
James and John in the Transfiguration, traditionally considered to have
taken place on Mt. Tabor: "[He] was transfigured before them: and his
face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light"
(Mat. 17.2). "… [H]e was transfigured before them. And his raiment
became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no fuller on earth can
white them" (Mark 9.2-3). "And as he prayed, the fashion of his
countenance was altered, and his raiment was white and glistering"
(Luke 9.29).
Against the charge of his polemical opponent, Barlaam
the Calabrian, that the hesychasts were deluded, Palamas argued that they
had indeed seen the divine light, grounding himself in two arguments: 1)
the Transfiguration itself provides precedent; 2) the divine light is one
of what Palamas terms the "energies" of God. This doctrine of
God"s energies is in fact Palamas’s most characteristic
contribution to theology. The relationship of the energies to the essence
of God is analogous to that of rays of sunlight to the sun itself:
functioning to project God’s action in the world. Palamas writes (in the
translation of Nicholas Gendle),
the chosen disciples saw the essential and divine
beauty of God on Thabor... not the glory of God which derives from
creatures, as you [Barlaam] think, but the superluminous splendour of
the beauty of the Archetype; the very formless form of the divine
loveliness, which deifies man and makes him worthy of personal converse
with God; the very kingdom of God, eternal and endless, the very light
beyond intellection and unapproachable, the heavenly and infinite light,
out of time and eternal…. They indeed saw the same grace of the Spirit
which would later dwell in them; for there is only one grace of the
Father, Son and Spirit, and they saw it with their corporeal eyes,
but with eyes that had been opened so that, instead of being blind,
they could see…. [T]hey contemplated that uncreated light which, even
in the age to come, will be ceaselessly visible only to the saints…. [T]hese
divine energies are in God and remain invisible to the created
faculties[.] Yet the saints see them, because they have transcended
themselves with the help of the Spirit. [long emphasis added] 76
Elsewhere, Palamas characterizes what might be
described as the heightened epistemological access which renders such
vision possible:
The light of the Transfiguration of the Lord has no
beginning and no end; it remained uncircumscribed (in time and space)
and imperceptible to the senses, although it was contemplated... but the
disciples of the Lord passed here [at Mt. Tabor] from the flesh into the
spirit by a transmutation of their senses…. For the body itself also
experiences divine things, when the passionate forces of the soul find
themselves not put to death but transformed and sanctified. 77
Upon reading such passages as these, even a believing
modern is likely to assume that this degree of afflatus may have been
appropriate or possible in an age of faith, but surely not in our own! And
yet it happens that the claims of the 14th century hesychasts and their
theologian, St. Gregory Palamas, are still being made today, by voices
hardly heard outside of relatively constricted circles. Our contemporary,
Archimandrite Hierotheos Vlachos, in his book, A Night in the Desert of
the Holy Mountain, describes an interview with a hermit currently
living on Mt. Athos. Vlachos directly asks the hermit, "Have you seen
the Light?" To which the hermit, after a period of silence,
responds,
Sometimes... because of their great purity and their
struggle, and even because of the special good-will of God, some people
become worthy of seeing the Light with their physical eyes—which have
been transformed by the divine grace—like the three disciples on Mount
Tabor…. We too, after the vision of the Light, feel exceedingly tired…. 78
Here then is a claim of access to transcendent
knowledge achievable in this world by human faculties in synergy with God’s
grace. It is the ultimate claim of Realist metaphysics, an option still
being exercised by living contemporaries of ours.
7. The Question: How Realist is Voegelin?
In 1953, in an introduction to an English translation
of "On the Incarnation" by St. Athanasius, C.S. Lewis cautioned,
"It is a good rule, after reading a new book, never to allow yourself
another new one till you have read an old one in between." 79 This is
sage advice, and I have tried to maintain at least this proportion in the
present paper. The moderns whose names have figured here so far—Chesterton,
Weaver, Lewis himself, Gilson, Maritain, Jaki, Molnar—are all of them
unquestioned (Neo)-Realists in metaphysics, men who prove themselves
capable to a remarkable degree of engaging in what Lewis calls an
"experiment in criticism",80 entering empathetically into the
worldviews of other ages, and therefore becoming capable of stepping back
from their own age and seeing it objectively. Now, if we raise the
question, "Does the name of Eric Voegelin (1901-85) belong in this
company?" we are faced at once with this problem: Voegelin would have
considered Lewis’s "experiment" to be an impossibility.
"History," he assures us, "is not a field of indifferently
objective materials…. Rather, history is constituted by
consciousness."81 Even more definitively, "there is no reality of
order in history except the reality experienced and symbolized by the
noetic consciousness of the participants."82 Thus one must
"renounce all pretense to an observer’s position outside the
process [of history]." One must instead "enter the process
and... participate both in its formal structure and the concrete tasks
imposed on the thinker by his situation in it."83 This is a view of
history derivative of Hegel’s transformation of history into a force
with a life of its own, adopted by Marx for his purposes, and finally
indistinguishable from the "postmodernist" view currently
fashionable. It would seem at once to deny the possibility of free will,
something Realist metaphysicians always uphold, and to limit the thinker
to the perspective of his own age. If the doctrine is true, one wonders
how Voegelin himself apparently managed to escape the trap, and to be able
to hold forth on the entire sweep of history, when his own philosophy of
history would seem to allow no scope for such an endeavor.
But perhaps I have misunderstood Voegelin here. Let us
put aside this issue for the sake of argument, and address directly the
question at hand. It is claimed by some that Voegelin is in fact a
Realist, and not all of these are necessarily his supporters; Molnar
records a conversation with a German colleague who, for example, could not
"forgive Voegelin... his realism." 84 One has the impression that
this claim rests on Voegelin’s undoubted acceptance of the reality of
the divine. If one were to compare this position of his with the terminal
nihilism of our own "postmodernists", Voegelin would indeed have
to be seen as a Realist of some sort.
But what emerges if one tests Voegelin, not against
"postmodernists"—in comparison with whom nearly anyone could
claim to be a Realist—but with actual Realist thinkers, and not merely
the Realists of the past, but such modern Neo-Realists as Gilson or
Weaver? To begin with, it will have to be admitted that Voegelin’s
account of "reality" itself is highly equivocal.
"Reality," Voegelin asserts, "is not a thing that man
confronts but the encompassing reality in which he himself is real as he
participates…. The philosopher [gains] insight in the structure of
reality... through participation in its process…. Insight into reality
is insight from the perspective of man who participates in reality. The
term perspective must not be understood, or rather misunderstood,
in a subjective sense. There is not a multitude of perspectives, but only
the one perspective that is determined by the place of man in
reality." 85 Now this is hardly distinguishable from Kant, and it also
introduces us to a characteristic problem of argumentation in Voegelin:
the self-invalidating claim. It might be epitomized in the form, "I
am not a subjectivist, but I see all reality as inextricably bound up with
the perceiving subject." Voegelin characteristically recognizes and
even analyzes a potential epistemological pitfall, and tries to avoid
falling into it by mere assertion of a difference between his view and
that from which he wishes to distinguish it. But, alas, he does not
adequately differentiate his position from the problematic one he
correctly perceives. In the current example, Voegelin beyond doubt ends up
falling into the dilemma of Kantian subjectivism as thoroughly as Kant
himself.
The issue is especially clear in this key passage from Anamnesis:
the impression of a subjectless event in being must
not be rejected as a false appearance; that would open the way for
psychologization: for sophistic theories concerning the gods as the
invention of a ‘clever’ man as well as for Feuerbach’s psychology
of the divine as a projection of the soul. On the other hand, one must
not hypostasize the impression [emph. added] of being, when it is
noetically illuminated, into being as an object; that would deliver
being to the libido dominandi of the speculators and activists,
and philosophy would derail into speculations of the theogonic or
historical-dialectic types. 86
Here Voegelin is definitive in his excellently
formulated rejection of the reduction of religion to merely psychological
phenomena, originated by Feuerbach, and then further developed by Jung—whom
Voegelin castigates by implication for "loading" the
"collective unconscious" with "archetypes that once upon a
time, before the psychologists put them down there, were the conscious
symbolizations of metaleptic reality," including myths, each of which
Voegelin considers to have "its truth", in a manner reminsiscent
of Mircea Eliade 87—as well in recent times as Jung’s popularizer, Joseph
Campbell. But when he cautions us against "hypostasizing" or
reifying "the impression of being" into "being as an
object", he reveals that he in fact falls short of the Realist
position. The Realists (or Scholastics), as Spinoza clearly stated in a
passage already cited, "start from things", and not merely
"impressions" of things. To start from the
"impression" (or "phenomenon" as opposed to "noumenon")
is to acquiesce in the Cartesian-Kantian fallacy which underpins all of
modern Nominalism. Realism asserts access to the actual thing, which
exists independently of the observing subject.
One senses from this passage that Voegelin may be aware
of his problem, but that he feels compelled to reject true Realism because
he thinks that it leads to doctrinal theology of the sort practiced by
the Church Fathers (here referred to as "speculators... of the
theogonic" type), out of which eventually emerge
"speculations... of the historical-dialectic type," i.e.,
Communism and Nazism! More explicitly than here, in The Ecumenic Age,
Voegelin credits Karl Jaspers for sensing in "[Christian]
orthodoxy", which of course is Realist, "the transformation of
existential truth into doctrine of which he recognized the murderous
consequences in the practice of Communism and National Socialism." 88 We
may conclude that Voegelin remained reluctant to assert the reality of the
objective world apart from perceiving consciousness at least partially
because he thought that such a move historically led to the destructive
modern ideologies. That in taking this position he was misconstruing
orthodox theology, both in terms of its actual content and in terms of its
true role in history, appears evident to me, even though I happen to agree
fully with Voegelin’s understanding of the ideologies as deriving from
immanentized Christian eschatology. The whole problem here lies in his
apparent failure to distinguish between a false interpretation of
the eschatology and a true one, as well as from an Hegelian
tendency, already noticed, to see the movement of history as inevitable.
If Voegelin is equivocal, for whatever reasons, on objects
or things, the true starting points of Realist epistemology, he is
equally so on human nature, the soul, and reason, all of which are also
foundation stones of Realism. "We casually work with the concept of
human nature as if we considered it constant, as did the classics [i.e.,
the classical philosophers?], or malleable, as do the ideologues." 89
But the true Realist does assert the constancy of human nature.
Voegelin’s attempt to claim some third conception of human nature seems
to be grounded in a Neo-Heraclitan view that all is flux, coupled with a
type of evolutionism again reminiscent of Hegel: i.e., human nature is in
process of unfolding, rather than given. This leaves the human
person with no faculty capable of "experiencing the divine
ground"—which is, as we shall see, Voegelin’s epistemological
starting point—or anything else, for that matter. "The subject of
the experience also is a matter of difficulty," he states, because
"the term ‘soul’, or psyche... must not be understood as
if it were an object about which one could make philosophical propositions
concerning its immateriality or immortality…. Rather it is strictly the
name of a predicate of which ‘place of tensions’ is the subject."90
(We might note that making propositions about the soul is precisely what
the leading Realist metaphysician, St. Thomas Aquinas, does in his Summa
Theologica.) But Voegelin goes right on to recognize that "since
neither the temporal being of man nor his experience of eternal being can
be doubted, there must be in man something nontemporal…." And this,
of course, is precisely the soul! Once again we find Voegelin painting
himself into a corner, and trying to have his ontological and
epistemological cake and eat it too: he sees the necessity of Realism, but
shies away from asserting it.
Thus Voegelin regards reason itself, at least as it
exists in the dichotomy of "reason" vs. "revelation",
as a construction of theologians calculated to "monopolize the symbol
‘revelation’ for Israelite, Jewish, and Christian theophanies" 91
(whereas Voegelin, as shall appear, wants to argue for the theophanic
legitimacy of the "experience" of such thinkers as Parmenides).
Hence "consciousness is not a constant but a process,"92 a
position which, taken in conjunction with the others studied here, puts
Voegelin, again, in the dilemma of being unable to posit any component in
the human person which could "experience" transcendent truth,
and he is left asserting the minimalist claim that
"epistemologically, there is no proof of things unseen but again this
very faith,"93 a doctrine which is conventional in much of Protestant
theology but stands at odds with the far more extensive claims for reason
found in true Realist metaphysics.
What, then, is Voegelin? A full-fledged
examination of his thought lies beyond the scope of this paper, but some
brief impressions may be given at this point. Voegelin actually takes
pains to deny that he is "dealing with problems of theology." 94
But that is exactly what he is doing. In fact, it is not difficult
to extrapolate from Voegelin’s writings a virtual Credo of his basic
doctrines, ironically contradicting his view that the articulation of doctrine
is a "derailment" of primal spiritual experience—a view,
incidentally, characteristic of mystics in all religions throughout
history. Actually, it is impossible to assert anything whatsoever on any
matter of consequence without at least implying some underlying first
principle.
Voegelin’s Credo might read something as follows:
I believe in a Divine Ground of Being, which is
ultimately the only reality;
and in a metaxy or intermediate state where
this Ground and man mutually inter-participate; and in a primal
experience by man of that Ground, undifferentiated and pure;
and in a faculty, "noetic consciousness",
that renders possible "differentiation", or conscious thinking
about this experience, thinking which causes a dissociation of the
previously unified cosmos into "world" and "divine
ground";
and I believe that in so thinking man invents symbols
or myths to capture or convey this experience, symbols that change as
the experience itself evolves and transforms; that such Christian
concepts as "Fall", "Incarnation", "Son of
God", "Resurrection", etc. are examples of such symbols;
and that these symbols devolve by error into
doctrines, which further degenerate into modern ideologies;
I await the ultimate evolution of the self-revelation
of the Ground of Being into some unforeseeable higher mode of Being.
These propositions, articulated in various ways
throughout Voegelin’s works, are precisely doctrines, every bit as much
as the doctrines promulgated at the Ecumenical Councils which Voegelin
thinks somehow "deform[ed]... the experiential insights" they
supposedly explained. 95
These doctrines establish Voegelin as what might be
described as a Neo-Parmenidean or Neo-Platonic monist, deeply influenced
by Hegel, in a mode distinguishable from Heidegger only in that he claims
to accept Christianity as part of the unfolding self-revelation of the
Ground. As an epistemologist he is essentially Kantian. Now, Voegelin
would undoubtedly reject any comparison with Heidegger; he speaks
contemptuously of "the epigonic Being for whose parousia Heidegger
waited in vain." 96 But Gilson, in his untranslated but crucially
important posthumous work, Constantes philosophiques de l'être
("The Philosophical Constants of Being," 1983), brilliantly
characterizes the real problem with Heidegger’s ontological stance:
Parmenides already said, ‘Being is.’ Twenty-five
centuries later not only have we not advanced any farther than this, but
Heidegger barely dares to go even that far. He does not feel certainty
about the proposition das Sein ist ["Being is"]... for
the phantom of ‘the being’ is always there, prowling around the `is'
as if around its home and anxious to return to it. 97
What Gilson sees here is the crucial choice that needs
to be made between the abstraction, "Being", and the actually
existent entity, "the being", or ό
΄Ών, The Being, The One Who Is, God,
a triune person and no abstraction. Voegelin’s formulation,
"divine ground of being", is in fact no better than Heidegger’s,
and falls short of the God who is the true ground of being in orthodox
Christianity as well as in the Realist meta-physics which is its handmaid.
Whenever Voegelin speaks of the actual revelation of God, whether to Moses
and the prophets or in the Incarnation as the second Person of the
Trinity, Christ, he treats these as being mere "symbols" of some
higher, ineffable "divine ground". This move—of relegating the
revealed God to a position of ultimate subordination to a higher
abstraction—is characteristic precisely of Plotinus’s Neo-Platonism,
as pointed out by Gilson in a passage already noted (see note 59). (As we
have seen, Neo-Platonic subordinationism also tends to be characteristic
of Pseudo-Dionysius, not surprisingly one of Voegelin’s most frequently
cited Christian theologians, and in fact more a mystic than a systematic
theologian.) But in true Realist metaphysics, nothing is higher
than the revealed God. Nor is revelation a mere "symbol" or
"myth" invented by man to explain some ineffable
"experience", but rather actual reality. One is, of course, at
full liberty to reject it out of hand; but there can be no having
one’s cake and eating it too by accepting it merely as another
"symbol" of an ineffable abstraction.
By placing the whole emphasis on a mysterious
"experience", Voegelin fails to escape from the solipsism of
German Idealism. As Molnar cogently phrases it, 98 "the term ‘experience’
is the alibi of German idealists when they wish to avoid speaking of ‘reality’;
it is the key to their subjectivism." And in the last analysis,
German Idealism is monistic; it is a monism of spirit, rather than
of matter, as in Democritus or Marx, but finally monism is monism.
Voegelin writes,
the philosopher must... include the truth of the
primary experience of a divine-worldly cosmos in his philosophy. For the
cosmos may indeed be dissociated into divine and worldly being, by the
experience of being, but that dissociating knowledge does not dissolve
the bond of being between God and World, which we call cosmos…. [N]either
can an immanent world nor a transcendent being "exist"; rather
these terms are indices that we assign to areas of reality of the
primary experience, as the noetic experience dissociates the cosmos into
existing things and their divine ground of being. 99
It is this monist position that makes it possible for
Voegelin to assert that "the God who appeared to the philosophers,
and who elicited from Parmenides that exclamation ‘Is!’, was the same
God who revealed himself to Moses as the ‘I am who (or: what) I am.’" 100
Similarly, the "force that compels the prisoner in the cave to turn
around toward the divine light (Republic)... belong[s] to the same
foreground of theophany as the fire that moves Moses to turn towards the
thornbush." It is significant that in the key passage, Ex. 3.14,
Voegelin amends "who" to "what", thus demonstrating
that he is disturbed by the radical personhood of the revealed God,
precisely as Gilson shows Heidegger to have been.
This, predictably, makes Voegelin a less reliable
interpreter of St. Paul than of any other figure he deals with at length.
He speaks of a "phantasy of two realities [which] has remained
constant in Western history from antiquity to the present…. Even in the
case of Paul we had to note his wavering between acceptance of the one
reality in which the Incarnation occurs and indulgence in the metastatic
expectation of a second reality to come in the time of the living." 101
Even "Resurrection refers to the Pauline vision [emph. added]
of the Resurrected."102 In other words, Voegelin equivocates on the reality
of the key events of Christianity, the Incarnation and the
Resurrection. He is so thorough an Hegelian evolutionist-historicist that
even Paul is said to be limited to the "construction" of
reality, and this "construction could not be ultimate but would have
to be amended with changes and enlargements of the empirical horizon; but,
at least, it remained ‘true’ for the better part of two
millenniums."103 Note how Voegelin, anticipating the common practice of
"postmodernists", puts "true" in quotation marks! No
surprise that he considers that "the divine presence itself, though
experienced by man who exists in time and space, is not a spatio-temporal
given,"104 and has recourse to the evasive concept of the metaxy,
instead of grasping the true Christian paradox of Incarnation: spirit
(which is one) assuming flesh (which is another) precisely in
space-and-time. If Voegelin had taken seriously as good-faith explorations
of these matters the writings of such Church Fathers as St. Athanasius or
St. Gregory of Nazianzus, instead of dismissing them as "derailers",
he might have escaped these misunderstandings, to say nothing of his claim
that early Christianity was "substantially ditheistic",105 which
breaks not only with patristic theology but with post-Reformation
Protestant theology of virtually any description. St. Paul famously
declared that "Christ crucified" is "unto the Jews a
stumbling block and unto the Greeks foolishness" (I Cor. 1.23).
Voegelin in his analysis of Paul appears to be one of the Greeks: he is
scandalized by the radical break between classical cosmologism and
orthodox Christianity.
Why should ontological monism be a problem for the
Realist metaphysician? Richard Weaver says that if we wish to reassert
Realism, "The first positive step must be a driving afresh of the
wedge between the material and the transcendental. This is fundamental:
without a dualism we should never find purchase for the pull upward…. So
long as there is a single breach in monism... the case of values is not
lost." 106 "Dualism" is the key word here, the ontological
dualism to which Realist metaphysics is committed. The material-monist
says all is matter: many modern scientists take this position, grounded in
Democritus through Marx, and in our time in a (probably false)
interpretation of Einstein’s apparent conflation of "energy"
and "matter", with "energy" being seen as a subtler
form of matter. Attempts to claim that matter itself encodes
"intelligence" also fall in this category, and emerge from a
desire to explain design in nature and consciousness without having to
resort to the postulation of immaterial spirit. The spiritual-monist says
all is spirit or consciousness: on the philosophical level, this is Plato
via Plotinus via Berkeley via Kant via Croce; on the religious level, it
is Buddhism or Vedantic (absolute non-dualist) Hinduism. "Things do
not happen in the astrophysical universe; the universe, together with all
things founded [sic] in it, happens in God." So says Voegelin;107
Śankara (c.788-820 or later), the leading Vedantic thinker, could not
have put it better.
But Realist metaphysics robustly asserts the reality of
both matter and spirit—the creation and God—and the radical
ontological divide that differentiates them in reality. Voegelin
happily recognizes the reality of the divine, but is unclear about the
world. Collapsing everything into one undifferentiated cosmos may be
aesthetically pleasing, but it does not capture the full complex
particularity of actual reality, and in the long run any misrepresentation
of reality will have the negative consequences Weaver properly cautions us
about. To protect the balanced assertion of both levels of reality
requires nothing less than a rehabilitation of true Realist metaphysics.
If such an occurrence is on the horizon, it may emerge
first in the realm of science, rather than philosophy or theology as
currently practiced. John J. Reilly has already noticed that
"complexity theory... is well on its way to restating something like
the notion of formal cause." 108
But as Stanley Jaki has shown, good
physics is often interpreted by bad metaphysics. The whole question
for the future will be whether our intellectual and spiritual life is
healthy enough to facilitate the reassertion by our mainstream thinkers of
ancient truths about the world we live in and the God who created both it
and us.
NOTES
1 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province
(Westminster, MD: Christian Classics reprint in five volumes, 1981), Vol.
I, pp. 11-12. Note that all citations from the Summa will be from
Pt. 1.
2 Thomas Love Peacock, Nightmare
Abbey, Crotchet Castle (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 67.
3 G.K. Chesterton, The
Complete Father Brown (Harmonds-worth: Penguin Books, 1981), pp.
367-8.
4 Ibid., p. 385.
5 Richard Weaver, Ideas
Have Consequences (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
1984 paperback edition of 1948 publication), p. 137.
6 Ibid., p. 164.
7 Ibid., p. 53.
8 Ibid., p. 87.
9 Ibid., p. 52.
10 See the discussion of this
document in Étienne Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy: The
Philosophical Constants of Language (English-language translation by
John Lyon, Notre Dame University Press, 1988), pp. 97-8.
11 Thomas Molnar, personal communication, May
7, 1994.
12 Weaver, op. cit., pp. 182-3.
13 James Boswell, The Life
of Samuel Johnson (New York: The Modern Library, n.d.), pp. 268-9.
14 Stanley L. Jaki, Cosmos
and Creator (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1980), pp. 94-5.
15 Emmet Kennedy,
"Enlightenment Anticipations of Postmodernist Epistemology," p.
7. I am indebted to Professor Kennedy for allowing me to cite his article
while still in press.
16 Jaki, op. cit., pp. 96-7.
17 Aristotle, Metaphysics,
II.2, as translated by John Henry MacMahon in Aristotle on Man in the
Universe (Roslyn, N.Y.: Walter J. Black, 1943), pp. 13-14.
18 Ibid., p. 14.
19 Étienne Gilson, History
of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House,
1955), p. 791; and pp. 489 ff. See also Thomas Molnar, "Guillaume d’Occam
et les conséquences de l’Occamisme," La Pensée Catholique,
May-June, 1988, pp. 56-60. Molnar is primarily interested in the influence
of Ockham’s thought on the political position of the Church, as well as
on the conception of the state, but grounds these precisely in Ockham’s
epistemology. He also sees Ockham as undermining confidence in causality:
"la causalité n'est pas dans la nature, elle est dans l’esprit de
Dieu. Cinq siècles plus tard, surviendra Kant qui localise la causalité
non pas dans l’esprit de Dieu mais dans celui de l'homme. Ce sera une
des catégories de notre raison, mais personne ne pourrait dire si elle,
la causalité, se trouve dans les faits également. Occam fut ainsi le
père de l’agnosticisme moderne." Thus, consistently with the
argument of Weaver, and with the position of the present author, Molnar
sees a development from Nominalism to Kantian Idealism to modern
"agnosticism". It is worth noting that the "Friar
William" of Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose "is the
fictional transformation of... William of Ockham," according to
Andrea Sciffo ("Letter from Italy," in Chronicles: A Magazine
of American Culture, June, 1995, pp. 38-40). Although Sciffo cites the
opinion of an Ockham scholar to the effect that Eco misrepresents Ockham’s
actual position, it is highly significant that Eco, a "semiotician",
associate of Derrida and "nominalist intellectual of the left",
would consider it appropriate to press Ockham into service as a mouthpiece
for what Sciffo calls his "gay nihilism". Needless to say, the
novel was a best-seller for months, and a Hollywood film version was
released. This should drive home the point that even the most seemingly
obscure, esoteric musings of the intelligentsia may eventually trickle
down and out to the realm of popular culture.
20 Étienne Gilson, The
Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1937), pp. 316-7 and p. 313.
21 Jacques Maritain, St.
Thomas Aquinas (second edition, New York: Meridian Books, 1958; first
edition published in 1931), p. 150.
22 Boswell, op. cit., p. 285.
23 Cited in Jaki, op. cit., p. 94.
24 Boswell, op. cit., p. 924.
25 Peacock, op. cit., pp. 78-9.
26 Ibid., p. 139.
27 Maritain, op. cit., pp. 91-2.
28 The definitive edition is
now the Clarendon edition (Oxford), edited by I.T. Ker and published in
1985. All references will be to this edition.
29 Ibid., p. 118.
30 Ibid., pp. 106-7.
31 Ibid., p. 119.
32 Ibid., pp. 117 and 119.
33 Ibid., pp. 207-8.
34 Ibid., pp 221 and 215.
35 Aquinas, Summa
Theologica, Q.79 Art. 9, Vol. I, p. 404.
36 Ibid., Q.79 Art. 4, Vol. I, p. 400, and Q.85 Art. 5, Vol.
I,
p. 437.
37 Ibid., Q. 84 Art. 5, Vol. I, p. 427.
38 Ibid., Q. 84 Art. 6, Vol. I, pp.
427-9.
39 Ibid., Q. 85 Art. 3, Vol. I, pp.
434-5.
40 G.K. Chesterton, St.
Thomas Aquinas: The Dumb Ox (NewYork: Sheed and Ward, 1933), pp.
203-4.
41 A.R. Waller, ed., Abraham Cowley: Poems
(Cambridge University Press, 1905), pp. 46-7.
42 The Apocrypha According
to the Authorized Version, with an introduction by Robert H. Pfeiffer
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, n.d.), pp. 123-4.
43 Ibid., p. vii.
44 John McGuckin, trans., Saint
Gregory Nazianzen: Selected Poems (Convent of the Incarnation,
Fairacres, Oxford: SLG Press, 1986), p. 11.
45 Ibid., p. 10.
46 Denis Molaise Meehan, O.S.B.,
trans., St. Gregory of Nazianzus: Three Poems ("The Fathers of
the Church--A New Translation," Vol. 75; Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press: 1987), p. 32.
47 For the complete Greek
text, with chapter-by-chapter English summaries and commentaries, see
Arthur James Mason, ed., The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of
Nazianzus (Cambridge University Press, 1899).
48 Ibid., p. xii.
49 Ibid., pp. 27, 29,
30, 31, 35, 54. Note that by "sense", Gregory is referring to
the human faculty of perceiving objects directly through the five senses.
This usage, derived from Aristotle, will also occur in Aquinas.
50 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 2 Art.
2, Vol. I, p. 12.
51 Ibid., Q. 2 Art. 3, Vol. I, pp.
13-14.
52 Ibid., Q. 79 Art. 9, Vol. I, p. 404.
53 Ibid., Q. 88 Art. 2, Vol. I, p. 450.
54 On apophatic theology, see
Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church
(Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1976 reprint of 1957
English translation of original French publication of 1944), pp. 25 ff.,
34 ff., etc.
55 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 12
Art. 4, Vol. I, p. 51, and Art. 11, p. 57.
56 Gilson, History of
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 70.
57 Sir Lancelot Charles
Brenton, trans., The Septuagint Version of the Old Testament and
Apocrypha (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House reprint,
1974), p. 73.
58 Colm Luibheid, trans., with
collaboration and introduction by Paul Rorem et al., Pseudo-Dionysius:
The Complete Works (The Classics of Western Spirituality; New York and
Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987), p. 98.
59 Gilson, History of
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 70.
60 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 13
Art. 11, Vol. I, p. 70.
61 Newman, op. cit., p. 71.
62 David Anderson, trans., St.
John of Damascus, On the Divine Images (Crestwood, N.Y.: St.
Valdimir's Seminary Press, 1980), pp. 36-7.
63 Ibid., p. 20.
64 Ibid., p. 79.
65 Ibid., pp. 74-5.
66 Ibid., pp. 16-17, 55-57, and passim.
67 Ibid., pp.52-3 and passim.
68 Catharine P. Roth, trans., St.
Theodore the Studite, On the Holy Icons (Crestwood, N.Y.: St.
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1981), p. 104.
69 Ibid., p. 107.
70 Ibid., p. 109.
71 Elizabeth A. Fisher,
"Image and Ekphrasis in Michael Psellos’ Sermon on the
Crucifixion," Byzantinoslavica, LV (Prague, 1994), pp. 44-55.
"Endowed with life" is Fisher’s rendition of the word.
72 Ibid., pp. 51-2.
73 Ibid., p. 55.
74 Leonid Ouspensky and
Vladimir Lossky, The Meaning of Icons (Crestwood, N.Y.: St.
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1983), p. 49.
75 See Frances M.M. Comper, The
Life of Richard Rolle (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969 reprint of
1928 publication), especially Ch. VI.
76 John Meyendorff, ed. and
intro., and Nicholas Gendle, trans. Gregory Palamas: The Triads (The
Classics of Western Spirituality; New York, etc.: Paulist Press, 1983),
pp. 106-7.
77 Vladimir Lossky, The Vision of God
(Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1983), pp. 162 and 164.
78 Effie Mavromichali, trans.,
Archimandrite Hierotheos Vlachos, A Night in the Desert of the Holy
Mountain (Levadia, Greece: Birth of Theotokos Monastery, 1991), pp.
114 ff., 120.
79 C.S. Lewis, Introduction to
St. Athanasius: On the Incarnation [De incarnatione verbi dei] (Crestwood,
N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1982 reprint of 1953 publication),
p. 4.
80 C.S. Lewis, An Experiment in Criticism
(Cambridge University Press, 1961), passim.
81 Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis, trans. and ed. by
Gerhart Niemeyer (University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), p. 158.
This work will subsequently be cited as "A."
82 Eric Voegelin, Order and
History, Vol. IV: The Ecumenic Age [hereafter cited as "E."]
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), p. 145.
83 Ibid., p. 314.
84 Thomas Molnar, "Eric Voegelin: A
Portrait, An Appreciation," Modern Age, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Fall 1981), p. 383.
85 A., pp. 163-4.
86 Ibid., p. 127.
87 E., p. 197; for a
specific allusion to Jung, see p. 211n; for one of several allusions to
Eliade, with whom Voegelin had at least one meeting (Molnar, "Eric
Voegelin," p. 383), see A., p. 113. The phrase about myth will
be found in Eric Voegelin, Order and History, Vol. I: Israel and
Revelation [hereafter cited as I & R] (Louisiana
State University Press, 1956), p.11, where it is attributed to Plato.
88 E., p. 312.
89 A., p. 150.
90 Ibid., p. 125.
91 E., p. 236.
92 Ibid., p. 305.
93 Eric Voegelin, The New
Science of Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 122.
94 E., p. 302.
95 Ibid., p. 58.
96 Ibid., p. 75.
97 As cited in Thomas Molnar,
"Le jugement de Gilson sur Heidegger," La pensée Catholique,
Nov.-Dec. 1983, p. 69.
98 Molnar, "Eric Voegelin," p. 384.
99 A., pp. 78-9; 176.
100 E., pp. 229-30. In
making this assertion, Voegelin unexpectedly echoes the "accomodationism"
of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and his fellow Jesuit missionaries in China.
They argued that God had in fact made a partial revelation to the ancient
Chinese, and that traces of that lost revelation were to be found in the
Confucian classics. Some of the more wildly speculative of them, such as
Jean-François Foucquet (1665-1741), developed a full-blown doctrine of
"figurism", according to which the I ching, or "Book
of Changes", contained hermetic symbols prophesying the Incarnation
of Christ, and thus paralleling the prophets of ancient Judaea. See D.E.
Mungello, Curious Land: Jesuit Accomodation and the Origins of Sinology
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989); and John W. Witek, S.J., Controversial
Ideas in China and in Europe: a biography of Jean-François Foucquet, S.J.
(Rome: Jesuit Historical Institute, 1982).
101 Ibid., p. 303.
102 Ibid., p. 244. Molnar has noticed
the equivocation of "vision;" see "Eric Voegelin," p.
384.
103 I. & R., p. 131.
104 E., pp. 304-5.
105 Ibid., p. 259.
106 Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences, pp.
130 and 146
107 E., p. 334.
108 John J. Reilly, "After Darwin," First
Things, No. 54 (June/July 1995), pp. 15-16.
back to Contents
***************************
Daggerpoints
and Loggerheads: A Sad Time’s Taste for Perverse Oppositions
by
John R. Harris
What’s the opposite of speed—is it slowness, or
stillness? A race car driver whose engine is malfunctioning might say, as
he loses position with every lap, that his machine is the very opposite of
what it was on the day of his last win. On the other hand, a man who has
clung to the luggage rack of a hijacked van for half an hour as it weaves
through city traffic might say, once rescued, that he just wants to sit
still somewhere—that his soul craves the opposite of speed which
he expects to find in an easy chair.
What’s the opposite of a bright light? Is it a gray
penumbra, or a pitchy darkness? If darkness is the opposite of light,
couldn’t extremely poor visibility be the opposite of extremely clear
visibility? After all, no visibility whatever suggests that all basis for
drawing contrasts has been removed. What about ear-splitting blare—is
its opposite a gentle rustle or an ear-ringing silence? The utter absence
of sound certainly negates the presence of sound at any decibel level; but
if the given level were the scale’s greatest value, then perhaps its
ultimate contrast should properly lie at the far end of the scale, and not
completely off the scale.
The qualities positioned between any spectrum’s
extremes (and, in practical terms, this means all qualities) are,
as everyone knows, relative. With respect to whom am I polite or rude?
With respect to which climate is today’s weather warm or cold? The
upshot of such relativism, let it be stressed, is not to invalidate
qualitative judgments as a whimsy of the beholder’s eye. Such reductio
ad absurdum belongs to the deconstructionist, and is really a very
romantic rejecting of the entire barrel for one bad apple, when you think
about it.1 For relativism is relative: it is hemmed in by the
solid presence of facts which the qualitative judgment has shaded and
approximated. The fact is that most of the apples are edible, or mostly
edible. Likewise, the fact is that most people are not much offended by my
manner, and that most pedestrians are apt to wear a coat when their breath
mills in frosty wreathes of a January morning. We can never pinpoint
qualitative distinctions with absolute precision; yet all of us are
recurring to them every time we utter or write words, thus proving that
their existence has a universal validity even though whatever
numerical values are proposed to demarcate that existence do not. We do
not all picture the same vehicle when we conceive of fastness, but we all
understand the word "fast".
To return to extremes or opposites, the alternatives to
one end of the spectrum are logically not many without number: they are
only two. The opposite of the highest measurable or known value can either
be the lowest measurable or known value, or else complete absence of value—"value
zero". I’m sure that these alternatives have been discussed and
named long ago in a forum which my own ignorance has closed to me; but in
the insulation of my ignorance, I would call the former alternative the polar
opposite and the latter alternative the nullifying opposite.2
Dusk is the polar opposite of noon’s brilliance: darkness is its
nullifying opposite. The polar opposite to the quasar is the slug: the
nullifying opposite is the stone.
One might more fruitfully call the polar opposite,
perhaps, the dynamizing opposite. The positing of two extremes
renders innumerable values between them conceivable. Polarities make sense
of endeavor: the words "better" and "worse" acquire
meaning within the polarized field of force, whereas nullifying
oppositions allow us only a laconic "yes" or "no"
without reprieve. A slightly mushy apple is a little better than an
inedible pulp of withered brown, and a forty Watt bulb is a little worse
to read by than a seventy-five Watt bulb. In these spaces between extreme
values, we live our lives—not only that, but we communicate to others
how they may better live. Here we find those qualities which we evoke in
our most casual exchanges: the state of my manners, the chilliness of the
morning air. The polar contrast is eminently sensible and highly useful.
If I were now to turn around and vilify the nullifying
opposite as too severe for life in this world, I should perhaps be
yielding to the innately human tendency to draw nullifying oppositions. It
is tempting, I admit, to argue that all-or-nothing alternatives are (as I
wrote just above of deconstruction) too romantic. A Manichaean universe
which offers us only black-and-white choices—good or evil, sense or
nonsense, day or night, manna or foul rot—seems so unsympathetic with
our routine travail that one has to wonder if it isn’t blasphemous, or
even insane. We must take care, however, not to divest ourselves of
idealism in our respect for "reality". In moral endeavor, at
least, ultimate reality is always beyond our reach. Were we to strive
after only what we might attain, we would never offer our lives in
exchange for the beleaguered innocent whose liberation appears entirely
impossible. The world we would be left with after years of such
"practical" calculations would be uninhabitable, in my opinion.
Having rejected the ideal of annihilating human sacrifice and infanticide
and mass execution of political dissidents and all the rest—having
accepted pragmatically that a little of these things is a necessary
concession to reality—we should have cut ourselves off from a central
human reality. Having defined failure out of our existence, we would begin
to look more like animals than people.
In summary, if setting certain "real life"
coordinates at either end of a spectrum is healthy, envisioning the
"nullification" of certain vicious spectra in their entirety is
not less so. Aristotle and Plato need each other—or, more to the point,
we all need both of them. As well as the intellectual acuity to
distinguish a good effort from a poor one, we need the moral intuition to
distinguish a right effort from a wrong one. Not that moral rectitude
completely, categorically rejects every option which comes a little short:
even here, there is much need of recognizing that things could be much
worse—that a certain degree of wrong is not so very wrong. Yet moral
intuition begins precisely in the understanding that nothing we do is
fully, utterly right. The sensitive gradation of moral efforts is so
important for the very reason that the ideal of perfect moral goodness can
crush us under its sublime majesty and leave us in despair. In Christian
terms, this admission of failure’s inevitability—of having to be under
the peak, if you will, in order to scale toward it zealously—goes by the
name of grace. To serve perfect goodness, one must first accept that
nothing one can do will ever be perfectly good. The collaboration here is
not just happy: it is necessary. One must wholly reject moral badness to
be a votary of moral goodness, but one must also—and in the same motion—recognize
that one’s offerings of good deeds are only relatively good.
So much, then, for the notion that working within
polarities is all wrong or that categorically rejecting an entire range of
choices is all wrong. We do both together, and we may often do both harmoniously
and righteously. All the same, I am afraid (and here I come to the
crux of this essay) that we even more often switch horses in mid-stream,
and that we do so carelessly, dangerously, and culpably. We split hairs
when the whole crown should be shaved, or else we sweepingly reject a
broad range of options when the only problem is that the currently
operative value is too extreme. We strike bargains with the devil, and we
refuse to parley with angels. I am completely sincere when I say that the
disastrous twentieth century—a stage for the West’s cultural debacle
almost from end to end—was largely shaped by this tragic inability to
pose fair, sensible oppositions. Instead, those years have left us an
unenviable bequest of ideology, one plausible definition of which might be
the consistent forcing of reality into one kind of opposition when the
other kind is more appropriate to the truths at stake. When the
"party of the people", as communism in its various forms fancied
itself, needed to muzzle the candid, bully the weak, and starve the poor
in order to attain its political objectives, it seldom hesitated to
compromise. When, however, capitalist governments offered deals which
would have relaxed the tensions of the arms race, it often took a rigid
stand in "principle". Or consider the situation which
preoccupies international attention as I write. People who claim to have
an uncompromising reverence for human life will not tolerate any flying
missiles or falling bombs, no matter how accurately aimed. Yet when faced
with irresistible evidence that the bombs’ target has starved, tortured,
executed, and chemically poisoned over a million non-combatant men, women,
and children during the past decade, the same people urge resignation to
the will of God or chatter something about the all-importance of global
image.
Obviously, this almost exactly inverted perception of
when to stand and when to hedge continues to bedevil us in the early years
of the twenty-first century. In Part Two of my essay (which I hope to have
ready for Praesidium’s summer issue), I should like to take a
slow, sad tour through the past hundred years in the pleasant company of
great authors: Alain-Fournier, Remarque, Saint-Exupéry, Jules Romains…
it is an ambitious project which I’ve had in mind for some while. Even
before our present embroilment with the French, I would have culled many
of my sources from that culture, for French literature seems to me both
the pinnacle of the European spirit’s achievement and perhaps the most
mangled victim of contemporary Europe’s spiritual meltdown. Already
during his own brief life, for instance, Saint-Exupéry was ruthlessly
defamed by De Gaullist forces for such "intolerable" positions
as not wanting Allied planes to bomb French cities. De Gaulle was the
quintessence of a perverse reasoner. The punishment of collaborators was
more important than some few hundred or thousand children’s lives—yet
he found all kinds of redeeming qualities in Ho Chi Minh when the United
States undertook to save a French colony in southeast Asia from being
overrun by a totalitarian machine which dwarfed Hitler’s.
Let all of this remain for later, however. Professor
Chaves has given me a much more serene context in which to broach the same
issues. His apology for the philosophical position known as realism (i.e.,
that our senses do in fact convey some significant portion of reality to
us accurately—see the essay directly preceding this one) clearly
establishes a polarity, with realism at one end and idealism at the other.
I am certainly not qualified to address his argument point by point (not
that I would have sufficient space, in any case: I have read few papers in
my life so densely packed with ideas). I would like to devote the
remainder of my words, rather, simply to questioning the opposition of the
real and the ideal as an either/or choice. This contrast leaves me
unsettled when presented in a "nullifying" format—and I hasten
to add that Professor Chaves’s presentation of it is perhaps the most
reassuring I have seen. Far and wide throughout the fields of theology,
philosophy, and history, the dramatic counter-pointing of one dogma,
theory, or trend with another which truly, upon calm examination, doesn’t
pose much of a threat is routine practice. Sometimes the advocate appears
genuinely hungry after the truth, and sometimes (more often, I suspect) he
or she is abiding by the rules of an established parlor game. I think we
should be very cautious about how we distribute white hats and black hats
among the major players of our intellectual history. Personally, I don’t
care what kind of sound a man thinks a falling tree makes as long
as he rescues my child from beneath it—and this seems to me a fully realistic
attitude, insofar as goodness is the ultimate "thingness" to
God and to the human soul.
I scarcely know where to begin. Why not start with
qualitative reasoning itself? There are two points about qualification
which seem to me beyond challenge, and which also undermine a strict
realist position. One is that qualities do not insistently invade the
human mind from without: they are perceived as part of reality, rather,
only after the mind reflects upon its perceptions, often very
deliberately. A person could look at a bit of wallpaper for years without
being aware that its green leaves are not quite the same shade as the
painted trim; he could listen to a recorded symphony hundreds of times
before noticing that the flute is slightly off key at a certain instant.
It’s no good trying to argue in such cases that our blunt senses just
don’t perceive the world accurately sometimes, for these are not
physiological problems. Call them failures of attention, if you wish—but
the lapse of attention here occurs after all the sense data have been
gathered. It is a lapse of intellectual processing. A mind trained and
practiced in the arts would perceive fine realities of shade and tone much
more readily, just as a trained doctor could distinguish between a
throat-clearing cough and a cough boding a cold. The cold will literally
ensue upon a certain cough, yes: these "things" are "out
there". Yet they are there because an active, alert mind is capable
of isolating them from the gray mass of indifferent data. The mind is not
imagining them in a void, and no idealist worth his salt would ever
suggest as much—certainly not Kant, for whom the categories are constitutive
of reality, not creative of it. Nevertheless, should the mind be
insensitive to shades of color or varieties of cough for whatever reason,
then the qualitative richness of reality is not exploited at that time by
that person. Often the causes of insensitivity are cultural. We have all
heard (truthfully, I’ve no doubt) that the Eskimo has a dozen words for
snow to our one. I know from my own tests that most of our bombarded urban
ears cannot discern in the quality of a copse’s silence the terror of
songbirds beneath the circles of a hawk.
We get more reality or less of it, in short, depending
on how keenly we apply our thought to what we perceive. That the
Eskimo would be able to explain his varieties of snow to us if given a
fair chance raises my second point. That is, the grand, harmonious reality
which emerges when we put all our sharp ears and eyes together is more
properly a proof that we think the same way than that the world is
a divinely purposive chronometer. The divine purpose lies in our insisting
upon purpose when we look at things—seeking it high and low, never
content until we at least find a clue. We are all made like this. God has
created us to yearn and to probe. He has given us minds which cannot even
regard a cloud formation without fancifully descrying sails and towers and
mountains. Of course, the castle in the clouds is indeed a figment of the
imagination. The point is, though, that we all know it is—or we
know, at any rate, that someone convinced of the castle’s reality is not
sane. How? What’s the difference between belief in a cumulus castle and
in a vast magnetic field causing the Aurora Borealis? I do not want to
digress into a praise of scientific method, for that is actually not
the point. Science or no science, we know instantly that clouds are just
clouds. The point is that, in a sensually confusing situation which rouses
a certain aesthetic play—a swirling cloud, a splatter of mud, the
chatter of sparrows—we can almost see our mind seeing as it
fashions one order, then sweeps it away and fashions another.
In my opinion, this scheme of things far more worthy
than a strictly realist one of God’s infinite love and his unfathomable
creation, both at once. The things around us turn out to have a very
flexible thingness: one age’s amor profundi is another’s
gravity is another’s time warp. The phenomena remain largely the same,
though the shifting theories draw attention now to this detail, now to
that one. Does this mean, then, that the "out there" lends us
the only stability we ever enjoy, the only safe haven we can ever find
from our treacherously poetic intelligence? Doesn’t it mean, on the
contrary, that the "out there" is a neutral mass of stimuli
whose assessment at any given point in history is a mirror of our hearts?
We struggle to understand, and in our struggle we grow infatuated with
various metaphors (as Voegelin believed), some of them sad or desperate or
terrifying. In the sum of those metaphors, however, is not (at least to my
way of thinking) an annihilating clash of competing fantasies, but a
sequence of chords haunted by complex resonances. It is a song of
struggle, wherein sadness and despair and terror all have their part—and
wherein the need to rest from the struggle by shifting reality away from
our hearts blends its Siren song, as well. From raw impression, we build
these "things" we see and hear according to innate human
patterns of construction, and then we argue over how different our things
appear. The truth about these truths, though, is that we understand our
"competing fantasies" only too well, and reject them so
indignantly because we prefer sadness to fear or confidence to terror. At
some point, after having been thoroughly worn out by the competition,
perhaps we have an inkling that the truth is both beyond things themselves—whatever
they may be—and beyond the metaphors into which we have woven them. What
else but love could lead us so patiently to that point, and what else but
superhuman design could outlast our passion for designing?
The greatest scholars of the last half-century’s
"neo-orthodox" movement, as well as many estimable figures of a
more "catholic" orientation, would crinkle their noses around
such a strong whiff of Kantianism. They deny that the qualitative
intelligence has this dynamizing power to lift new realities from the
cloud of sense impressions. There is no cloud. The realities are
"there". The only reason Ockham, Kant, and their decadent
progeny have emphasized the perceiving mind’s constructive role is to
win more ground for the autonomous self—the ego, the Satanic force which
drives us to elbow God out of creation’s center and insert ourselves in
his place. Qualitative judgments are not polar oppositions (as I have
defined the term above): they are nullifying ones. You either see it or
you don’t—it’s either there or it isn’t. All Dr. Johnson has to do
is kick a stone, and… behold! It rolled, didn’t it? What thought went
into that?
Very little, to be sure—no more than what Kant would
have called a quantitative judgment: the lightning-quick assessment that
the gray mass along the path was a distinct unit. (Had the mass proved to
be a loose dirt clod, it would not have rolled so gratifyingly: a
qualitative judgment, no doubt, was devoted to assessing its tint and
texture.) Why are such amiable people so hostile to the merest notion that
the human mind routinely assists in constituting the reality we perceive?
The answer, I think, is egotism—not Dr. Johnson’s or those of
his ilk, but that native to all human beings. The realist is rightly, even
laudably alarmed by the potential of egotism’s usurping every moment of
judgment if once we admit that our judgments originate in our intellectual
structure rather than in the things which impress our senses. If our mind
processes a stone, then what’s to keep it from processing that stone as
it does a cloud? And if we can make golden galleons out of stones and
clouds, what’s to keep us from turning our fellow human beings into ants
or phantoms? The crisis, as realists see it, is moral. The first stage of
any moral dilemma is the simple perception of its factual details. (I
might add here that the realist—with some justice—would suppose my
child more likely to be rescued from a falling tree by someone who
believes that trees really fall.) Anybody who is convinced that he
normally concocts phenomena of sound and heat from personal whimsy will
readily persuade himself that a baby screaming for help in a conflagration
doesn’t really exist. In order to preserve the urgency of our moral
duty, we must nip subjectivism in the bud. Our moral duty is "out
there" because the practical situations evoking a moral response are
"out there". All else is cowardly equivocation and slick
sophistry.
I would be the last one to contest the claim that we
are presently drowning in a moral squalor combined of pathological
self-obsession and brutal indifference to others. What I must contest is
the claim that all forms of idealism lead toward this quagmire while
realism nimbly bypasses it. In fact, the most self-serving, lubriciously
rationalizing people I know believe very much in the objectivity of
things. They believe that we human beings are highly evolved bundles of
muscle and nerve whose purpose is to survive individually and as a
species. They believe that advanced forms of survival for creatures such
as we involve maximal pleasure and minimal pain. They believe that no
motives beyond genetic programming or neurological tingle make any sense—that
moral obligation, for instance, is a fantasy invented by the ruling
classes to modify the behavior of the working classes. Professor Chaves is
not the first to note with astute irony that the urbane relativists
dominating our cultural scene all of a sudden accept objective reality
implicitly when their precious skin is at stake. The celebrated
deconstructionist with chest pains will on average make it to the
emergency room a lot faster than his gardener would. Frankly, I myself
find little surprise in such ironies, and for this reason: the person who
has no faith in immaterial realities is very likely to place whatever
faith he’s capable of in material reality. The Pyrrhonist is less
properly a doubter in what he sees than a doubter in any possible sense
behind what he sees. He laughs at philosophical realists because
they discern a sense in things: for his part, he will just take things as
they come—a good meal, a night with a pretty wench, a quick profit with
no chance of criminal prosecution.
I am not attempting to conflate realism with
materialism; but then, materialism is surely a species of realism (its
most degenerate species), and for that reason should make any more
ambitious realist recoil a step toward idealism. Those who would oppose
the real to the ideal in what I have called a nullifying manner, requiring
that every last trace of subjectivity be expunged from how we frame
reality, end up sharing the same side of the great divide with those who
believe in the senses and nothing but the senses. I should hope that this
would make them nervous. It would have been far more productive to
"polarize" the situation, with the swinish materialist at one
extreme, the matter-loathing gnostic at the other, and more or less
reasonable people in between who can admit that "thingness" has
something substantial about it but that what we know of this substance is
shaped by how we think. After all, the realist metaphysician must
eventually take reality itself on faith. The common-sense contention, for
instance, that creation must have begun some time and must at some level
have parts not made of other parts is opposed by the equally sensible
proposition that every event is another event’s effect and that every
measurable part is capable of further dissection. Common sense is a dead
end for realism. In the twilight limning our comprehension, we can either
choose sterile absurdity or accept that our impasse results, not from real
senselessness, but from how we think of things. We can opt for
sense precisely because the only other option is senselessness, and
because, while not more honest, sense is also not less honest. Inasmuch as
we are made to think in a way that gives life a certain sense—and
in no other way—we might as well bet on the Maker’s having equipped us
benignly rather than on his having set us up for the cruelest of jokes.
Why put our money on the option where to win is to lose everything?
I am evoking Pascal, of course—but also Kant. The
gist of Kant’s "antinomies of pure reason" (i.e., those
perfectly common-sense premises which end up contradicting each other)
is not that reality is crazy or imaginary, but only that our minds cannot
know the whole story.3 This is Kant’s realist side (or his
critical side, as he would say). He is so committed to the notion of our
mind’s structure being significantly correlated to reality that he waves
aside the antinomies’ latent horrors. We are to proceed with our human
way of looking at things, first because it’s all we have, and second
because we all have it—that, at least, is real, and it is no puny
truth. On the contrary, Kant sees our universal endowment with a way of
processing reality as a good indication of supernatural love and purpose,
since it makes accessible to us the concept of moral obligation. Real
trees fall with real thuds, not because their objectivity is demonstrable,
but because the goodness which our hearts are formed to serve would be
invalidated if each of us lived in a separate world. For me to deny that
your trees thud as mine do would be, even more than a denial of science’s
possibility, a denial of morality’s. Kant’s realist critics reject him
because they see in his subjectivity a menace to moral goodness; but Kant,
more keenly, sees that goodness must be embedded in the heart’s secret
places if it is to extend immaterially to all hearts—and he concludes,
with the easy motion of Ockham’s Razor and Pascal’s bet, that our
knowledge of neutral objects, too, might as well ride on this same
generous wave of common sense.
There are two very different reasons, I think, why
religious scholars (i.e., scholars of pious disposition) are apt to
persist in rejecting a point on the spectrum anywhere near such idealism.
I have already mentioned the dread of egotism in all its forms which
renders the individual intelligence’s action upon reality suspect—but
this dread, frankly, is more of a layman’s bugbear. The scholarly mind
is preoccupied with history, as well. In the first place, what to do with
all those traditions, revelations, confessions, chronicles, codes,
testimonies, and martyrdoms? The legalism of the Pharisee tends to afflict
those whose knowledge of a sacred text is so thorough that they invert the
chain of command. Christ’s Sermon on the Mount is not good because it is
in the Bible, but in the Bible because it is good. (This is Kant’s
formulation, by the way.4) The wind bloweth where it listeth.
The leaves are not sacred for giving voice to its passage: without its
spirit, they wither and fall. But the scholar must safeguard the reverend
position of his precious books! He has devoted his life to them.
Sometimes, in a significant sense, they are the only friends he has ever
known—for his studious introversion has often cost him the company of
other human beings.
The other scholarly incentive to "nullify"
subjectively entrusted realities is, one might say, the whole library
containing that favorite shelf of books. The scholar is surrounded by
physical records which (since the days of Gutenberg) span millennia. No
one else in our society lives and breathes in such a steady sandstorm of
shifting tastes and trends. Under the circumstances, scholarly eyes can be
forgiven if they glass over like a Bedouin’s. Who else but the scholar
can flatter himself that he sees "where it all began" or that he
knows "where it must end" because it has all happened before?
Consider a passage which Professor Chaves cites from Thomas Molnar (see
his note 19): "Five centuries later [i.e., after Ockham], Kant will
arrive, locating causality not in the spirit of God but in that of man. It
[causality] will be one of the categories of our reason, but no one would
be able to say if it—the cause—is likewise embedded in events. Ockham
was thus the father of modern agnosticism."5 It is
difficult to imagine a more sweeping, eon-intoxicated statement than this.
Kant actually chided Hume for suggesting that our causal formulas have no
bearing upon reality, and anyone who has read his work broadly (e.g., Religion
Within the Limits of Reason Alone) knows that he sought to bestow upon
God’s moral authority what the Enlightenment had chipped away from God’s
once-Jovine power over natural events. Hardly an exercise in religious
agnosticism! I leave to one side the painfully obvious fact that our
understanding of causes, even at its most certain, is constantly being
undermined by further observation—not just thanks to science, but
thanks, more often, to the most ordinary experiences of living. Professor
Molnar’s curmudgeonly banishment of Kant to an agnostic rogue’s
gallery does not display his learning and insight, in my humble opinion,
at one of their many bright pinnacles. He has here fallen into the trap of
having to nullify everything on the far side of his contrastive line—and
it turns out to be a great deal of Western thought. But then, the West has
been getting it wrong since the thirteenth century. Cut it all loose and
send it by the board, or sink!
The resistance to compromise in such cases of erudite,
principled hostility as this is truly discouraging. It has something of
the stupendous. Perhaps the death of philosophy (in any meaningful sense
of the word) is partly to blame. Philosophers once chastened the jaundiced
lateral view of the historian, before whom plains were spread with ruined
temples and illegible gravestones, by reminding us that the human heart
is, after all, the same beneath its many sea changes. If missionaries turn
into imperialists, it is because they want to serve and have mistaken the
proper end of service. If liberators decay into sybarites, it is because
they are driven to drink life to the lees, and the heady thrill of the
battlefield has at last left only the tedium of peace. Constructing
complex polar oppositions to explain these paradoxes may be more
befuddling than informative. To be sure, every historical sine-curve of
rise and fall is attended by circumstances unique to its time and place (a
position maximally stressed by Otto Spengler)… but at the bottom of it
all, people either make certain basic choices—certain moral
choices—or they do not. A moral philosopher of the old school could have
pointed this out very eloquently. He could have described how, beneath
that wide, waste historical plain, a spiritual cosmos draws human
generations in orbit around the same source of gravity. He could have laid
out an opposition that largely nullifies historical circumstance. Instead,
we see the historian who claims to speak for moral goodness nullifying a
huge block of history as morally wrong, then explaining away its many
not-so-wrong moments by giving them a downward vector on some spectrum of
epochal decline.
Such oppositions, it seems to me, are not only the
reverse of their proper nature: they are perverse to the point of
tragedy. In matters spiritual, no contrast could be of greater
significance than that between inner authority and outer authority. Molnar
has actually dedicated a book, Authority and Its Enemies (see note
6), to upbraiding those of us who impetuously want control of our own
reins. I, for one, recommend the book and venture to say that I profited
from it. Yet the question of authority also brings us to the ultimate
misalignment of that opposition between realism and idealism. It doesn’t
really matter very much, we can all agree, whether a person says he
does or does not believe in the Loch Ness Monster, or the heliocentric
theory of the planetary system, or the existence of DNA: if his head cold
gets bad enough, he takes a pill—and if it gets really bad, he goes to
the doctor. But the place where we locate moral authority determines the
very possibility of moral endeavor, and also (by the way) the essential
character of the god we worship. If we cling to a nullifying opposition
between authority heard from without—a book’s text, a minister’s
sermon, a vision’s kerygma—and an imperative to act (or to abstain
from acting) felt from within, then we cut ourselves off from that which
alone can make any external command authoritative. We have custom or
conformism or sensual dazzle goading us forward, but not inner conviction.
Naturally, the inward may speak through any such outward voice as these:
in the case of a long-revered book or an established minister, I cannot
imagine that it has failed to do so. All the more reason, though, to admit
that the highest authority is that which convicts: which pricks the
guilty heart from within, which bolsters the cowardly heart from within.
In some sense, we must know what is right in order to recognize its
appearance around us in spoken or written words. We must know, to put it
another way, that such rightness isn’t just what we know
individually, but what we all know as human beings consulting the common
inheritance of our soul.
I have been flabbergasted over my lifetime at the
number of figures I deeply respect who flatly refuse to place the
ostensibly outer authority of a sacred book like the Bible on the same
side of the dividing line as the imperative commands of conscience. They
insist upon opposition here—opposition unto nullification. Perhaps they
were jaded by all the rigamarole of the sixties and seventies. Conscience
was much invoked then, though seldom knowledgeably or responsibly: "I’m
being true to myself," "I’m finding myself," "I’m
doing my own thing," "You’re okay, I’m okay"… there
seemed to be no end to the mystical inner spirits people would summon to
justify "letting it all hang out". But people abuse external
sources of authority, too. They twist passages of scripture, grow wealthy
behind a tax-free pulpit, and "surrender" themselves to God’s
will after a delirious round of prayer rather than standing up for truth.
Such behavior doesn’t strip sacred books or church institutions and
officers of their authority, does it? Then how could a fatuous appeal to
independence be said to discredit the inward ideal of righteousness? No
doubt, even the most saintly people fail to be utterly, perfectly
dedicated to this ideal. Formal religion, too, fails to be perfectly just
and disinterested in its exercise of authority. These are cases calling
for a polarized contrast of opposites, with consistent, malign failures at
one end and inattentive, impulsive failures at the other. Ecclesiastical
authority is indeed condemned to suffer small lapses of judgment, even in
the best of times, precisely because it is administered by human beings,
and because these human beings can at last only make choices by consulting
their conscience. Even the decision to suppress a wayward conscience and
follow the will of a "higher" authority is arrived at inwardly;
and, should the meek soul who chooses that path turn out to have followed
a wolf in sheep’s clothing, he is morally answerable to the highest
authority in the universe—make no mistake—for having muzzled the voice
within.
But there is no counsel of conscience, says the
strict realist: everyone has a different idea about what must be done!
This is a bizarrely relativistic protest, when one considers that it is
advanced precisely to save the moral universe from relativism. If human
beings, taken with all their blemishes, really had no natural inkling of
murder’s shame or deceit’s wickedness, then history’s many instances
of deposed tyrants and self-sacrificing resistance to injustice would be
inscrutable. In place of such inklings, we would have only the ascendancy
of one power here, another there, each with its own arbitrary,
self-serving rule of law. A bleaker portrait of relativism’s triumph
over human affairs would be impossible to paint. We are to recognize in
the canvas, to be sure, something else: one of the arbitrary codes,
we are assured, comes from God. Our acceptance of this proposition is
proof of our faith—another nullifying opposition. We either accept or
reject: we either believe or we don’t. But if we do not believe because
moved to do so by an inner compulsion, for what other reason can we
believe than communal pressure or childhood conditioning or fear of
official reprimand? Under these circumstances, belief in the one true law
would count for nothing as faith. It would be a response to behavioristic
programming and cynical muscle-flexing—exactly what the postmodern crowd
alleges of it.
If ever any aspect of human experience cried out for a
polarized interpretation (and here I mean, once again, measurement by
degree or progress), it would surely be our exercise of conscience. No, we
do not always agree upon a course of action—and yes, some of us who are
most confident turn out to have been most mistaken. Besides youth,
arrogance, and sheer stupidity, however, might this disheartening
phenomenon not be accounted for by the residence of right action’s
highest ends in a realm beyond our world? An utterly, perfectly good
action would be heavenly. Even Christ declines to be called good or to
call anyone good except the Father. The moral fact which he must have had
in mind can be no other than that our world constantly involves us in
already tainted choices. Someone always gets hurt—some end is always
left dangling, a threat to unravel or to trip a passer-by. Here is the
ultimate example of a round peg in a square hole: an imperative to act,
that is, whose force translates into no single clear, fully satisfactory
command. What more palpable proof could any believer want that the spirit
intrudes upon the flesh?
A rapturous vision, by comparison, is a paltry thing.
It remains, after all, just a perception of external events. Empirically
speaking, an encounter with an angel differs from an encounter with Aunt
Harriet only on two points: its sequence seems to strain what we
understand of natural causes, and (therefore) it is not readily
reproducible. Actually, even our run-ins with Aunt Harriet are not much
more reliable than our consultations with conscience. How many times do we
mistake strangers for people we know, or fail to recognize our intimates?
If conscience can be mistaken, how many times over the past decade has
medical science, our culture’s most trusted advisor, reversed itself on
the causes of cancer and heart attack? For some reason, religious
apologists have long lumped the inner compulsion of moral duty into the
category of "experience", along with such animated events as
hearing a beautiful hymn and seeing a baby smile. (The baby can’t make
moral choices, true—but neither can it solve for variables, yet we don’t
consider algebra to be inductive.) Pious scholars, I suspect, stress that
conscience is acquired in order to preserve the high ground for
"revelation", which is always the other extreme in this
nullifying, "either/or" contrast. No learning at the visionary
end: just… pop! A burning bush! A thunderclap! Nevertheless, the truth
is that revelations are perceived and hence subject to the rules of
perception: it is their very suspension of those rules which makes them
marvelous. Were they not subjects of perception’s kingdom, their
defiance of the land’s absolute decrees would leave no one agape. The
legitimate contrast here is with the inner imperative, which has no
measurable grounding in "thingness" and yet impacts things
constantly through human activity. Indeed, moral duty and religious
commitment are both very much invested in superimposing the visible,
tangible world upon a polarized scale where the relative impact of dutiful
behavior makes sincere hearts smile or weep. This is called, among other
things, living the good life, being an adult, and thinking responsibly.
I must close succinctly by addressing the question: How
have reasonable oppositions come to be so often reversed in these affairs,
with matters requiring finesse being reduced to a line in the sand and
matters requiring that one do or die being erased beneath spectral
gradations? I have probably long ago betrayed in these pages my fondness
for laying our contemporary miseries at the door of electronic technology.
In this case, television and the computer (as well as radio before them),
while serving our disastrous passion for instant gratification, are also
implicitly urging us to think in simplistic contrasts. A moment of boredom
or perplexity is annihilated by a touch of the dial or a click of the
mouse. Toggle on, toggle off; previous screen, next screen. The very
jargon of life before the monitor scintillates with nullifying
oppositions. There’s no time to arrange our experiences deliberately
upon a spectrum of subtle change; or rather, there is no will among us to
make the time. The one/two, yes/no mathematics behind digital programming,
far from being a calculus in pursuit of a gesture on Keats’s Grecian
Urn, is really little more than the "ugh-ugh" of some comic-book
cave man—and that blunt fellow becomes us more every day.
But, of course, I’m being a bit hyperbolic now (and
enjoying it, too). I hasten to sober these remarks with the observation
that our shift to "yes/no" alternatives is older, by my own
admission, than radio. The second part to this essay will aspire, for
instance, to sample the rigidity of European thought just before World War
One. When I say "European thought", I do not mean the product of
professional thinkers. In fact, I mean something more like the absence of
thought which ensued upon the decline of the "thinking class". I
am hard pressed not to say that I mean democracy. As we commonly
understand the word "democratic" these days, it has my
unwavering support. I certainly do not favor the rule of tyrants, nor do I
believe that people should be taxed or policed without their consent.
There’s a vast difference, however, between an informed citizenry
periodically appointing representatives from its midst to address the
land’s problems and an amorphous mass of ill-educated, easily led
drudges responding almost daily—through strike, riot, and (nowadays)
poll—to every unconfirmed rumor.6 The rise of such masses
characterized all of the last century. Urban hordes and uprooted
peasantry existed abundantly, to be sure, in the nineteenth century, but
only the twentieth learned to exploit them politically. In an environment
dominated by such milling throngs, the side which carries the day is the
side which keeps things trenchantly simple: yes or no, thumbs up or thumbs
down. One could make the case, indeed, that radio and its electronic
progeny would not have been marketable in an ethos which demanded
painstaking examination of issues—in other words, that the rise of the
masses invented in some sense (i.e., necessitated the invention of)
media of mass communication. The print journalism of the decades directly
preceding radio’s advent was plainly given to reductive contrasts and
fiery ultimata. If anything, radio introduced a brief
"regression" of newspaper reporting into a more literate,
analytical scrutiny of issues by siphoning off the audience’s less
lettered component. Dr. Johnson would have fared rather well on the air
waves: The Immanuel Kant Show would have been canceled before it reached
its first commercial break. Not that Dr. Johnson’s views are shallow…
but in their favoring of a "pro/contra" sort of austerity, they
lend themselves to a format wherein shallow minds find greater comfort.
It is a sad but inescapable fact, I think, that the
intellectuals of the twentieth century frequently had to pitch their
argument at a simplistic level where it could be heard among many
varieties of "line in the sand" stridency. The twentieth
century, from this vantage, was the most political century humanity has
yet endured—not political in the Aristotelian sense of "responsible
to the polis", but political in the ideological sense of
having to wear someone’s livery to receive a hearing. I can scarcely
find it within me to blame any honest scholar for trimming his philosophy
around the edges so that it resembles a more marketed and publicized
version. How else is he to obtain grant money, recommendations, or
employment? (I should really be using the "he/she" barbarism in
this passage, for I have known more thoughtful female scholars who felt
obliged to pick up feminism’s refrain than male scholars who have done a
crash course, say, in deconstruction.) One of the palliatives of being in
this unenviable position, I suppose, is that, as a scholar, you spend most
of you time providing dust clouds and smoke screens to shield the
ideological beacon’s blind sides. That is, having meekly embraced The
Movement and received your membership card, you are absolved of placard
duty and sit-in detail: you labor in the spectrum-mill, instead, splitting
hairs so that the obvious objections to The Movement’s reductivism
become mired in sophistry. The cultivation of polar opposites to generate
a sliding scale is certainly not a lost art in these times—it has merely
been relegated to a rear-guard action. First the charismatic vanguard
stakes out its keyword phrases, mottoes, slogans, and bumper stickers:
then it obfuscates the inanity of its position by employing faithful
scribes to reveal how all positions are inane, anyway… etc., etc. We
have lately been treated to enough politicians who have mastered this art
that I don’t think it needs further description from me.
There is a particular consequence to the rise of the
masses which deserves special emphasis as a saboteur of fine analysis: the
debasement of genuine art. Kant argued in the Critique of Judgment
that moral instruction is a "propaedeutic" to aesthetic taste—by
which he meant that a respect for laws and rules in the practical realm,
where they must clearly exist to make a humane society possible, prepares
the young mind to bring the same respect to the arts, where lawlessness
may seem more amusement than crisis. We are all aware, of course, that art
was highly formal in Kant’s day—perhaps oppressively so. My own
inclination in our troubled present is to invert his remark. That is, I
suspect that an apprenticeship served to the imaginative play of colors or
sounds or metaphors in great art would sharpen up the mind’s ability to
resolve intricate moral problems. This does not mean that great artists
are moral people: for some reason, they seem to achieve distinction
consistently among our most dissolute brethren. We are the benefactors of
their tormented existence, though: they prick and prod us into seeing joy,
fear, peace, menace, hope, or despair where we saw only a gray hovel on a
gray plain before. They awaken us to subtleties which the moral reason, in
its service of a truth beyond this world’s formulas, is obligated to
court with tireless determination.
Yet taste in art does indeed require an
apprentice-ship. The masses of common folk who labored in mills and shops
and warehouses from their childhood to keep body and soul together had no
opportunity to play such edifying games. While they remained on the land,
they had at least a stock of traditional songs, poems, and lore, together
with a truly stunning array of inexpensive, often improvised instruments
which many of them would so master as to make an angel throw away his
harp. Uprooted from such traditions and diversions in the nineteenth
century, however, the poor of Europe were reduced to the existence of
mindless beasts. Some of them eventually emigrated to the New World, where
their lot did not immediately improve, perhaps, but where their children
fared notably better. I realize that my European friends may take rigorous
exception to this gross overview. They will insist that the most
impoverished clerk or huckster in Paris or Madrid has far more culture
than his gadgetry-ridden American counterpart. With respect, though, I
doubt that this was so in the twentieth century’s early years,
especially on the continent. A guttersnipe in Bucharest or Milan was not
protected by the panoply of child labor laws operative in England or the
United States. Even in rural Europe—in the fishing villages of Sicily or
on the parched plains of Andulasia—the degree of malnutrition per capita
and the prominence of related diseases like tuberculosis far exceeded what
one would have found almost anywhere in the States.
Europe was fertile ground, then, for the great
uprisings which plagued the twentieth century from its birth: anarchy,
communism, fascism, and heady draughts of nationalism or political
secessionism which could be blended into all of these. The inarticulate
voice of the mass eventually made itself heard like the roar of the sea.
As it grew more decisive politically, it was servilely wooed or
demagogically guided by intellectuals who feared being cast away on a
desert island. Art became at once more populist and more hermetic,
sometimes at the same time. I have seen portraits of proletarian figures
by the likes of Pier Mondrian (to name the best of the lot) which might
have been accomplished by a clever fifth grader. I am not sufficiently
"in the know", it appears, to appreciate their genius—yet
their ceaseless gestures to the ordinary and the lackluster do little to
leave me feeling humiliated. Andy Warhol’s innumerably mirrored Coke
cans and film idols are the quintessence of this "precious
vulgarity". Today we see it literally reaching into the sewer, for
the media of its work if not for the subject—and I must say that Europe
seems to continue leading us in this toilet-bowl katabasis, even though
all of us in the West are now pretty effectively vaccinated against both
tuberculosis and education. If American political institutions are perhaps
more open to popular choice than what one finds in most of Europe,
European institutions are more tightly tied to the fortunes of dominant
parties, which can leave bureaucratic carnage and exact ruthless vendettas
far and wide after an election. The great untutored mass believes
itself to be in control, it has punished the conventional "élitism"
of the fine arts capitally, and now it really has nowhere to turn for a
little practice in how to view things not clearly accommodated by the
party line.
Contemporary novels and short stories are all volcanic
explosion and no seismic rumble, their characters all cliché and no
complexity. Music is all beat and no rhythm, all noise and no crescendo.
Art is all political statement, complete with the smell of the urinal, and
no deep chasm haunted by a cataract. The arts are dead, and they are dead
because artists can do no more, apparently, than flash their exclusive
allegiances—for or against, one of these or one of those—with all the
subtlety of a gang-banger parading a red kerchief or a black jacket.
I end, as I began, by stressing that my comments are
not intended as a point-by-point response to Professor Chaves’s profound
essay. I deeply admire his grasp of the arts; like so many who have
contributed to Praesidium, his level of cultivation is infinitely
superior to my own. Were I to leave the impression that I associated
philosophical realism with the sort of boorishness I have described in the
previous paragraphs, I would perilously have missed my mark. I do believe,
however, that those of us still committed to thinking must take more care
than ever not to draw our dividing lines too quickly or severely, just as
we must reinforce them to the death when convinced that they are
true. We are surrounded by enemies of fine discernment, for whom the most
impotent pretext—the stuff of a fur coat, the content of a hamburger,
the axle-width of a motor vehicle—instantly plots the geography of
another Great Wall, its palisades marking the edge of reality and the
non-negotiable point of nullification. If we are not to belittle and
parody the rigors of genuine moral duty, we must mount a principled
resistance to this game of high indignation every time our favorite lines
get scuffed.
NOTES
1 Raymond
Tallis, for instance, speaks most perceptively of "a disappointed
longing" in Derrida (see Not Saussure: A Critique of Post-Saussurean
Literary Theory [2nd ed.], New York: St. Martin’s, 1995),
226. I shall not repeat the old saw about cynics being scarred-over
romantics.
2 I
apologize for the dissonance which my use of "polar" is likely
to create throughout this paper—but I believe my understanding of the
word is more precise than the popular one. When people speak of
"polarizing issues", they do not mean viewing issues on a
sliding scale from greatest to least value. They mean, rather, cutting one
widely advertised position entirely adrift from its primary adversary, so
that no negotiation of middle ground is possible. This is not at all how
polarities work: it is, instead, a nullifying opposition.
3 The
antinomies are presented in the Critique of Pure Reason’s Second
Book, 2.6. In his concluding remarks to this section, Kant stresses (in
one of many passages ignored by his realist critics) that the mind
naturally resists the agnosticism licensed by the antinomies in its
pursuit of intelligibility within experience. The moral dimension of this
resistance is advanced when the Critique of Practical Reason
insists upon our common obligation to a metaphysical end.
4 See
footnote in Der Streit der Facultäten, Kants Werke, vol. 7
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), p. 65.
5 My
translation from the French. I must say that the revulsion Kant stirs in
Professor Molnar sometimes mystifies me. In God and the Knowledge of
Reality (New York: Basic Books, 1973), Molnar wrenches from context
Kant’s observation that "God can only be sought in us" (cited
on 166), and concludes that Kant "justifies any and all moral
positions provided the agent possesses an inner awareness, indeed a god,
dictating him the choice" (221). I should have thought that the
Vatican’s very dubious compromises with fascism in the thirties and
forties would convince anyone of what bad choices people can make even
through the holiest of protocols. As for Molnar’s reproach of Kant in a
footnote for a single sentence in a single private letter, I can only hope
that God in his mercy will judge us all with far less thoroughness!
6 I cannot
resist citing in this context Thomas Molnar’s most apt comments from Authority
and Its Enemies (New Brunswick, NJ: Arlington House, 1995). Of
democratically elected majorities, he writes that they "could, after
all, be immoral, and this immorality may go so far as to suppress the
right of the minority to hold different views…. From what source does
our indignation stem when we envisage such possibilities: suppression of
minority rights or legalizing abortion? It stems from the conviction,
articulated or not, that laws and institutions have a higher law behind
them, one which satisfies the moral intelligence" (113). Perfectly
said! And it seems that Professor Molnar does—even at the risk of
walking a few steps beside Kant—accept the inner origin of moral
conviction.
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***************************
R.S. Carlson: Poetic
Encore
After carrying nothing from Dr.
Carlson in the previous issue of Praesidium, we are delighted to
have three new poems. Ralph S. Carlson teaches English at Azusa Pacific
University (California). As is strongly implied in the first poem, he
completed a tour of duty in Vietnam during the war years and has often
returned since on charitable missions.
Some Mornings on the DMZ
Some mornings, a guy would have to admit,
were clear-blue beautiful,
no clouds hiding the foil strip of river
twisting an elbow
over to Route Nine
for the walk up the valley to Khe Sanh,
no convoys dodging mortar rounds on the
highway,
no medevacs pulling wounded from trapped patrols
at the base of the mountain,
no B-52 strikes cracking the opposite ridgeline into
roiling
cauliflower columns of dust
shuddering five seconds sooner than the rest of the
world,
no rain polishing the shell-casing stairs and mud
till walking means falling twice every five meters,
no rain sluicing mud and drowning rats downhill
till sandbags slough away from the bunker walls,
no rain washing away the last sticks and sheet metal
panels
once intended to be the latrine
no drizzle drenching anyone who needs to sneak
outside
to add a little water to the local mud,
no weeklong monsoon downpours
soaking the sandbags to ooze gritty mocha streams
through seams in the plywood ceiling to puddle the
mud floor,
no pneumonia-debilitated buddy awaiting a copter
through the fog,
no frustrated recoilless rifleman from another hilltop
blowing rounds at the command post southeast corner
chewing away one sandbag at a time,
no superindoctrinated mortarman blasting a circle
around the chopper pad with 82 millimeter rounds
cutting a cross inside the circle and an X across the
cross….
no, some mornings were still, soft, blue-sky beautiful,
the forked valley greening over all its gashed earth
from last month’s combat,
the hills still marching grass and brush and bamboo
up to clumps of young trees reminding the vigilant to
dream
of earthbound ways to rice fields and coffee trees, to
pigs and dogs and ducks
browsing simple unmined dirt trails to something
called home.
January/Chinatown/1991
The place we liked has gone out of business. Its
"CLOSED"
sign fronts a clutter of dusty carpet scraps and
chairs. A few tourist traps still light the alleyway
with postcards, calendars, Hong Kong-Taiwan
gimcracks,
tea sets and cork carvings. I find another small
place to get a bowl of barbecued shrimp and rice
noodles. I make my bid in the home language. The
man nods and turns to the kitchen. I roam the place
for papers left for patrons to read. The stack
is all Chinese. I head back to my table, then
spot Ngựời Việt on the floor in the corner. I
reach,
retrieve it, and sit to scan the front page stories.
The elder son suspects a ruse. He asks if I
can read. I say "A bit. Sometimes I don’t know
words."
Later he will tell me the Air Force veteran
story is about an Air Force veterans’ group.
Next the father sits down to talk. Mother, daughter
and two sons sit near by to listen to the odd
accents this stranger brings to the mother tongue. The
father asks the common things—where I learned to
speak;
where I served and when; and, what I thought about
the
old politics, the new views on trade and travel.
He, this year, reached the age of forty-nine, past the
average life span in the homeland. He recalls the
partition of ’54: his family fled south
to Sàigòn; the party Secretary General
shot his own father to prove the righteousness of
Class Warfare; and even in the South, the VC
traced and shot his father; battle took his brother
near Rạch Gia. The father has the daughter bring me
a second cup of tea. He thanks me for my time
in the homeland, despite the loss. Now his life is
calm: feeding the customers feeds the children, but
of course, the long days in the shop leave no time for
English class. I thank him for talking with me. He
thanks me again. "No," I say, truth deep in the home
tradition, "I dare not accept your thanks." The young
ones and wife clean up for closing. I am ready
to drive home in the dark. I pay my tab, and I
tip more than usual. He sees me to the door.
Before he locks up, we shake hands firmly. It is
Western New Year this week in Chinatown, and we
agree that, this young year, in a world rushing its
children to new wars, the old griefs are sufficient.
Into August
I rekke nevere, whan that they been beryed,
though that hir soules goon a-blakeberyed!
Chaucer’s Pardoner
In the thicket east of the trestle
old vines, clumped like saplings thick as his arm
barrelled up purple only to drop
six, eight, even ten feet off
in slim green whips that set tendrils
back into the soil.
Through the young brush under those arches,
paths broke into the vault.
If he came too soon after another,
the lesser vines still leaned,
but little fruit was left within his reach.
Coming too long after
meant seeing berries ripe beyond the blades
curved to cut his flesh,
and hunting hard around the edges to find
whatever might have ripened
since the last pickers worked the vines,
berries the birds had skipped
and deer had missed at dusk in their evening
browse.
Clusters in full sun
were easiest seen and almost always scant,
their berries baked hard,
or—those that escaped the scald and grew and
swelled—
wantonly beaked to shreds.
At the edges, easy access meant
slow, meager picking.
This afternoon he paced the thicket edge
considering the yield.
August lay bright on the dusty green leaves.
The spike-and-sickle briers,
the dried, the slashed, and the few still green
knots of berry clusters.
All was aftermath. To have fruit
he must force the vault.
He stooped to peer inside, between the vines,
but till he shaded his eyes
he couldn’t tell the clusters from the shadows...
yes... berries were there—
well guarded, but large and visibly ripe.
If he forced a path on his own,
he might very well fill his empty pail.
He sniffed, curled his lip,
and started stepping down the nearest vines.
The youngest still caught him
and pulled away no worse than noisy zippers.
Those old enough to bear
had hard, curved spurs and sawed his arm
unless he lifted them
with caution, or whipped back across his face,
refusing to hold firm
in the new patterns he tried to weave
when turning them aside
to avoid breaking or splitting the stalks.
Those that wouldn’t yield
he trampled low as he could. More than once
a vine withstood his weight:
his sole slid off; the vine raked back
across his blue-jeaned leg
leaving thorns in the cloth and skin
to be picked out.
The first time he yelped, then muttered ‘damn’ as
though
Mother might hear him.
But he was getting close. Another yard
of trampling and side-weaving
and he’d be deep enough for good picking.
The vault made high shade
breathing out, as thickets often will,
cooler than it breathed in.
Still he beaded sweat,
and circling gnats lit for water and for blood
between his slaps and twitches.
Hunted as much as hunting, he groped the shade,
avoiding the purple hooks
when he could, and shrugging off the slices
they did take along his arms,
for only a few berries drummed the can:
the bottom quickly blackened
and took the rising harvest silently.
Another trampling move,
and a cluster worth a pint was open to him.
Ripe and overripe,
some fell before the fingertips could close;
others crushed at the touch,
leaving a few spheres among the pulp
to be licked away.
Here in the mottled light, August stained him.
Taking the broken fruit
purpled his tongue and lips. Always among
the firm fruit he found
his fingers dark with mishaps at the vine.
At thicket’s edge, the gnats
raising welts, the briers slashing back
at every move were
unacceptable but, in the opened heart,
were standard August price
on prime fruit taken for a hunger,
to burst across and linger
rich upon the pressing tongue tomorrow.
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***************************
War of the Worlds:
Post-Literate Reporting Meets the Ugliness of Truth
by
Peter Singleton
Over the past year, Praesidium ran two special
issues on the subject of creeping "post-literacy" and the
decline of Western culture. For me, journalism always leaps to mind as an
illustration of this decline, perhaps because I wasted a year or two in
that major once upon a time as an undergraduate. Journalists are not dumb
people: on the contrary, I believe they manifest the essential profile of
the post-literate literato (which would make them oxymorons rather
than morons). They circulate widely at the better soirées, they have
attended the better schools, they know bohemian artists and legendary
celebrities, they clearly brim with progressive ideas for a better future…they
just don’t read, and they don’t think like people who read. They
consume the book’s images, but not the book. The images are the
book: the new book is the extravaganza of photos on your coffee table. The
other day, when American tanks were pausing on their prowl through Baghdad
and a young Marine began to blow a handsome bubble from his turret behind
a machine gun, Diane Sawyer instantly remarked—instantly, before
the little voice in her ear could even bestow creativity—"If anyone
out there happens to recognize this soldier, please send us what
you know!" Sure enough, interviews with the Marine’s family
appeared on the evening news.
The camera pans desultorily, it captures a face, the
talking head throws a frame around it, a network of minions is activated
to secure guffaws from Ma and Pa behind their pitchforks… these people
are good at what they do. They can follow a lead better than the CIA. The
difference with their hard-bitten, nicotine-stained progenitors pecking
out copy after a day at central booking isn’t that they’re lazy,
uninquisitive, or stupid (though a literate person might be stirred to
employ all of these words against them): it’s that their news isn’t
a body of facts, but an image trailing more images.
The thirst for images comes at a cost in sacrificed
truth—not just a swap of one truth for another, but a real sacrifice.
The pampered children of the technocracy just don’t understand
certain realities from which they have always been insulated. I shall
always remember the collapse of the first World Trade Tower in tandem with
Peter Jennings’s ludicrously ineffective appeals to his on-site
reporter. Watching a monitor, Mr. Jennings plainly couldn’t get his mind
around images that didn’t belong on the coffee table. "What’s
happening there? Is that smoke?" "No," I recall muttering
to myself, "it’s the tower falling, you blind ___!" Now,
Jennings is no babe in the woods, at least chronologically. He had no
Nintendo when he was in knickers, and he probably read Shakespeare when he
was in college. I doubt, though, that he saw much of mortuaries or shanty
towns as a cub reporter, and his day’s privilege is our day’s routine.
Television journalism (and what remains of print, too), especially on the
national scale, is increasingly the province of Ivy Leaguers who couldn’t
gas and oil a lawnmower if you put a revolver to their head—let alone
discern at a glance if the revolver was loaded. I hate to pick on Diane
Sawyer (Katie Couric is too easy a target)… but her running commentary
on the Iraqi men who threw a noose around Saddam’s stature in central
Baghdad was uproarious. She had them "discussing what to do
next" when they were clearly tying a knot and probably (so I guessed)
waiting for a pole to push the rope over the left shoulder. Sure enough, a
pole appeared a moment later. God forbid that anyone at the news desk
should ever have to change a tire!
And what applies to wrenches and winches may be
multiplied a hundredfold for bullets and bodies. "Image
journalism" may think that it understands violence and death as no
variety of reportage before it: after all, Peter and Diane’s generation
was reared on Joe Friday and James Bond, and its children on
Schwarzenegger and Stallone—as well as, for the youngest, Mortal
Kombat. This is a false baptism of fire, however—a baptism of fiery
images which choreographs mayhem and distributes death on impact. It is a
complete parody of mortal reality. The most prominent characteristic of
violence in real life is its utter absence of choreography—its perfect
nonsense with respect to the established patterns of living. The most
chilling characteristic of death by violence in real life is the wait
between impact and exit: the rolling, panicked eyes of the victim, and
sometimes the agony of pain which finally retreats into an impenetrable
stupor. Nothing could be less appropriate for coffee table or den. How do
you run to relatives with images like that in your hand, in your head? You
don’t. You lie. You say, "He died in peace. His last thoughts were
of you." Joseph Conrad might prepare you a little for times like
these: Lethal Weapon and CSI will leave you as exposed to
them as a soldier taking a smoke is to a sniper.
Not surprisingly, then, the reporters who went along
for the ride in Iraq, "embedded with" so-and-so company, saw a
lot more than they bargained for… and a lot less. They saw things
instead of images, raw reality instead of sense: sandstorms, sleepless
nights, corpses with half a uniform wrapped around pasty red meat, motors
assured to split the hardest head with racket and exhaust fumes. Some of
these realities yielded no image at all, and some yielded images to which
Mom’s Tears Back Home would somehow have been a stale follow-up. For Mom
would at least have been alive. It wasn’t the grief—they knew grief
inside-out, these reporters. Grief was their stock in trade. After the
flood, after the tornado, there was always grief, and they had always
caught it in their camera’s lens. This time, though, it was the mystery
beyond the grief—way beyond it. Not the grief, but the… the horror.
Not even just death, but the fact of death—the deplorable,
infuriating, noisome, scarcely thinkable fact that a person with a certain
smile, a certain half-dozen photos in his wallet, can end the day looking
like a cut of steak on the butcher’s block. They had built their careers
(mostly young, blossoming careers) around gathering the emotions on every
side of death; but they had only been assigned to stories after death had
already struck, just as they had only sped off to Prom or Spring Break
after someone else had already tuned their sportscar and rotated the
tires. This was not something they had been remotely prepared for. In a
post-literate society, reality is seldom that something.
Many of them grew testy. Their mood at official
military briefings became downright pugnacious. NBC’s "trophy"
Irish redhead, a thick-spectacled "geek" from a glossy magazine,
a tremulous but determined young woman from Hong Kong… they all rose in
turn and questioned why things weren’t going quicker, going better. They
had come to harvest images of children racing to tanks with flowers, and
they seemed upset that the military had not supplied the propaganda of a
Hollywood set. Disgruntled, they packaged what images they could muster
according to the tried-and-true template. Open with fireworks (mortars,
tanks, machine guns), state official position ("Coalition
spokespersons claim that…"), contradict previous position
("But resistance within the city is likely to be heavy…"),
close on an image of poignant ambivalence (soldier gazing into sunset,
child wading through rubble). None of this told anybody much of anything:
it was "impartial reporting" à la lettre. Of course, to
those who affirmed that the day’s events were not shrouded in
ambivalence, the "he said/she said" format was not impartial at
all. It seemed deliberate subversion—an attempt to erase the undertaking’s
overall progress in confusion and fear.
I am not in a position to assess how much of the
reporting about the war was indeed motivated by political objectives. Some
of it, no doubt. What I stress here, however, is not political bias, but
practical ineptitude. The reporting of this war was inept, because the
reporters sent to cover it, for the most part, had absolutely no
preparation whatever—no knowledge of local languages, no tutelage in
regional history or culture, no experience of combat or violent death, no
awareness of the labors involved in getting an engine to run—absolutely
no preparation whatever for their task. They were indeed babes in the
woods. We had all been told beforehand that the war would be covered with
a precision and immediacy never before witnessed. What we got, instead,
were a lot of spectacular images of tanks firing with sharp recoils, of
tracers carouseling through the night, and of machine-gun crews squeezing
off rounds into the distance. Precise and immediate? Well, as images go,
these gained in unstaged grittiness what they lost in graininess, and they
arrived as quickly as the speed of light can overtake a satellite. But the
assessment of just what was happening behind and within and beyond the
images was miserable. The best reportage on this score actually came from
the military—bad news for a free society if we should ever have occasion
to fear a massive cover-up from that quarter. The Secretary of Defense,
while publishing his suspicion, refused to declare that drums found in a
fertilizer plant contained components of nerve gas. Both the suspicion and
the resistance of hastiness turned out to be responsible and justified. On
the other hand, the Pentagon, while declining to assert that Saddam had
been killed in the bombing of April 8, belittled reports that he had
escaped to the Russian embassy or Syria. Two BBC reporters were the source
of this dissonance, which proved completely misleading. A good print
journalist of yesteryear would have ascertained who the reporters were,
what organization paid them, what political view their editors supported,
how long they had been in Baghdad, whether they had contacts there and
spoke the language, etc. No such investigation was ever prosecuted, though
most of it could have been done state-side. The resources back at the home
office were all engaged in finding the bubblegum-chewer’s mom.
Expect more of the same as we proceed through the
twenty-first century—the first century to attempt building an illiterate
culture upon the achievements of literacy. Expect "hard news"
images that replicate the mawkish displays of sentiment on talk shows or
the visual spectacle of Star Wars. Expect the blithering
befuddlement of reporters who don’t know which end of a hammer to hold.
Expect "analysis" which focuses on the gripes and grumbles
roiling the press corps before a briefing—on polls and "world
opinion" and "it seems" and "they wonder" rather
than on the collection of testimony from witnesses. Expect a kind of
sullen daze during "breaking catastrophe" from the prettily
primped faces whom wealth and power got into Yale and Vassar, and whose
experience of life has been carefully shielded from its greatest horrors.
You say that this last condition has nothing distinctly post-literate
about it? Not so. It has been known before, but now it will be known more
widely than ever—for our new age of unprecedented make-believe allows
even the humblest citizen to grow up in a glass bubble.
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***************************
Spontaneous
Overflow
by
Ivor Davies
Ivor Davies often contributes to Praesidium.
This tale from the hallowed halls of ivy has a double dip of the sardonic.
At the sight of three teenaged girls congregated around
a red convertible in a driveway—and, even more, at their sound, their
childish but no longer child-like laughter—Pettijohn accelerated his
pace. Though his Thursday evening walk was usually devoted more to gentle
reflection than to physical conditioning, he pushed himself until he
started to breathe heavily. He knocked out what he imagined to be a
boot-camp rhythm. (That fresh peal of laughter at his back… was he
its cause? They should be locked up—they should all be locked
up!) Today he didn’t want to think, or whatever it was he used to do so
luxuriously on these twilit suburban meanders. Gentle reflection... but
no, "reflect" was even farther off target than "think"
(he reflected). All those satisfied gazes at the new neighborhood’s
young shrubs and clean bay windows, all those satisfied images of the
Wordsworth conference where he was going to read a paper next month…
images, not issues, were his customary companions. Pure fantasy. God, yes—that
was what he usually did on his Thursday evening strolls. He fantasized!
The discovery shocked him almost into jogging. At all costs, he must not
begin fantasizing.
Cheryl was snapping at the kids to get their homework
when he returned in a not unpleasant lather. No wonder they mimicked her
behind her back and deliberately dragged their heels to taunt her—if
only she knew how she sounded! Then she started in on him as he reached
for a cool V-8. "When are you going to help Marshall do his science
project?" "Well, excuse me if I take a walk!" he heard
himself snap back, amazed at how belligerent he could sound when he felt
only trepidation deep inside. "Take a walk, sure… I forgot you’ve
been sitting down all day. It must be nice." "Yeah, nice, all
right. Departmental and faculty meetings on alternate Mondays until the
accreditation’s over—" "You’re breaking my heart."
"—Advising on Tuesdays until the end of April, curriculum committee
every Wednesday—I get one stinking afternoon off to take a
constitutional, and I’m supposed to feel guilty for not doing Marshall’s
homework." "And I don’t get any afternoons off."
"Well, I asked you to come." "And who would get their noses
out of the TV? And who would make supper after being on her feet in the
surgery ward all day?" "All you’d have to do is stick
something in the microwave… that’s about all you do, anyway."
"What did you say?" "Well, look at those, they’re already
breaded and pre-cooked, right?" "Yeah, so why don’t you
volunteer to do them?"
Around and around the kitchen they sparred, he gulping
down his drink and rinsing out the empty can (he had a horror of sticky
cans), she searching for a hot pad and then slamming the salt shaker down
on the range. "I’m going to get my shower—I’ll help Marshall
after supper," he said, throwing in the towel… almost. And then, on
his way out of the ring, "To hell with my lesson plans. To hell with
getting tenure. I’ll just lose this job, too, and then you can work two
shifts in the surgery ward while I cook and do the kids’ homework."
As he raked shampoo through his thinning hair, he
realized that there was no chance of… of what he had been thinking
about. Of what he had been trying to make himself think about as a way to
keep from thinking, from fantasizing. He just wasn’t interested. When
Cheryl got bitchy (and she stayed that way most of the time nowadays), she
just plain turned him off. She still had a little bit of her figure left,
and she was still cute when she laughed (as well as he recalled: she had
laughed as recently as last Christmas). Anyway, he was no gorgeous hunk of
manhood himself (he admitted with a rueful gaze down his white ventral:
the only virtue of those splayed toes was to signal that his fortyish
paunch was somewhat in check). And anyway… since when did a woman have
to be ravishing to be desirable? If she were just a woman, and especially
if she were just your wife…. And anyway, since when did she even have to
be pleasant? He recalled a self-styled Marxist revolutionary in grad
school, her face permanently sour, her dark eyes permanently smoldering,
her semi-permanent turtlenecks permanently advertising those compact, firm
breasts, so that even when the veil came off, the mystique of its
obstruction lingered….
No, no, no! He turned the lever to full cold and
shrieked under the icy spray. He had to chase them away, those breasts.
Not the revolutionary’s, but… and to think that he had her in class
again tomorrow! No chance of a Spring cold snap, according to the weather
(he had already consulted the forecast): another low-cut dress for sure,
or maybe even a tank top. And there she’d be sitting in the front row,
as she always was—front and center, right smack over the edge of his
rostrum.
It was then and there that Pettijohn decided to show a
film in British Romantic Literature. He could sit in the back of the room
with his fingers curled over a remote stick. He could pause the tape from
time to time and make pithy comments. So much for lesson plans.
As he toweled off, he became aware that Marshall was
about to catch what-for from the strain in Olivia’s plaintive voice—the
note she always used to indict her brother for willfully creating
distraction. Sure enough, Cheryl double-teamed the poor bugger on cue. No
doubt about it, he couldn’t lay a hand on Cheryl tonight—not even if
she miraculously cast off her exhaustion and ill humor. She was getting on
his nerves too much. It was one thing to be unpleasant, but her… her mean-spiritedness
strangled every trace of desire within him. Just as well, really. The best
way to handle this present crisis was probably not to work up his
appetite in the mistaken notion that he was quenching it. The monks who’d
burrowed into cold stone vaults like Tintern Abbey’s had it right—they
knew a thing or two, after wrestling with the problem for a few hundred
years. The best way to rein it in was to go cold turkey.
He drew a deep sigh, and headed for the dinette’s
battleground. He could already see Olivia pouting over her math. How her
face had filled out in the last year! Over her militantly folded arms, he
noticed, as if for the first time, the bulge of her blossoming breasts
through a sweatshirt. He decided then and there that if he ever caught her
going to school in a tank top, he’d drag her by her hair into her room
and lock the door. No man deserved to be put through that, least of all a
poor teacher trying to gather his ideas. He decided, too, that he would
forbid her to keep company with those girls down the street in the
convertible… and then he realized that they were far beyond her in their
three or four years of superior maturity. What a horrible, sudden
transition it was—a decline quicker than AIDS, or even MS. One day, your
baby girl finds a pink bicycle in the garage on Christmas morning. The
next, she’s nuzzling up to her professor in shirts cut down to the pink.
His face became so gloomy that a strange quiet descended over the kitchen
table just as he was bracing himself for action.
For the past few days, they seemed always to have
something for supper that made him fidget. Last night it was ravioli. The
night before that, Marshall had built himself a vanilla ice cream cone for
dessert with an ostentatious curl at the dollop’s crest. Little swine!
Tonight it was new potatoes, sleek and shiny in butter sauce, their golden
flesh swelling from their tight brown jackets. Pettijohn tried spearing
them vindictively: that only made it worse. But he couldn’t discern any
improvement when, instead, he tenderly halved them, exposing the white
meat inside beneath rising veils of moist heat. He gave up and moved on to
the peas.
Cheryl, of course, noticed his fidgeting. She wouldn’t
have noticed if he had announced that he was going to climb the ladder to
the top of the house and throw himself off, but this she noticed. She was
very reliable in that regard. "I thought you liked new potatoes. I
made them just because you like them. You don’t just throw those things
in the microwave, you know—they don’t just come in a cellophane
pouch."
"Why not? Everything else does," he grumbled,
lancing three at once and stuffing them into his face. Again he was amazed
that he could sound so surly while feeling timid to the verge of paralysis
inside.
"You sure have been in a foul mood this
week," rasped Cheryl. No one was better than she at turning an olive
branch into a big stick—and, naturally, she had not hesitated to exploit
the advantage of his mouth being stuffed. All he could do was sigh heavily
and roll his eyes.
"Can I have another ice cream cone?" asked
Marshall.
"No!" he snapped through potato-mush, though
the question had not been directed to him.
"Finish your supper first, and we’ll see,"
soothed Cheryl, her barbs reserved for the glower she turned upon him.
Pettijohn realized too late that he had just elbowed Marshall—even
Marshall—into her camp. She was going to exploit that, too. He couldn’t
contain himself any longer.
"Maybe I have a right to be in a foul mood. Okay,
so I sit down most of the day. That’s not true, as a matter of fact. You
try delivering three hours of lectures a day, and see how your feet
feel." It wasn’t anything like three hours, and he seldom lectured
at all… but to hear her talk, you’d never guess that she took coffee
breaks, and he happened to know that she took a good many. "But
forget about the classes. You think it’s easy sitting through those
meetings, trying to stay awake and look like you care—you think that’s
easy, don’t you? Go ahead, say so. You make fun of it all the time. You
think it’s easy. Why? Because it’s all so stupid? Because it’s all
such a waste of time? Because we all just run our mouths and never get
anything done? You think that’s easy?"
Pettijohn was momentarily arrested by the thought that
what he had just described did, after all, sound definitively easy. With
his fork poised in mid-air to secure a rhetorical keystone, he searched
the wicker shelves of running plant vines for his next word. He dare not
look anyone in the face.
"Of course it’s easy! That’s just it—that’s
what makes it so hard! I went to school for half of my adult life so that
I could spend the other half sitting in meetings! I’m a highly trained
professional who has to tiptoe around all of the authors he dreamed of
teaching because a bunch of spoiled brats might find them boring! Whether
I get to stay at this job or have to sell my house and drag my family off
somewhere else is decided by how un-bored my brats are and by how
bright-eyed and bushy-tailed I can look while sitting through hours and
hours of… utter crap! And then I get to come home and try to
explain to my wife how it is that I work hard all day when I just sit back
listening to crap and spouting crap—"
"I wish you’d stop using that word," winced
Cheryl. "Or do you want to be called from one of your important
meetings because Marshall’s sitting in the principal’s office about to
get expelled?"
"Oh, Mom! They wouldn’t expel me for saying
that! Anyway, I wouldn’t say it where a teacher could hear me."
Pettijohn noticed that Olivia was tittering. He thought
of the three teenaged girls and the convertible again: yes, it was
starting.
"So what kind of Gestapo mentality is there at
that school?" he protested weakly (he felt weak inside, but his voice
continued to sound lusty). "Next thing you know, they’ll want to
say a prayer in the morning over the intercom."
"It happens to be the only alternative to public
school that we can pay for, that’s what kind of school it is,"
countered Cheryl, twisting his question. "And I don’t mind one bit
that they’re concerned about foul language. Or maybe you think that Finn
Kleist is an example of what you’d like our son to be."
"Finn Kleist!" laughed Pettijohn.
"You think that’s funny? Have you forgotten that
note I found in Marshall’s jeans last month?"
"No, I was just… Finn Kleist. The first
fruits of multiculturalism. His name. It’s… it’s half…."
But Pettijohn was silenced by two gestures. One was the
contemptuous wave of the hand which all his pedantry attracted from his
wife. The other was the moist stare which Olivia had riveted upon her
potatoes. What in hell was she thinking of? What did she know about dirty
notes and boys like Finn?
"Finn’s okay," continued Marshall glibly—not
at all the right tone to adopt at this moment, especially with his mother.
Why did girls learn about men so much faster than boys learned about
women? "He’s never gotten into trouble. Not… you know,
officially. Not very often."
"He was suspended last fall—they should have
kicked him out permanently!"
"Well, not for language."
"That’s not what Matthew’s mother told
me."
"What… that he was suspended for bad words? That’s
a lie, Mom!"
"She told me that he got kept after school for
what he said on his oral report."
Pettijohn, though keeping his silence now, squirmed at
the word "oral". He shot a furious look down at Olivia, who was
still examining the place mat.
"But that wasn’t his fault, Mom! That was so
unfair! I mean, Ms. Calvert was the one who assigned him to do Romulus and
Remus… you know, the Greek guys who were brought up by a wolf, and when
they were babies they—"
"THAT’S ENOUGH!" roared Pettijohn. He had
surprised himself yet again, along with everyone else at the table; but
this time, the hostility he felt inside was equal to that of his voice.
Working the plaster of Paris for Marshall’s science
project was therapeutic, by comparison. He had been avoiding it all week
long (the thought of shaping little white volcanoes lovingly with spatula
and fingers, one after another, sent his fantasizing into overdrive). In
the oddest sort of way, however, he found his anxiety released. After
about five minutes, he was no longer even trying to suppress the images of
Amada’s generously exposed sternum and the sugarloaf hills which rose in
tandem from a wide, rich plain. He daydreamed himself back into his office
on Monday just after class, where Amada had followed him with a trace of
steal tension in her mindless prattle. Frankly, he, too, had been a bit
shocked by the poverty of her first major essay. She seemed to read most
of the assignments (a rarity) and to talk about them in class with genuine
sensitivity (a wonder of the world). She even possessed substantial
knowledge of related texts not on the syllabus (a miracle): she had all
the signs of being an honest-to-goodness lover of fine literature. Yet her
essay had been a sloppy mess, both conceptually and visually. She hadn’t
taken the minimal pride in her work to type it up after marking out entire
lines of the handwritten version and scrawling replacement lines in the
margins. That much he might have forgiven, if only what emerged were
tinged with brilliance. On the contrary, it was mired in platitude and
generality. If he hadn’t already known from class discussion that she
did the reading, the essay would have convinced him that she was bluffing
her way through the course, for its argument had no acuity whatever, and
textual illustrations were absent except in the most elliptical form
("… like the death wishes in Shelley and Keats" had been the
closest thing to a primary reference).
Then, in the middle of his shuffling papers on the desk
and trying to break the news that she was one lousy writer, she had pulled
the empty chair all the way across the room to his left side. Her knees
were jammed against the desk’s drawers, so he couldn’t very well ask
her to lean forward. He had had to hold the paper between them, on the arm
of his swivel chair; and there, as near to his hands as her highly
perfumed cheek was to his nose, had been those succulent breasts. He could
actually see inside the lower-than-low-cut dress—he could see
everything. He had felt so disturbed that he couldn’t put a single
sentence together. At any cost, by any means, he had had to disrupt the
scene before the restlessness in his lap became visible.
But now, safely sprawled on the den carpet with his
head propped on a palm, Pettijohn revisited the scene and slipped the
dress down from Amada’s shoulders. He sculpted her breasts over and
over, caressing the plaster with thumb and spatula until it ran high and
smooth and firm. Only when Marshall began to come after him and gouge out
volcanic calderas with a pencil did he feel a frown creeping over his
face.
"This looks really neat, Dad!"
He was about to say something—just what it was, he
had no very clear notion. But the first words never left his lips. He
happened to glimpse Cheryl’s feet beside the sofa, and peeked up from
under his brows. Her mouth, too, was open, as if it too couldn’t find
that first word to express a horrified indignation. Nervously, he glanced
back at his mounds. They were plump, round, and supple—not exactly the
raggedly devastated slopes of Vesuvius or St. Helen’s.
"This stuff is kind of… kind of sagging as it
dries, Marsh," he stammered. "Be sure to make it look… you
know, more like the pictures in your book. In your science book… your geography
book."
"Shouldn’t you be making your lesson plans
now?" he heard Cheryl ask dryly over his head.
"Oh, umm… made them already. In the
shower."
"In the shower."
"Yeah. I get lots of ideas in the shower."
"How about that! Must be the sound of water going
down the drain."
If only he had been able to do something equally
therapeutic as he lay in bed trying to sleep… but by that time, three
hours later, Pettijohn found himself unwelcomely awake and agitated. Just
what exactly was he going to say to Amada tomorrow? He might be
able to avoid in class the bust that was normally thrust under his nose
just beyond the rostrum (and which he had noticed, of course, long before
this week—but it had never been a threat to his job, his marriage, and
his sanity before this week). How, though, would he avoid her—would he
avoid them, those two beautiful balloons—after class? On Monday,
he had fled from her to the secretary’s office after faking an urgent
phone call, and on Wednesday he had deliberately scheduled other
conferences for his morning office hour. But nothing was lined up for
tomorrow… and even if he improvised something, how long could he keep
dodging her before she complained to Stew Utley? And then he thought of
the advice that "Studs" himself—the chair of the English
Department, no less—had once bestowed upon him in another context. Give
the students all A’s and B’s throughout the semester so that you get
good evaluations, then murder them on a killer final exam that counts 40%
of the grade and spares you a reproach from the Dean for contributing to
grade inflation. (Pettijohn had protested, "What if they come back
for revenge next semester?"… to which the one-time radical had
replied, with an "old boy" cynicism that was meant to be
anti-establishment, don’t-give-a-damn hipness, "They won’t,
Raymond! Why should they get shafted a second time just to give you
the shaft?")
Well, something like that might work here. Just tell
Amada to retype her paper—tell her it’s too messy, to make some of the
changes recommended in the margins. Then give her an A-. She’d be off
his back and out of his face: goodbye to any further little tête-à-teats
in his office For there was never any doubt in Pettijohn’s mind that
Amada’s interest in him went precisely as far as his grade book. She was
blackmailing him. Her double-barreled gun was forcing him into some kind
of career-ending indiscretion, and the price of release was an A. He wasn’t
stupid—he knew what was going on here!
The morning was blessedly hectic. He had hardly time
enough to drink his coffee, what with straightening out the mess in
Marshall’s hair and clearing away the remains of breakfast (Cheryl
having charged off bright and early to the hospital: how come her
microwaved suppers were hard labor while his frenetic maneuvers at
breakfast were unworthy of notice?). There was certainly not a moment to
spare upon any apprehensive brooding about Amada and her bow chasers…
not, at least, until he was nestled behind his desk with the door safely
locked. This was usually his favorite time, a period not scheduled as an
office hour and when, indeed, most professors and students were still
groggily rolling out of bed. In past years, he had often volunteered to
take the eight o’clock class so as to curry favor with everyone around
the department; but now that the time to apply for tenure was looming, he
needed to think seriously about publishing an article or two: hence this
very private spell at the beginning of the day (or what was, around
campus, the day’s beginning).
Today, with his video on Lord Byron safely reserved and
his notes on Wordsworth’s sister neatly assembled before him, Pettijohn
found that he could do absolutely nothing. Nothing but think. It wasn’t
even fantasizing any more—he had worked his way through all that. No, it
was closer to a genuine reflection upon his mortal coil. A genuinely
melancholic reflection. Maybe sullen, as well. Here he was, about to
exorcise a voluptuous young woman from his life so that he could settle
back into his stultifying grind… and why was the exorcism (about whose
success he had no doubts whatever) required of him? Why was his face being
rubbed in his own impotence? Naturally, he couldn’t lock the door behind
the two of them, clear his desk at one sweep of the arm, and crawl over
the well-worn surface into Amada’s luscious embrace… naturally. Even
if she were not just teasing him and would really have him, the risk to
his career would be incalculable. And he wasn’t quite ready to confront
the prospect of being a perfect heel in a divorce suit, either. Quite
ready? He wasn’t even preparing for it—it wasn’t going to enter
his mind. He was going to do the right thing: he already knew he was. He
had known that from the start. That was what saddened him, what irritated
him. Somewhere over the last ten years, he had surrendered himself to
being boxed up in oppressive duties which would never more allow him to
consult his own happiness, first and foremost. In a significant sense, his
life was over. Amada, with her low-cut dresses and tight-fitting shirts,
had made him see that. Would she have dared to dangle her riches before
his nose if she hadn’t well known that his hands were shackled? She was
like a strumpet queen blowing kisses at galley slaves.
The result of this meditative hour was Pettijohn’s
decision that he detested Amada, perhaps more than he had ever detested
anyone in his life.
The real Amada who settled quietly into the front row
compared favorably with the one he had briefly imagined slapping in the
face. She was wearing a dress again: in fact, she usually wore a dress.
Here was one girl, at least, who had never worn a tank top to his class.
(He would have noticed; but then, maybe that was why. The casement
window was enough—neon lighting would actually have been a distraction
from the merchandise.) One could almost say that there was something
vaguely traditional about her tastes and manners. The dress’s thin
fabric fell well below her knees. The problem was that it also fell almost
below her nipples, whose more than ample mountings were held nestled
together like hands at once praying for and offering heaven. By the time
he had finished taking attendance (with Amada & Company being checked
off first), Pettijohn had forgotten all about his righteous loathing. He
even felt something melt within as she dealt him that sweet smile, that
rather homely smile exaggerated by a slight overbite which became oddly
sweet as it contemplated the full masses beneath it. She seemed at times,
almost, a naïve country lass bearing blue-ribbon produce back from the
fair in her arms: "See how big? The judges hardly looked at the
others. Want to touch?"
Pettijohn actually found himself in good spirits as he
slyly extolled Don Juan’s saucy delights (hoping to tempt the
group into reading the next assignment) before retreating to the back of
the room with his remote control. The rest of the hour was dedicated to a
scenic tour of Greece and an "in-depth" examination of Lord
Byron’s last days: The Travel Channel and The History Channel,
basically. (His sense of irony had turned so spicy by now that he smiled
over the absurdity of the department’s heavy reliance on these videos
after years of undermining the historical approach to literature: too bad
he had no one with whom to share the saline morsel. He glanced left and
right… no. Not a chance.)
As class ended and he gathered his papers, he remarked
vociferously to nobody in particular that he had to get the video back to
the library. Amada didn’t make the least effort to detain him or to
follow him. Could he really have wriggled off the hook so easily? As
incredible as it seemed, he now felt saddened by her indifference, even a
little hurt. An hour ago, he had wanted to lift his chin, point his finger
out the door, and cry, "Go clothe yourself, you slut!" Now he
was stung by the oddest sense of having been betrayed.
The injury evaporated—vaporized instantly in one
flashbulb flicker—when, ten minutes later, he turned down his office’s
corridor and discovered Amada leaning on his locked door. Already she was
unfurling that demure smile which vaguely pointed at her bust (but what didn’t
point at her bust, including the smoke alarm and the door stopper?). He
fumbled for his keys as he fumbled for words.
"Can we talk about my paper now, Dr. Pettijohn?"
"I… sure, I… if you could just retype it… I
mean, type it… maybe a few marginal comments… my comments in
the margins, I mean… make a few adjustments…."
But it was hopeless. He couldn’t get rid of her in
the hall. What was he going to say—"I’ll give you an A, just
leave me alone"?
His damned fumbling incurred a further penalty. As he
looked beyond his desk into thin air, trying to impose order on his
thoughts while holding his swivel chair’s back in a kind of minuet, she
grabbed the free chair and plopped it right beside him once again. Her
initiative left him speechless. All he could do was gape; and as he gaped,
his eyes sank irresistibly into the chasm between those ripely swollen
glories of the flesh. When he caught himself and glanced back up to her
eyes, he was absolutely certain that she had been spying out what he was
spying on. She smiled more broadly than ever, leaned forward, and elevated
her creaseless young throat.
"Uh…." Pettijohn turned away, coughing on
his own saliva. It was then that he noticed his wide-open door. Maybe he
should close it. Yes, by all means… but he had no sooner reached for it
than he abandoned the effort. The fear of being observed with a luscious,
unbodiced tart in his lap was squelched by the thought of what Amada might
do to him—of what she might do with him, might make him do with
her—if they were shut up together.
He heaved an enormous sigh, then plunged into his chair
with all the adroit determination of a fireman sliding down a pole.
"So… so, what’s on the menu? I mean…"
"You said you’d explain to me why I got a
C."
"Yes, well, I… are my comments not clear?"
"No. You said you would explain them."
"Oh. Well… well, let’s see what I wrote here.
Umm. Umm. ‘Almost utter…’." Pettijohn cleared his throat again,
and tried to blink away something like spots before his eyes: the word was
utter. "‘Almost utter absence of reference to primary
sources…’."
"But you said this wasn’t a research paper, that
it was just our own ideas."
"Yes, that would be secondary sources. Citing
scholarship, I mean, would be secondary sources. Use of… secondary
sources. What you need to do here is to pluck… er, to pull a few lines
from the poets you discuss and—"
"But it’s supposed to be my
thoughts!"
For the first time, Pettijohn gathered something like
poise. More precisely, he was struck mute by the obtuse petulance of the
objection, and he found in his bewilderment a tiny trace of that former
ill humor.
"But… but Amada," he frowned, for once
looking straight into her deep brown eyes, "these thoughts of yours
are to be about the poetry we’ve read."
She didn’t give an inch: in fact, her obtuseness grew
more profound. "They are about the poetry! Why should I just
quote stuff that anyone can look up in the book? You want me just to pad
my paper like that? I guess Teila was right."
"I… what? Teila?"
"She told me just to cram the paper with a lot of
stuff copied out of the book. But I said, ‘No, he wants our own original
thoughts.’"
"I… I do! But… but you are thinking about
something, right? So you have to show how your thoughts relate to that
something that… that you’re thinking about…."
There they were again. If she had positioned two thugs
in brass knuckles at her shoulders, he couldn’t have been more
distracted.
She must have known exactly what his thoughts
currently related to; because, without a word, she leaned toward his lap
(how had the paper gotten there? he hadn’t even noticed) and turned back
a page, forcing her cleavage right beneath his nose. Pettijohn felt a sort
of "what’s the use" swoon begin to descend upon him. In
another second, he would have been running his lips up and down those
sweet slopes like a desert castaway gulping water at an oasis. At that
very instant, however, Gwyn Thomas came prancing down the hall warbling Robin
Goch with so many Welsh trills that the tune’s simple harmony
somehow escaped. Pettijohn could identify the precise moment when his
voice was magnified in the open doorway. Professor Thomas never missed a
trill; but the next time he piped the refrain, it was translated into the
oppressor’s tongue. "Robin Redbreast, sweet and wild…"
As he withdrew his lips to a safe distance from the
limpid pools in his double mirage, Pettijohn found Amada smiling coyly at
his eyelids—almost conspiratorially, as if to answer back in song,
"People will say we’re in love." For the first time, he
remarked how moist and bright her teeth were.
"I really like talking with you," she lisped.
"I learn so much!"
He couldn’t take any more. He groaned, shut his eyes
tight, and fell heavily back in his chair.
"I was just going to show you this passage,"
he heard her persisting. "I thought it was one of my best, but you
marked it all up."
"Which one is that, Amada?" he droned, still
squeezing his lids shut.
"The one where I talk about how the Romantics
refused to be enslaved to convention. They were different—they were
themselves. Everything they did asserted their independence. They were the
beginning of the modern era. In many ways, we are their children. The
freedoms we have today are all founded on their will to be free. If it
weren’t for them, we would still have marriages arranged by our parents,
and the institution of slavery."
Of this, too, Pettijohn could take no more. It was
enough to be stitched up tight in a winding sheet and made to witness a
strip show as colleagues passed smirking up and down the hall. But his
mind, his mind remained unfettered and functional, and he just
couldn’t sit still for any more glitter-sprinkled, cliché-wrapped
folderol. He wouldn’t. Freedom, yes—he was a free man, though
he be shot for declaring the truth. He might have to take this kind of
crap from a full class after studying a decade to render himself wise; he
might have to swallow large shovelfuls of it at committee and faculty
meetings, and then ask for more with a smile. But enough was enough.
Something was flowing over, and he wasn’t going to hold it in for this
little twit. Even if twit rhymed with another monosyllable highly
relevant to Amada, the word that best described her—that really
described her, and not just doubled, but squared and cubed—was twit.
"In the first place, our freedoms, as you call
them, are primarily an outgrowth of the Enlightenment. Politically, that
is. The exchanges which produced them were those between Enlightenment
thinkers. Chronologically, it is impossible and ridiculous to maintain
that they were a product of Romanticism. In the second place, the
Romantics—as I keep trying to tell you guys in class to no avail—were
themselves children of the Enlightenment. Why do you think we talked about
the sublime all last month? Where do you think that concept came from?
Where did I say it came from—no, not me; where did Wordsworth and
Coleridge say it came from? It’s not a matter of your opinion
here. I’m sorry, but it’s not. You can’t change history. It just
didn’t happen that way. In the third place, there was a fierce reaction
to Romanticism, and especially in modernism. You can’t just declare that
we are their children because you’ve seen news reels of hippies with
flowers in their hair. I know you probably haven’t studied those periods
yet, except in your survey courses—but why are you even writing about
them? This course isn’t about those periods. You’re supposed to be
writing about the Romantic Period. For crying out loud, what do you mean
rambling on and on about the twentieth century?"
Pettijohn was surprised to discover himself leaning
forward in his chair—half risen from it, in fact—and confronting Amada
full in the face once more, with a finger raised oratorically over his
head. The girl’s features, momentarily but unmistakably, were indeed
those of a girl—a child like his daughter, pouting, confused, and
intimidated. He was startled that her mouth could sag so and still produce
no wrinkles about the corners.
"But Dr. Utley said we were Romantics. He said
that’s what the sixties were all about."
For some reason, Pettijohn rose the rest of the way
from his chair, fitting a palm carefully over his brow. "Ah… Dr.
Utley."
"What’s a news reel?"
"What?"
But either the question had merely been floated to
elicit a turn in her direction, or else she had already forgotten about
it. She rose to meet him, almost straight into his arms, her plump, thinly
veiled cones not two inches from his shirt. Strange… as he looked
irresistibly down upon her treasures, he felt tears welling in his eyes.
These would never, could never be his.
"So there’s nothing I can do? Because I’m
young, and was born too late, and haven’t had these other courses, and
haven’t read all the books you’ve read, and didn’t pull stuff out of
the book… then I’m just going to have to get a C?"
Miserably, he looked about for her paper—where in
hell had it gone? If only he could kiss them goodbye, like Humphrey Bogart
and Ingrid Bergman, just one long goodbye kiss for each one….
"Are you looking for this?"
"Uh… yeah. Just retype it, Amada. I mean, just…
just type it out. It’s… it’s almost illegible. I can’t give an A
to a paper that’s illegible."
"Then if I type it, I’ll get an A?"
"Um… sure, probably. Let’s just see you try to
answer some of those comments I made."
"I can do that!" she said smartly. He had
been moping about trying to avoid a frontal view of her. Now that she was
fluttering away like Tinkerbelle, he almost lifted a hand to detain her.
The decisive swish of her dress betrayed no inclination to linger. In a
tingle of plate jewelry—a charm bracelet and earrings (somehow he’d
never noticed them before)—she shook back her thickly waved hair,
already at his door, and turned one last time.
"Thanks, Dr. Pettijohn! I really appreciate
it! You’re a great teacher!"
She said all this quite loud enough to be heard up and
down the corridor, almost as though she were the pleased patron in a car
commercial. It was his payback, perhaps (his tit for tat, he mused
bitterly). Though his feet seemed glued to the carpet, the rest of his
body strained after the swish and tingle as they withdrew into the
distance. Not five seconds had elapsed before he heard Amada’s
satisfied-customer voice chirp once more, "Hey, Dr. Utley!"
"Hi, Maddie!" said "Studs"
effusively.
Pettijohn didn’t like something in his tone. He could
just imagine Studs, proud owner of a Harley-Davidson, inviting "Maddie"
to climb up behind him in a tone like that. He decided that he absolutely
had to see the face which accompanied the greeting.
Flinging himself out the door with sudden energy,
Pettijohn nevertheless came stalking down the serpentine hallway’s curl
too late to catch the backwash of one more swish—but Studs was posed
like a piece of driftwood pointing the direction of the tide’s last ebb,
his yellowed teeth hanging hungrily out his gray beard, his tall,
incredibly lean frame almost coiled around the next corner. His tongue was
manufacturing some kind of clicking sound from behind those gaunt teeth.
Pettijohn decided that if he ever heard anyone emitting a sound like that
after the passage of Olivia, he would kick the culprit in the crotch. Of
course, Olivia wasn’t going to hang around places like… like
university English departments.
"Raymond, dear boy, you look positively
deathly!"
It was Gwyn Thomas. He had padded noiselessly from the
direction of Studs’s gaze, his own dark Welsh eyes rolling somewhat more
discreetly back toward the main hall. His height a mere fraction of their
department chair’s, his compact paunch as well groomed in cardigan and
blazer as Studs’s fence-rail limbs shabbily filled their denim and
flannel, Professor Thomas nonetheless perfectly completed this pair of
Saturnine bookends….
Or so it seemed to Pettijohn. He sighed and continued
to glare at Studs, who had not yet so much as acknowledged his presence.
How he would have liked to grab the "dude" by his long gray
pony-tail!
"Our colleague stands in great need of the looming
summer holiday," continued Thomas, feeling out his pants pockets
without interrupting the perfect creases. He was gazing philosophically at
the carpet, yet Pettijohn could tell by the way his sleek head bent toward
Studs that the comment was addressed there, and that its subject was him.
"I could use a vacation myself," murmured
Studs behind his horrid teeth, not visibly moving a muscle.
"Get on the bike and head west, eh?" murmured
Thomas back: he might have been a priest taking a confession.
"Yeah. Something like that."
"Mm. To my mind, your Rocky Mountains are
altogether too… rocky."
"North Wales for you."
"Oh, most definitely, dear boy! There the hills
are round and gentle. The mists have wrapped them and caressed them until
they wear their rich verdure like a baby’s down. One may tarry among
them for hours without growing weary, passing easily to the crest and
easily to the valley. For the valleys are also sweet. The mists leave a
bead on every grass blade as they trail across the rounded bryn, and the
beads flow like a gentle perspiration, and their rivulets wind to the
valleys like silver arteries."
"I like my arteries to be moving a little
faster." Studs’s facétie slightly startled Pettijohn: the
voice of Gwyn Thomas had cast a Merlin-like spell over him.
"One cannot become one with things in haste, dear
boy. Many have tried to conquer those hills, but they must be stroked and
wooed. He who would come rudely with fire and sword is doomed to stumble
into a pwll, or to be devoured by the dragon of the cave."
"Stay out of the caves, is that what you’re
saying?"
"Indeed, there is only one way out of a cave, and
that is the way in. One enters in conquest, one exits in rout."
"Mm. Stay out of the caves. I take your
point."
If Pettijohn could have melted into the newly painted
wall, he would have done so. As it was, he managed literally to walk
backward in his tracks, always (so he believed) just beyond the border of
Gwyn Thomas’s low, abstracted, vatic gaze. Finally he slipped from their
view. He turned, followed the corridor to its other end, and mashed the
elevator button. He realized belatedly that he had left his office wide
open… but what did it matter? He needed some fresh air, and who in this
place was likely to steal his Collected Works of Leigh Hunt? As the
electric door shut seamlessly upon him and the capsule began its silent,
two-story descent, he was again too late in regretting that he had not
sought out the stairs. Though the transit was mild, he was nevertheless so
overwhelmed by a sudden flutter in his stomach that he fell heavily
against the padded wall. With the hard, reassuring pressure between his
shoulder blades, he had just time enough to fish out his handkerchief—though
not dexterity enough to catch all of his breakfast orange juice in it. He
gazed distantly, penitently, at the brilliant, bubbly spatter between his
shoes as he folded the kerchief with extreme care. When the door opened
upon a virtually empty lobby, he decided to step over the mess and say
nothing about it.
back to Contents
***************************
Star-Mangled Banner
When a nameless Iraqi citizen, asked what he expected
would be the consequences of American intervention, jubilantly exclaimed,
"Democracy, whiskey, and sexy!" he was probably not very wide of
the mark. (And he might have added "mangled English" to the
list.) It is not our place in this journal to opine (as Secretary Rumsfeld
would say) upon the political implications of current events. Yet somebody
somewhere (as Homer would say) really ought to remark the sad irony of the
situation. Certain elements of Western culture apparently retain enough
common humanity to risk life and limb that innocent non-combatants and
children on the other side of the world may be freed from a psychopathic
tyrant—and, yes, also enough reason to gauge the long-term effects of
trusting in a psychopathic tyrant’s turning reasonable. But the West is
crumbling, and has been so for a century. Internal critics of its humanity
and its reason are, of course, incapable of appreciating the nature of
this decay, since their refrain is precisely that nothing unites human
beings, least of all rational discourse. So as our more optimistic
brethren warm themselves in the prospect of a dawning renaissance, our
gloomier brethren wear themselves out trying to ask Hamlet-like questions
without having read Hamlet (or having read him as gay or Oedipal or
a chocoholic). The former cannot see that new economic prosperity and new
political freedom do not necessarily mean new life for the spirit, and the
latter, being fiercely and definitively resistant to the very notion that
things spiritual exist, can only cavil that so-an-so is getting
such-and-such a sweet deal on oil-drilling rights.
Indeed, on the home front, the "Nothing’s either
bad or good" crowd has been instrumental in maximizing Hollywood’s
opportunities to degrade our taste and in hazing our children to
"experiment" during their college years. The very people who did
not want us to "intrude" in Iraq, that is, are closely allied
with the degenerative cultural trends which, more than any other single
factor, have rendered the West odious to the Muslim world. The very people
who pushed ahead to free Iraq, on the other hand, are most likely to
adhere to some sort of religiously based resistance to Hollywood and
campus libertinage here at home… and yet, their initiative has indeed
provided a wedge for "the enemy" to peddle porn and booze in
Baghdad (as well as the all-American Coke-and-Big-Mac).
Who can blame the average Iraqi for getting his cheer
wrong? Maybe, just maybe, he got it right.
back to Contents
***************************
Footprints in
the Snow of the Moon,
Chapter Six
by
J.S. Moseby
We published the first two chapters of
Mr. Moseby’s novel in the Winter issue. By this point in the story, the
narrator is well aware that Celine, whom he considers to be his fiancée,
is subject to depression and has been suicidal in the past. His mother,
meanwhile, has flatly refused to meet the girl; his sister Meg represents
the only link which he has been able to forge between Celine and his
family.
There are times when it is impossible to tell a story
blow by blow. Sometimes several things are happening over the same period;
and sometimes these same things are not so much happening as evolving,
each of them the cause of the others in certain ways, each of them the
others’ effect, as well. Spring Break was a descent into a valley of
swirling mists, where landmarks seemed to change shape or position—or
simply vanish—by the moment. For this golden hour, Celine and Meg and I
were eating in a public place as merrily as three sailors on leave in
Paradise. For that gray hour, I found myself walking with Celine’s hand
in mine and yet unable to follow her gaze or understand her lengthy
silences. For a black hour without name or number in the dead of night, I
sat wide awake in my bed at home after bolting, cold with sweat, out of a
dream, wondering if I would ever see Celine again, yearning to race
instantly over to her apartment. Who could be surprised that we were both
topsy-turvy? Meg was a blessing to us… but my mother had laid her
unspoken curse upon our union. We had finally broken somewhat free of
malignant parental influences… but what other friends or relatives did
we have in the world? I understood Celine’s past infinitely better after
Mona had filled me in, and I had helped Celine to see the pitiful delusion
behind my mother’s animosity… but what chance had we of ever bringing
peace where so much frustration had festered for so long? We had perhaps
learned too much too quickly. It was paralyzing, terrifying, oppressive,
and… and something else, something we certainly didn’t expect and
something no theorist of the human mind has ever touched on, as far as I
know.
We were aroused, physically. We began to want each
other as never before—to want to possess and be possessed by each other’s
bodies. In the afterglow of Meg’s angelic descent into our complicated
lives, we restrained ourselves; but later, on Monday or Tuesday evening,
our golden threesome now a star abandoned in another hemisphere, the two
of us began to grow intense. We groped and wrestled, and our hands
traveled everywhere. Celine had often been a somewhat uneven collaborator
in our kisses: she would sometimes seek me out and draw me in, but she
would more commonly just throw her head back and offer her lips to me. Now
she searched as she surrendered and took as she gave. She was on fire, and
she set me on fire. We both struggled like pearl divers at the bottom of
the sea, mere seconds away from blackout, our eyes three-quarters closed
and useless in the murk, our fingers ransacking shadows for the prize. And
when we came back up for air at last, there was no joy in our hearts, but
exhaustion and an indescribable sweet sadness.
This will all strike any citizen of the contemporary
world as comic, and I won’t deny that it has that dimension when viewed
at a distance. Parental rejection as an aphrodisiac: what a delicious
irony, and what a biblically ancient one! But ancient as it is, it
remains, as I’ve said, undiscussed with any seriousness as part of today’s
great social crisis. At least, I myself would never have suspected how my
parents’ spurning of my fiancée could end up whetting my appetite for
her. As long as I could see Celine and me harmoniously following the
pattern of my mom and dad, I regarded her with that quasi-mystical
reverence that I’ve already described. We no more needed sex education
or sexual exploration than generations of ancestors before us: they had
always found out how to keep the line alive, and we would, too, once
formally admitted into their ranks. The continuity of history made sexual
rebellion, above all else, ugly. We were waiting (or I was
waiting) for absorption into the beauty of marriage as a natural cycle, a
music of the spheres. We would unite in a fertile explosion perfectly on
cue as long as the rhythm was observed on all sides.
But this era had banished rhythm. Even my immovably
wedded parents had failed miserably to recognize the importance of
physical chemistry to spiritual union. They seemed to think (or my mother
seemed to think, with Dad pleading no contest) that I could be reasoned
out of my present attachment and persuaded to hold out for more money,
better social connections. In an atmosphere like this, sex has always run
wild outside marital bonds. Celine, of course, had even less cause than I
to hear any mystical harmony descending through the ages. Her parents’
marriage had labored almost from the start, as I learned from Mona by the
end of the week, and I had known for some while that she felt herself
excluded from her mother’s second marriage. The institution was anything
but a picture of permanence to her: it was, on the contrary, the kiss of
death to loving ties. Had she sometimes held back ever so slightly, so
subconsciously, from my kisses because she felt them drawing her up to
some kind of pedestal rather than down to instant gratification? That
gratification would have brought the death of desire, true… but it would
have been an honest, straightforward death, and seldom (she could hope) a
permanent one. Desire could always revive. The fall from the pedestal,
however, would be far and catastrophic. The pieces would never fit back
together again. Much as she wanted a family and stability, she had a fear
of marriage which very much resembled a fear of heights.
And so she caught fire as she felt me heating up, and I
caught fire, in return. This, I realized, was the kind of love she had
known with men before—especially with Richard, that other
Richard. I knew it would end up drawing her back into the fatal cycle of
fleeting joys and ultimate disillusion—not that I would ever have
wearied of her. But I could sense that I myself was being drawn into a
ride down the maelstrom whose circles were ever narrower, and I was not
quite vain enough to believe that I might not end up bearing the other
Richard’s image in some way that I could neither foresee nor—once it
overtook me—deny. The mere appearance that I, too, was mining her sweet
body for all the pleasures I could wring from it might cause Celine to
supply the rest of the similarity from her imagination. She was good at
doing that. Over the years, I have often noticed that neurosis is, from a
certain perspective, an overdeveloped inclination to find pattern. The
paranoid is a highly creative person in the reverse of what we consider an
artistic sense. Rather than finding rich diversity where the rest of us
perceive only humdrum routine, he or she finds the same old thing where
the rest of us see confusing variety. I was falling into the wrong pattern—the
one that Celine knew all too well, not the one bequeathed by centuries of
civilization which our era had all but forgotten. Even if I hadn’t the
equipment then to assess the dangers as soberly as I do now, I knew
better, all the same. Why did I get so close to the edge?
People will say, "Well, you were young. The
hormones were running high!" But that kind of explanation is even
more obtuse than it is crude. Sex is a less basic motive force than anger
or fear, in my opinion. Men can be so consumed by rage or terror that they
forget all about sex for days or weeks or months. I’ve seen it happen.
At the same time, anger and fear produce certain physiological effects—accelerated
heartbeat, raised blood pressure, muscular contractions—which sex can
magically relax. Men borne away by battle fury sometimes rape their way
through a country village after wiping out its military defenses. Men on
the fearful eve of a great battle often fling themselves into the arms of
prostitutes. My parents had delivered Celine and me to just these
emotions. Anger dominated in my case. I was fearful of losing Celine, all
right, to another severe depression… but I was absolutely furious with
my mother, and little less so with my dad. Naturally, they had adopted the
tried-and-true "see no evil, hear no evil" posture throughout
that week. What else would they have done (speaking of neurotic submission
to pattern)? The days of my break ticked away, one by one—and never
another word on the subject of Celine! If a judge had sentenced me to
community service for being drunk and disorderly, and I had wandered to
the supper table each night fresh from my garbage-picking duties, the wall
of silence could not have been more complete. It made me furious. After
Tuesday, I simply ceased trying to eat in their midst. I would stop by the
grocery store, show up on Celine’s doorstep with a brown bag of TV
dinners, and sit down in an atmosphere where I could actually swallow. But
I also brought over all that nervous tension. We broke a couple of plates
once when I attacked her at the sink.
On her side, Celine was quivering like a leaf beneath
those distracted gazes and numbed silences because (as I can say now,
after having seen the whole cycle dozens of times) she was frightened half
to death. She was sleeping poorly again—I could see the weariness in her
drooping lids, in her contracted lips, in the constant pallor of her
cheeks. The lethal idea had taken hold of her that we would never be
married, never have a home together—that she would only ruin the home I
already had with my parents. Despite all my assurances, she couldn’t
believe that she was enough to compensate me for that loss. She could tell
that I thought she would be… but that only turned up the tension
several more notches. What if I sacrificed everything for her, and then
discovered—too late to redeem any of it—that she wasn’t all I had
expected? And how could she be all that I expected? She had never been
sufficient to hold anyone’s interest before—not her father’s, not
her mother’s, not that miserable swine whose name I had
"inherited". If Mona had not held her captive by means of a
paycheck, she perhaps would even have found a way to back out of her
"surrogate mother’s" life. Back out… yes, she was backing
up, backing out. Not looking where she was going, just shrinking away from
where (as she was convinced) she could not go. But she was also putting up
the best fight she could, because she wanted all those things—me, a
home, a family, Meg visiting her, Mona cajoling her. Hence the fear. While
she fought, she feared, because you only fight while there is something
worth winning, and you only fear while there is still something to lose.
Eventually, though, fear itself can betray you to the enemy. Lack of sleep
and lack of reinforcements wear you down, and you end up slitting your own
throat before the enemy is even over the wall. Despair. Despair releases
you from fear by releasing you from life. If the fear grows powerful
enough, it renders despair overpowering. That’s what Celine was
fighting: her fear of fear—her fear of when the fear would be too great
to resist. My poor Celine!
And that’s how a young woman who has been discarded
in sexual relationships before flings herself right back into the sexual
whirlwind. Fear. The sex is a release from the fear, even though, in some
subtle but inexorable manner, it is also a path to the fear’s most
dreaded nightmare. Looking back, I can recognize in those feverish kisses
and caresses (I still remember them well) the struggle of electrified
nerves to be rid of fear, if only for a moment. So I fought to suffocate
my anger, and Celine toiled to slip loose from her fear, and the two of us
ended up pushing our bodies to the very edge of consummation.
I have referred to "the edge" twice now. No,
I never actually went over it during that week. What an incredible
admission that seems to me now—no legendary medieval knight ever scored
a greater victory over a fire-breathing dragon! How did I do it? Youthful
idealism, I suppose (aided, of course, by complete inexperience). For
besides not wanting Celine ever to believe that I was just using her for
pleasure—that it was all "just sex" to me—I also felt the
restraint of what I can only call religious scruples. Anyone alert to such
matters will have noticed that I seldom spent my Sunday mornings in
church. A "born again" movement was sweeping over the land at
that time as the heyday of televangelism was dawning, but young men of my
stripe were not very attracted to it. I had briefly flirted with a
"charismatic" group as an undergraduate, as a matter of fact
(praying my guts out, I recall, over that ice queen whose ire I roused
with my roses). It was a wholly profitless debauch of humiliating my
intelligence which ended, when all my prayers failed, in my frantically
concluding that God hated me. I quickly pulled myself together. I needed
to believe with my mind, as I soon figured out, and the services of those
days were moving in the opposite direction. All the same, I retained a
very firm belief in certain things (by the grace of God). More than
anything on earth, I wanted my union with Celine to be holy. I wanted it
to take place under a veil of mystery and sacrifice, where my anger and
her fear would both be infinitely subordinated to that perfect being into
whom we had vowed to grow for the rest of our natural lives. If all that
doesn’t sound like a belief of the mind, it’s because the intellectual
has been so debased by the carnal in our time; for what could be more
logical, really, than the insistence on an end beyond logic? Without that
end, all must die. The greatest love must die in sexual fatigue, and the
greatest devotion must die in mounting boredom. I didn’t want Celine and
me, as a couple—as a spiritual unit—to die. I strangled my appetite at
the last instant to give us a chance at eternity.
I know those are pretty black-and-white terms; and I
have learned, of course, that reducing spiritual struggles to such terms,
even with the best of intentions, can often lead to diabolical arrogance.
It would reflect very unflatteringly upon my mature faith if I were now to
say that I think people go to heaven or hell on the basis of whether they
do or do not perform some specific act or say some specific oath. But for
a young man in his twenties, surrounded by peers who hadn’t the least
respect whatever for any kind of restraint, such rigor, I think, is a
testimony to high character. I salute that young man. He had kept his mind
in control of his passions, but he had also elevated over his
understanding a purpose which can never be fully understood. I haven’t
seen that a lot—not in any of my decades on earth.
If it’s comic relief you want, you would have found
it in my anguish then. There were times when my strangled appetite very
nearly strangled me, in return. I remember rolling off Celine’s sofa on
one occasion and pounding her carpet. Sex education, indeed! What I needed
was about ten consecutive cold showers. On another occasion, I needed the
shower less than the washing machine: I made a royal mess of my
undergarment. I won’t dispute anyone’s right to smile at such
adventures. I’m smiling right now myself.
I only ask for the concession that such ribald little
comedies as these can conceal great tragedies at work. For what I couldn’t
feel as I flailed about in the quicksand of my own feelings was Celine’s
response. Perhaps it’s foolish to expect a young man to go beyond
self-absorption in matters like these… but I often wonder if I should
have thought more about Celine’s new sense of eagerness, and even
urgency. "It’s all right," she would whisper in my ear at
crucial moments. "You can go ahead, if you want." A single Rish-aard
appended to that whisper would have brought me on… but she seemed to
want me to make the last move. And when I didn’t… why did I not ever
look up from my folded arms, my clenched fists, to see how she was taking
my retreat? All I can remember is—when I finally did lift my eyes to
hers—the sadness. As I reconstruct that response now, I see it, not as
sensual frustration over a stimulus removed before maximum effect—that
would be the "what women really want" claptrap of a Don
Juan or a Stendhal. No, I see fear. Every time I refused to bring our
union to a climax and scored one of those spiritual triumphs, Celine felt,
far more than a wilting of the flesh, a trembling of the spirit. She felt
my triumphs, and they terrified her. Even when faced with my parents’
rejection of her and with the uphill battle of creating a household out of
pocket change, I continued to resist the plunge with her into the sweet,
dark, forgiving, forgetting shadows. I continued to insist that she join
me atop that pedestal. Women talked a lot about pedestals back then,
always in voices ringing with indignation. In them, too, though—in all
of them—it was fear. Fear of the spirit, of high places, of the
infinite. They wanted to find themselves rather than to lose themselves…
but they didn’t stop to consider that the self they would thus find
would have to be something capable of being fully found: the flesh, the
finite, the mortal. What a flight to the finite it all was back then! Even
the "born agains" with their "I found it!"
bumper-stickers… what, after all, could they so confidently have found?
For the only thing worth finding is how to lose yourself—how to find
that part of you in which you fully become a mere part, or that merely
visible reflection of an inconceivable whole. How terrifying. Better to
find the limits—to feel them, caress them, and fold them around oneself
like a winding sheet. My poor Celine.
I wonder how many people will consider my portrait of
Celine completely self-contradictory when I write down that she took me to
church on my last Sunday? Actually, the suggestion that we might go to any
church of her choice had come from me on Saturday. I suppose I was
exhausted by our struggle against drowning all our sorrows in sensual
intoxication. Even if we should haggardly emerge from that struggle in a
few more hours without having cheated our wedding night, our final kiss
safely exchanged at my car door, I suppose I knew that something critical
had slipped from our kisses as they heated up. I suppose I thought church
might be a way of refocusing, before we had no more time to refocus. After
all, we would be married in a church, wouldn’t we? Did that mean nothing
whatever? If it meant something, then why not pay our respects to the
something on the last day when I would be in town?
So I offered to go with her—just to make the offer,
not expecting much of a response. To my surprise, Celine wanted to go to
early Mass. We could go before breakfast, she said, and then she would
feed me at her place. The cathedral would seem almost empty then, she said
(she had the Catholic church downtown in mind): the kneeling boards would
be cold and hard, the liturgy’s words would dissolve over the empty
pews, the chalice and the platter would distantly clink, and the freshly
risen sunbeams would spin horizontally through the stained glass. I am not
really embellishing her words, or not much; and these were indeed words of
anticipation—perhaps a kind of vision, perhaps a distillation of many
lonely hours in that cathedral—because they scarcely described the scene
that awaited us. (The morning was overcast, and, thanks probably to Easter’s
proximity, the pews were about a third filled even at eight o’clock.) I
already knew that Celine had a delicate eye for beauty, but I had never
before noticed this seamless fusion of taste and spirituality. There was a
poet in her, and perhaps a mystic—and, just maybe, a true believer. I
felt ashamed that I had assumed these doors of her life to be closed; and
I also felt delighted to be so thoroughly put to shame. For the first time
since I had introduced her to Meg a week earlier, I found reason to start
hoping again.
My parents took for granted that I had slipped away so
early on Sunday morning to bid my china doll an infatuated farewell.
Naturally, my final departure for the big city would be launched from the
warm nest where I had been raised. Naturally. I didn’t disabuse them.
After finishing breakfast at Celine’s, I came back home for a few hours
to pack my things and say my good-byes. I had never properly sat down and
talked with Roger about his major, and I begged him to give me a
rain-check until the summer—or else to write me a letter. I felt pretty
disgusted with myself as I patted him on the shoulder: it was the one
moment I passed at home that week when I really did feel guilt. But Meg
brightened us up, and we all three chattered a bunch of nonsense while I
stuffed my car’s trunk, then determined that I needed to lighten the
load. After all, I was supposed to be clearing out of my apartment at the
end of May. I shouldn’t be hauling records and headphones across the
state just to bring them back in two months crammed beside a lot of other
junk. (But I ended up taking the records: I decided to sell them on the
sly for my "grub stake".)
Dad wandered out as we were trimming the fat off my
cargo. He overheard the talk about vacating my apartment, which he
silently digested for a while. (It was the kind of decision I had always
reached with his help before: I’m sure that fact occupied some of his
thoughts.) Then he began to question me, without a trace of antagonism,
about my degree work and summer plans. Yes, I said, my Master’s degree
was well in hand. I would have completed the required courses by the end
of this semester. My thesis would surely be finished by September as long
as I could get all the books I needed on library loan. I explained that
our local branch in the university system would honor my student card and
give me certain privileges.
"So you’ll be moving back in at the beginning of
June?" he murmured, watching Meg and Roger drift back into the house.
"It’ll be nice to have you home."
No it won’t, I corrected him in my mind, but
thanks for the courteous gesture. "As a matter of fact," I
said, "there’s a chance I may be moving into one of the dormitories
down there on McClain. I’ve applied for a job as a house steward, I
think they call it."
"Riding herd on freshmen," he laughed gently,
"is that the sort of thing?"
I contributed a smile to his laugh. "Yeah, that
sort of thing. It doesn’t pay much, but… every cent counts, and I’ll
be close to the library." And close to Celine’s place of employ—but
I was now beyond inserting her name into conversations wherever possible.
What was the point? "Trouble is, there’s not really an opening
right now, and they don’t expect a lot of summer students. I won’t
know anything definite until after registration. The one thing I’ve got
going for me is my qualifications to do some formal counseling. They said
there might be a position where I would be… well, mentoring a lot of the
underclassmen. ‘Mentor’ is the big word right now."
"You’ll be a good one."
"I don’t know. I’ve done a lousy job of
mentoring Roger this past week. He’s been trying to talk to me the whole…."
And then something came over me. I guess I realized
that we were right back in the thick of it—Celine, my afternoons and
nights away from the family, all the bad blood simmering away under our
roof. Roger had been a casualty of the tension, and I was sure my dad
could understand that. Perhaps he had also just glimpsed the unflattering
truth that my having neglected Roger was about the only thing caught up in
those events which caused me any remorse. If my implied lack of repentance
irritated him, however, it didn’t show.
"It’s good that you can help Roger. College has
changed a lot since I went on the GI Bill. Everything’s changed. I can’t
believe they have some of these majors… and who am I to tell him what to
do? I have no idea what’s going to make him a living in this crazy new
world."
"Well, it would be easy as pie to help him if I
got on that campus in some official capacity and could figure out just
what they’re trying to do."
"You really want to work there? I mean, not as a…
steward, but… eventually, as something a little more respectable?"
"Right now, I’d be happy with house steward, and
even that looks like a long shot."
Dad raised his index finger dramatically, then smacked
it three times on the firm bridge of his nose. "Don’t be so
sure." I was to remember that gesture several months later, and in
circumstances where I allowed Dad’s generous attempt at a peace offering
to be overshadowed by my personal sense of humiliation.
I arrived back at Celine’s a little after noon. We
went for a walk in the park—that same park where I had hugged her tight
to chase away the cold a few nights before Christmas. Now my sleeves were
rolled up, and she was wearing slacks and a peach blouse with flounces
around the cuffs. I always felt proud—so proud—to be seen with her in
public. In the back of my mind, the thought would replay itself
incessantly: "Who would ever have believed that a guy like me would
be holding hands with a girl like this?" Even under all the recent
pressures which had beset us, I was never too far from feeling like the
class egghead who gets a date with the homecoming queen. Even with all of
our excessive familiarities on her sofa (as the Old Guard still considered
them—as I considered them in my calmer moments), that schoolboy
wonder of her person never completely left me. Simply to bend my fingers
around hers never stopped being magic.
She made me a sandwich later, and then I lay down on
her sofa for a rest. Finally, at about four, she walked me down the stairs
to my car. We had said little enough during our stroll in the park: now we
said nothing. Why did we hold each other so long—was it just because we
loved each other so much? Could it not also have been, perhaps, because we
both had felt Celine’s spirits sagging and both dreaded a six weeks’
separation which probably concealed a fearful trough just around the bend?
"Come with me," I said, pushing my lips from
her temple into her hair. "I’ll help you get some things. We’ll
just toss them in the back seat. You can call Mona and explain—she’ll
understand. Get your birth certificate. Tomorrow we’ll go down to the
courthouse after my classes. We’ll get a marriage license. Come with me
and let’s get married."
"We don’t even have the rings yet," she
laughed into my shirt. "We can’t afford them."
"I’ll sell something," I said.
"Anyway, you don’t need a ring at the courthouse, do you? And
anyway… you’ve already given me a ring."
"Did you ever figure out who Joe D is?" she
laughed a little higher up, her nose nudging my chin.
"With Mona’s help. It took me a while."
"I knew you wouldn’t know! It’s not in any of
your books! I’ll tell you all about it some time."
And then she hugged me tighter than ever. I understood.
It wasn’t that we physically could not do just what I had
proposed. It wasn’t even that our hearts weren’t in it—on the
contrary. But though our bodies were still in the same objective space,
our spirits had already embraced solitude. Perhaps if I had made that very
suggestion in those very words as we walked in the park… but now the
tide had gone out on our resolution, and even the park was probably too
late. Obstacles which would have been easily surmountable with a little
energy soared invincibly over us in the growing shadows. Mona could hardly
grant Celine a two-month holiday out of the blue, staunch friend though
she was… and what would Celine do, if not work for Mona? Get another job
in the capital as I finished my semester? But I was supposed to come back
here for the summer: I had already applied for several jobs. How would we
pay our joint expenses with neither of us working and our
"household" without roots in either of the cities which held our
light baggage? Impossible to elope? No, of course not. Yet we both knew
that we couldn’t go through with it. We were too shaky, too emotionally
raw, to generate such sudden bursts of determination. Even if some
sinister axe were descending upon us (and I secretly regretted mentioning
her father’s ring, which had signaled our last decline into the pit), we
lacked the vigor to raise a hand. All we could do was hold on to each
other, as tightly and for as long as we could. And, at last, we had to
surrender our holds, as well.
Of course, my misgivings were not immediately
justified. I didn’t expect them to be. I had already learned that Celine’s
descents could be very gradual. At the same time, I took heart in
recalling how well things had gone over the first part of the semester.
(Or, maybe, I just allowed myself to latch on to a shallow reason for
optimism: being worried all the time doesn’t help you do your work, even
when the worries are well founded.) Perhaps separation was just the thing,
I told myself. Now we could go back to writing letters and talking twice a
week over the phone. We had shared a lot of secrets and nourished a lot of
hopes by that method while tuning down the tension almost to nothing. What
had succeeded for us once could succeed again… why not?
In fact, our twice-weekly phone conversations seemed
warmer than ever. Celine would now chatter on and on until I had to remind
her, laughing with every word, that we would run out of dimes this way. I
really don’t recall if I let myself have any suspicions at all of this
new effusiveness. Probably not. I was very busy finishing up my course
work, and happy answers to questions I couldn’t influence right at the
moment, anyway, were just the kind I wanted. In looking back, however, I
think I see what was happening. Celine wanted to reassure both me and
herself, and the best way to do so was to bubble over when we talked. She
could neatly accomplish this by steering the conversation into trivial
matters at the office, most often—an area where she might have consumed
hours without running out of gossip and where I never had enough knowledge
to mount a significant intrusion. Subjects like wedding plans or preferred
house designs were not given a sufficient opening to rear their frightful
heads. We were somehow just supposed to stay in a holding pattern around
those objectives—they’d already been agreed upon, hadn’t they?—while
accepting that our higher phone bills proved a greater degree of intimacy
than ever.
In the letters, however, such self-deception was hard
to hide. Any self-deception is hard to hide, in a letter. When you
write an observation down, you take time over it; and when you take time
over it, you end up analyzing it, whether you want to or not. If anything
penetrated my thick wall of see-no-evil optimism that spring, it was
Celine’s letters—hers and mine both. For her part, she wrote less
often and not as lengthily. When she did write, she would begin with an
apology for not writing, explain tediously (in her telephonic style) what
was taking up her time, and then abruptly end with something amounting to:
"Oops! I’ve taken up all the time I have by telling you why I have
no time!" I stopped pretending early on that I took much pleasure in
such wasted space—though, of course, I didn’t rebuke Celine for her
sorry effort. How could I? Mine wasn’t much better. I meant to tackle
the big questions, all right: to force certain issues like our wedding
date or our guest list. But I backed off, every time. I chickened out. I
didn’t want to stare a major crisis in the face right at this time, so I
kept telling myself that discretion was the better part of valor. If we
could just limp and stagger our way to the summer with these
feather-weight exchanges, I’d be back home, and I could go head to head
with all the problems till I beat them black and blue. Just squeeze out a
little more time. At least we were talking and writing, however awkwardly.
That was forward motion, wasn’t it?
Well, apparently it wasn’t. Apparently it was
backward motion: I wasn’t even holding my own with the truth, since its
sudden appearance completely blind-sided me. The first hint I received—or
should have received—was the "conference". About three weeks
from the semester’s end, Celine told me during our Wednesday evening
chat that Mona had booked her on a flight to Chicago later that week,
where some sort of conference for small business owners was to take place
for the next several days (exact number not specified). Was there ever any
conference at all? Probably: Celine had enough details that Mona must have
shown her a brochure accompanied by some such remark as, "I wish I
could afford to send you to that." But did Celine actually go
anywhere? Of course not. Mona would have made the arrangements for such a
major trip well in advance, and Celine would have told me about them weeks
ago. Besides, conferences never last over Sundays and into the new week—I
knew that—yet Celine had implied that she might be gone almost
indefinitely to participate in some special seminar. How could I have
swallowed such patent nonsense? How? By liking where I was—by not
wanting to see the imminent danger. Also by loving Celine "not wisely
but too well"—by wanting irresistibly to trust her and wholly
surrendering to the exceptional tenderness in her voice. That tenderness
in itself should have sounded another warning. Not since Spring Break had
Celine talked so haltingly over the phone, offered me so many pauses, and
filled them in herself with so many "I love you’s" and
"thanks for loving me’s". She was fixing the tones of my
voice, the fervor of my words, in her memory. She was signing off.
And, naturally, I had seen it all before. Over
Christmas. The trip, real or feigned, which would account for her not
being home to pick up the phone; then the quick fade into oblivion, as if
I could be so morally callous or intellectually dull as to forget her
after one evening of unsuccessful calls. When I failed to draw an answer
throughout Sunday afternoon and evening, I guess I was supposed to think
that she had indeed stayed over in the Windy City for further tutelage;
and, throughout that one evening, I did. I hadn’t the time to think
anything else: an important oral presentation in my toughest class was
coming up the next day, and I had to get all my ducks in a row. But when I
got no answer on Monday night or Tuesday, I finally declared an official
end to my stupid, costly tranquillity.
Official? Well, yes, it was almost as though a gavel
descended upon me, in a way. It was like the bell which calls a child in
from recess, or the alarm clock which announces that a new day on the
grind has begun. I suddenly grew very serious—grimly serious. Part of
the grimness, the oddest part, was that I felt almost none of the nervous
panic I remembered from just after Christmas. This time I knew exactly
what was going on: I guess I’d known all along, really. I guess I hadn’t
been so much deceiving myself as letting myself catch a little sleep. That
week, my nights of sweet dreams ended… not that I burned the midnight
oil pacing the floor. On the contrary, I put my time to good use.
Especially on Wednesday night, I immersed myself in my work, finishing
some papers early and getting as far ahead of every syllabus as I could,
since I didn’t know what next week might bring—and since, of course, I
had to distract myself from the phone. I was determined not to call. This
was Celine’s night to call. Let her call if she dared, if she won some
major battle over her conscience or her suffocating self-contempt. I knew
damn well she wouldn’t. If I paced a lot that night (and I won’t deny
that I did), it was mostly with a book in my hand or to take a short break
from the typewriter.
And Thursday… Thursday I did something the like of
which I’d never attempted before. I became unscrupulously, aggressively
devious: I did some spying. Over Christmas, I had grown so wildly
suspicious that I had spent several hours on a bus stop bench behind a
newspaper—but that was sheer madness. Now I was downright clever. I
schemed. Celine knew perfectly well that I would never call her at work
about anything delicate between us. She had actually mentioned that to me
at some point before Spring Break—I mean, that it amazed her how I had
respected her job obligations during our "break-up" over
Christmas and had not called her at the office. It was the only reference
she ever made to that week of hell—and it was flooded with more sincere
admiration and gratitude, perhaps, than she had ever shown me. I’m sure
she was counting on my not invading her "job space" this time,
either. She knew that I knew that she couldn’t function at the simplest
level if she were afraid to answer her work phone. She knew that I knew
that breaking this taboo would submit her to extreme torture—and she
knew that I wouldn’t torture her, no matter how much she deserved it.
I had a few friends around campus—not many, not
enough that counting them would have required a second hand. But I really
only needed one to help me confirm the truth beyond any doubt. Rebecca
worked as a secretary in our department. She was quiet, competent,
discreet, and wholly unaffiliated with the prevailing lunacy which hummed
around her. She just typed and answered phones: it wasn’t part of her
job description to liberate the working classes or dazzle the bourgeoisie.
She and I had often had brief, ironic conversations about the protracted
adolescence of the grad students—and some of their professors—as I
checked my mailbox. She was a pretty girl, despite being overweight and
wearing rather thick glasses. She had beautiful dark eyes behind the
glasses, and her skin was as white as milk. If I had met her a year
sooner, and if her being Jewish hadn’t foreshadowed certain problems
with my mother, I would have asked her out.
Instead, I asked her to make a phone call for me—a
long distance call for which I would pay. It had to be made before
lunchtime, I said, but it would consume no more than ten seconds. We would
place the call, I would listen for the voice that answered, then I would
quickly pass the phone to her and she would sweetly announce that she’d
dialed the wrong number. She was entirely cooperative, as I’d known she
would be. She told me to come back after ten o’clock, when Dr. Shelton
would be out of his office at a meeting. She said not to worry about
payment—that wrong numbers were dialed all the time, and that trying to
pay for this one would make far more trouble than it would avert. I was
convinced.
At 10:05 on Thursday morning, I dialed Images Unlimited
back in my hometown. Celine’s voice answered in the perfunctory chirp
which she would have used from the guillotine if required to field a call
for Mona. I passed the phone to Rebecca, who begged off in an equally
professional manner—except that she first uttered a "hello"
into the receiver, which would have drawn a second, perhaps more nuanced
greeting from Celine. Was that on purpose? I was too embarrassed to tax
her with it after she hung up. The look of infinite sympathy which poured
upon me through those thick lenses was the first thing that week which had
brought me close to breaking down; and, when she said after I’d thanked
her and turned to leave, "She has a really nice voice," I couldn’t
bear to do any more than nod my head on the way out.
On Thursday evening, I finished my most important paper
and threw a few things into my smallest traveling bag. I felt at peace
now. It was not a comfortable peace—or no more comfortable than a combat
pilot’s who has inspected his plane, assembled his gear, gone over his
flight plan, and signed his will. When I finally went to bed that night, I
shared the pilot’s deep, dreamless sleep—a sleep without hope, a sleep
needed to give the mission the ghost of a chance. I was ready to live or
to die: in that respect, it was like Christmas all over again.
I imagine that Celine must have entered an ambiguous
peace something like mine. She would have written her
"bombshell" letter on Wednesday evening after realizing that I
had desisted from calling her She would have inferred… well, who knows
what? Probably that I had finally had enough of her, that I was now safely
free of her and permanently disgusted with her. Which was just what she
wanted—what she needed to achieve her peace of utter hopelessness. Just
to nail it down, and to occupy the once sacred hour when we would converse
over the phone, she would have written the following letter—which she
would have mailed Thursday morning, just in time for me to retrieve it
Friday afternoon from my apartment box on the way to my car.
I want you to know first of all that I love you and
will always love you more than you can ever know. You will not
understand how I can love you after reading this, but I promise you it
is the truth. I swear before God that you have meant more to me than
anyone I have ever known. I only wish that were more of a compliment.
But among the men I have known, especially, you are in a category by
yourself, so it doesn’t mean much for me to compare you to them. Maybe
they have all made me the way I am—my mother first and foremost, and
then all the others, men and women, except for Mona. Maybe that’s why
I just cannot reach you way up high where you are, and why you cannot
imagine me way down low where I am, where I really am. Richard, because
you are so honest and decent, you cannot imagine what dangers might lurk
for you in a life with someone like me. You have always thought the best
of me, and I am deeply grateful to you for that. But I just cannot live
up to that best. In the end, you would be bound to be deeply
disappointed in me, and I know I couldn’t bear that. The pressure of
knowing how high you rate me and how much respect you give me is making
me unravel, darling. It keeps me awake at night and takes my appetite
away. It terrifies me sometimes until I start to shake all over. I’m a
nervous wreck, all because I can’t stand the thought of failing you—and
knowing that I will. I am already failing you just by writing this
letter. I know how you will read it, how it will hurt you, and I hate
myself for writing it. But it is better to save you from me, darling,
before I hurt you more deeply. It is my prayer that you will see that
someday.
Dearest Richard, could it be that I actually love you
more than you love me? I love you the way you are, and you love me the
way you picture me in your mind, a bright little wife making you a happy
home. But I would make your home a living hell with my dark spells and
these moods that I can’t shake off. I wonder how I would even raise a
child? What a terrible mother I would be! And you would not have your
own mother to turn to because I would have driven her from you. Richard,
my darling, someday you will understand how much better it is this way.
Please understand, Richard, and try not to hate a pitiful girl who loves
you a thousand times more than herself.
I read this letter virtually without emotion as I sat
behind the wheel, my traveling bag in the passenger seat. It was just what
I’d expected, once I had allowed myself to expect the worst, the
obvious. I reinserted it into the envelope—how elegant was the
handwritten address, yet how apologetically pinched together!—and I
started the car.
As I slipped on my glasses, fitted shades to them, and
fought the lowering sun to reach the traffic’s mainstream, I nonetheless
felt something begin to fester in me. It was that claim about my expecting
her to be something she wasn’t. Damn it! Every robber and murderer in
prison might as well plead that he was being unfairly punished for
fulfilling his God-given nature rather than society’s expectations! Did
she think that I found it easy to scrap and save, to battle with my
family, to plan a future while trying to earn an advanced degree, to
postpone our marriage rites until our marriage night? Did she think that I
enjoyed all this—that it was just how I was made, that my idea of a good
time before I met her was hitting my head with a hammer? I was expecting
one hell of a lot from myself, too—couldn’t she see that? What was I
supposed to have done over Spring Break that I didn’t do? Show up at her
place with an armload of six-packs and some weed, strip her clothes off,
and come up for air at the end of the week? Would that be putting the bar
low enough? My grad school peers had all chosen about that level of
difficulty: was that what she expected out of me? No goals to shoot for,
no ideals to live up to, no expectations, no pressure, no strain. No hope.
As easy as pie… no problem.
Of course, at the red-hot core of this emotional lava
flow was my argument with Mom about her squeezing me into a certain image.
Celine’s letter had unwittingly accused me of treating her as I had
accused my mother of treating me. That stung me to the quick, even though
Celine couldn’t possibly have known that she was framing a charge of
hypocrisy. (I had never given her any of the details about the blow-up
with my mother in March.) The charge had just a grain of truth in it,
perhaps—and no false accusation is more searing than the one that isn’t
one hundred percent false. I was my mother’s son, and I went through
life carrying high expectations. I knew it wasn’t the same thing with
the two of us: I knew Mom expected success, prosperity, comfort, even
glory—whereas I expected fairness, honesty, and other things that would
often sabotage what my mother most admired. Still… there was a certain
rhetorical sameness. And it ate and ate at me, all the long drive home.
I had tried to time my arrival at Celine’s apartment
for a few minutes before five. That way I could see her come home from
work and overtake her just as she was reaching her door. I was too late. A
wreck had backed up traffic, and I turned into the parking lot well after
5:30. Celine’s car was already parked in its space. I found an empty
space from which I could study her window. She might only just have walked
in: I didn’t want to be stuck at her unresponsive door because she was
in the bathroom and couldn’t hear me. In fact, I decided that the best
course was to wait until it grew pitch dark (still about an hour away),
when I would surely see a faint haze of light showing through her drapes.
I wanted not only to be absolutely certain that she was inside (and where
else could she be with her car right in front of me?), but also that she
would know her presence was apparent to anyone who came calling. I didn’t
want her to be able to pretend that she wasn’t at home. Whether or not
she would have tried such a maneuver, I had no idea. The possibility didn’t
seem far-fetched, considering that she had played the same trick several
times when the phone was ringing. I had no other fears than this one: it
entirely preoccupied me—even (as I caught myself rattling my keys, then
thumping the floorboard) consumed me. I had to see her face to
face, and if she wouldn’t let me in… what would I do? Break the door
down? Wait until morning, or until a security guard chased me off? No, I
wanted her knowing that she had given her presence away. Even though she
could hardly think I would show up within hours of receiving her letter, I
wanted such signs of activity in that apartment as would force her to
concede herself spotted once she had spotted me through the drapes. She
wouldn’t have the nerve to pretend after that. I knew her too well.
This became one of the most frustrating waits of my
life. It seemed even longer than that morning I had spent at the bus stop
across from Images Unlimited. Then I had wanted not to be seen, not
to speak to her. This time I had no bone to chew on, no dominant thought
to mull over. I really had no notion whatever of what I was going to say,
if anything. If I could only see her—physically, visually see her and be
seen by her… and if I couldn’t, then I could think of no next step. I
wasn’t going to my parents. I wasn’t driving two hours back the other
way. At what point would some cruising squad car shine a flashlight in my
face?
My anxiety rose as darkness fell without being resisted
by any light behind the drapes. There were plenty of lights and noises
elsewhere: it was Friday night, and most of the tenants were exiting in
high spirits. Occasionally, tires squealed on the street in front of the
complex, and once I heard a glass bottle shatter to a chorus of male
laughter. Celine’s room seemed the only one on her floor which had not
betrayed a single sign of life since my arrival. I finally got out of the
car and walked across the street to a gas station. I relieved myself
there, coaxed some peanut butter and crackers out of a vending machine,
and overheard a minute of some serial thriller Roger always watched from a
TV by the cash register. It was odd to think of Roger sitting in front of
that show not twenty minutes from here, of Meg taking off with her friends
and Mom doing the dishes and Dad perhaps classifying old photos while
listening to a jazz record, maybe Harry James or Pete Fountain… all of
them entirely out of my reach, no less so than if I had been on the dark
side of the moon. It was a lonely feeling.
As I crossed back over toward my car, I thought about
climbing the stairs and listening at her door. I hesitated, pacing the
lawn instead. What could I possibly find out—and what if a neighbor
should see me lurking about suspiciously and call the police? What would I
tell a cop—would a cop, perhaps, force her to come to the door and vouch
for me?
About then, a car turned into my nook of the complex.
Its motor purred like a tame cat, and its black silhouette was low. The
engine was cut, the headlights died almost instantly, and I heard two
doors slam in my temporary blindness. Even before my eyes grew readjusted
from the lights, however, I knew that one set of footsteps belonged to
Celine. The other was a man’s.
A man. Celine had been out on Friday night with a man.
It was the most obvious, most prosaic of explanations, yet I would never
have believed it if I had not been standing there in the grass as they
clambered up the stairs. My fiancée. As I stood there gaping upward—as
the two dark figures partially emerged in the dim light at the top of the
stairwell—I did not really register anything that could properly be
called belief. I could not have been any less reflective at that moment if
I had been a small frog staring wide-eyed from the mulch around the
manicured shrubs. If there is a God in heaven, he will bear me witness
that I did not even feel any anger, any resentment—not one scintilla. I
was overcome with wonder. I did nothing but apply my pupils to the two
figures, the two angels on a cloud, the two devils in a pit. Celine was
wearing a light coat, probably camel-hair or alpaca, its cinnamon color
accenting that thick, compact hair of hers which glinted richly in the
light every time the man’s shoulder moved. I paid him little attention.
His back was to me—all I noticed was that he kept breaking off my line
of sight to Celine. The interruptions were actually rather staccato: they
lasted briefly but came often. Perhaps that impression, in all its oddity,
was what faintly roused me from my daze. I could comprehend now that
Celine was pushing him off, thrusting his hands away from her. I don’t
know what was in my mind as my feet started to move beneath me. I have
examined my memory under the microscope, and I still do not recall the
slightest tinge of anger. Yet some instant of fury might well have
exploded if I had turned up the second flight of steps and still found him
pawing her. I have heard people describe many such incidents since then.
They have no inkling of what’s coming—they feel almost torpid inside:
and then, in a white flash whose heat sears away all reason and all
memory, they commit acts of mayhem.
Fortunately, the man was just springing off the final
stair as I reached the sidewalk. He had shot down in mere seconds, and now
he lunged into the darkness so quickly that his shoulder actually rubbed
against mine. I didn’t even turn to watch him go, yet I had the
strangest sensation of having seen him before. It was the first conscious
moment of reflection that had reanimated my mind since the two of them had
stepped from his sports car. I know that man!
I got to the top of the stairs somehow—I got to
Celine’s door somehow. Perhaps that one reflection which I had lavished
upon the dark figure brushing past me had overloaded my numb mind. Now I
found myself, as if waking up, right before the bronze digits of Number
31. A light had switched on inside. I could see its luminescence down the
central slit in the drapes. I froze for a moment. If I had been in fuller
possession of myself, I would perhaps have panicked—but I was already
too far gone for a plunge into this abyss to disorient me further. If I
had known where I had been for the last hour or two, I would have been
horrified now to see that I was nowhere. It was bad enough, just to see my
"nowhere" suddenly intensify. No fiancée, no girlfriend, no
friend. No common, ordinary decency of the most common, ordinary sort.
Just betrayal, just shut doors. Just nullification, the nullity of
everything… nothing real but a dirty forty-Watt bulb over my head, a
dead cricket on dirty concrete at my foot, and a tacky set of drapes that
didn’t fit properly. All else had been a fantasy.
I reached out at the door now less in terror than in a
bid for some kind of lifeline. In this corridor-comradeship with decaying
insects, I felt that I might throw myself over the rail just any second.
She opened almost at once. My third feeble tap had
hardly sounded.
On the drive over, I guess I had expected to create
something of a shock at Celine’s door, unlike the time over Christmas
when I had materialized in this same spot. We had been less intimate then—half
a state hadn’t separated us, either. Now here I was, within forty-eight
hours of the weekly call she had refused to make, within six hours of
receiving her letter. I shocked her, all right—but it was a delayed
shock, a shock whose jolt was bizarrely postponed. She looked right at me
through the opening door without batting an eyelash, for a full two
seconds. Only then did her lips part speechlessly her fair green eyes
widen (seeing them after any lapse of time always made me catch my breath:
it did so even now). Two seconds can be an eternity. How could she have
peered out into the night, found my face, and studied me almost in
weariness for a full two seconds before registering that her dead lover
had come to life?
"Richard!"
If someone can be described as fleeing who never turns
her back, then Celine fled from me—or cringed, or shrank (for her whole
body drew up)—into the apartment. Her evening coat was still on. She had
just uncinched the belt which had locked it in a hug around her trim
waist. The high collar and epaulette-like straps across the shoulders
continued to emphasize the golden-red sheen of her short, thick hair in
the lamplight.
I shut the door quietly behind me. Obviously, I must
have come in, though I had no consciousness of any movement in my body—of
any life, I might say. Even my tongue could not move. I stood there with
my collar open, my jacket half-zipped, my hands dangling from my sleeves,
just gazing at this woman who held absolute power of life and death over
me, for whom I had sacrificed so much, for whom I would sacrifice whatever
remained to me and of me in an instant, and who had just barely resisted
the embrace of a strange man a few feet from where I now stood, a mere
minute before I arrived.
If her shoulders had cringed and her hands were so
squeezed together that their bare bones stood out, the clearest sign of
Celine’s flight was nevertheless her eyes. I watched them run farther
and farther from me, searching the deepest shadows along the most remote
walls. Almost imperceptibly, like a flitting ghost, her body gravitated
toward the same dark spots. The lamp nestled on the counter/partition
between den and kitchen was almost at her back. A single ray of light
caught on the finely molded ledge of her lower lip, where I saw no sign of
trembling: just the frozen glaze of open-mouthed muteness. At last she
came to rest on the far arm of the sofa—the arm where we never sat,
thrust far into the room’s most lifeless corner. There she perched
herself, leaning her right shoulder into the wall.
I have no idea how long we stayed this way, awkwardly
suspended in time and space—for it did indeed seem a complete arrest of
time, a balancing act where a kind of nightmarish stasis had been
achieved. Nor do I know what finally broke the spell enough to start her
talking. If the cue came from me, it was neither any spoken word nor any
rustling motion of the body. Can you hear a man staring at his hands—a
man who isn’t even breathing, who has to look at some part of himself
just to be sure that he still exists?
"I had to let you go," she confided to the
wall in a tiny voice utterly drained of tone. "I had to let you go. I
got to where… there was no other choice. You told me it would destroy
you, if I let you go. You told me that after Christmas. That it would
destroy you. Well, I got to the point… the point where I was more sure
of destroying you if I held on. More than if I let you go."
You don’t usually remember sighs with crystal
clarity, especially after years and years. I can still hear the sigh I
gave then—probably the most enormous of my life. Suddenly I couldn’t
stand up any longer. I shut my eyes and reeled backward, almost falling
into an armchair set against the opposite wall. There I thrust my hands
deep into my pockets, as if I were suffering from a chill, and marveled at
the lamplight’s sickly yellow color on the carpet. I had never before
seen a color that made me feel nauseated. The edge of everything, the
boundary line of nothing—the limn of outer darkness—is that shade of
yellow.
"You don’t know. You just don’t know. And it
would kill me if you did. If we… if I held on to you, you would find
out. If you are going to be destroyed by me… at least this way, you won’t
find out. The worst thing your mother could think about me… believe me,
that would be nothing beside the truth. Even your mother. Even if she
would tell you the worst thing she could think… it would be nothing. She…
she has the right idea. You need to listen to her. You need to let her
have her way. Mothers are always right. Even I was right, maybe, when I….
She’s more right than she will ever know."
The pronouncements of this telegraphic drone must have
cost her several minutes to deliver. Yet the silence which followed them
was immensely longer. I remember no door slamming anywhere, no footsteps
falling anywhere, no car engine growling by in the lot below. I was deaf…
but even the deaf can feel the blood pulsing in their own ears. I had no
pulse: I had no breath. From somewhere very, very deep within me, I was
dredging up that old sensation from last Christmas—that feeling that,
null as the possibilities within this small room appeared, there could
most certainly be nothing beyond them. This was the antechamber to
oblivion. What sense could time have, after all, when all ties to the
beyond have been severed? There was no hope or fear for me—no one
expecting me, nothing awaiting me—beyond Celine’s front door… so how
could I feel any strain of time not used? I believe I could have sat in
that chair until I starved without ever noticing daylight come and go at
the drapes. I simply sat and watched the old sensation come creaking up
from the depths, like some muddy, amorphous terror of the ocean bottom
whose sheer dead weight tautens heavy cables almost to the snapping point
as its unclean shadow grows and grows. I dredged it up, I reeled it in…
or rather, it sucked me down.
From somewhere under those fathoms where no green life
lives, I found a word. "Talk," I said gently. "Talk some
more."
She tried to, several times. I heard her try rather
than watched her try. I heard her draw a breath, hold it to carry forth
some few words—a sentence—and then let it go at last, unused. I heard
her alpaca coat grind discreetly against the plaster wall. I waited. There
was nothing else to do. There was nothing else I could possibly say.
Unless she talked some more, the two of us would drown in silence.
"I thought it would be all right. Maybe. After
Christmas."
In my mind, I watched the thin filament drift toward me
through the soupy murk. It wasn’t a rescue line, but it was a strand.
"It was all right," I murmured.
"Yes. It was all right. For a while."
I turned slightly and looked—with my physical eyes—back
up the sickly trail of lamplight, as if I might have missed something
swimming there or might find something torpidly floating there. Something
to knead, to shape, to combine. But I still saw only vacancy, nullity.
She inhaled again, and again the breath escaped without
a message—or so I thought. But at the last instant, she caught its tail.
"If you hurt yourself… I’ll kill myself."
I received this without moving a muscle. Finally, very
slowly, I nodded over it as my eyes infinitesimally seesawed between the
yellow mist and darkness. "That… that would be one way."
"No!" I heard her cry. It was the first
emotion I had detected in her voice, and it drew the single short syllable
out like the groan of a trauma patient whose ruptured organ the doctor has
just pressed. In spite of this response, I couldn’t seem to move my
eyes, even to blink them. I don’t know if she turned to me or not. I
only know that I heard a rustle from her corner.
I thought perhaps she was going to cry, or perhaps to
shout or plead. But more minutes went by, more breaths were roughly drawn
and roughly exhaled, until again I could hear nothing at all. Even violent
motions did not create much of a ripple at these depths.
I was almost a little startled when she started to talk
again—I had almost passed into some sort of trance, I think. "It
was Spring Break. It was… it wasn’t so much your mother. It was you.
It was you… honoring me. Treating me… like I was something I’m not.
That was when it really started to hit me. That I couldn’t be that. Not
that. What you wanted. Your dreams… they go so high. Someday you’d be
sure to wake up. I would wake you up, and you’d ask me… you’d ask me
what I did with Celine. With your Celine. But I can’t be your
Celine. I never was. You have this image of me, which you honor… but the
honor… the honor… the honor was crushing me. It kept keeping me up all
night. It wouldn’t let me sleep—"
The last word was never finished: her voice suddenly
gave out. Her head thumped the wall audibly, and then was still. I don’t
know how she held it down for so long, but at last the moist remnant of a
sob fluttered through our renewed silence. I could still not rouse myself
to speak, but something was definitely stirring within me now. My eyes
widened over it—my physical eyes, turned intently within me. That word
"image"… I remembered using it bitterly when arguing with my
mother. Of course, every line of Celine’s letter (which we never
mentioned a single time that night) came back to me in one hot red flash.
All the protests that had seethed in me during my two-hour drive started
to simmer once more. My mother’s inhuman image of me… and Celine, all
unknowingly, now writing and saying that I was doing the same thing to her—that
I was forcing her into an image’s straitjacket! Everything in me
began to shout foul. I felt my teeth start to work. Was there no
difference, then, between an image which suffocates all the soul’s life
out of it to make a nice appearance and an image which calls a soul to
fresh new life? From the fingertips, I felt myself starting to tremble.
"You… you’re better off," she concluded,
once more dry and toneless. "I could have been… some things for
you, if you had let me. Made your meals. Done your shopping, bought you
nice things. No one ever buys you nice things, and you would look so good,
so handsome, if I could dress you up. Why doesn’t your mother do that? I
could do that for you!"
There was a sudden strange warmth in these sentences,
which were the longest she had yet pronounced. I actually looked over at
her, looked up at her. In fact, I no longer took my eyes off of her.
Between the thawing tenderness in her words and the smoldering indignation
in my heart, I was able to look at her very directly.
"And share my bed?" I whispered. "As
long as we weren’t married, you could share me bed?"
She crumpled against the wall, her gaze following it
back into the dark line where it guttered into the rug. "There,"
she said, once more in a tiny drone. "You see? I’m no good for you.
The best that I can offer… it’s so vile to you."
I was bursting to say, The worst that you can
offer—that you can dish out to me and yourself—makes me want to fight
back, for both of us! But I only trembled a little more. I was going
to say something to all this, though. I was going to say something.
I felt it slowly rise, so slowly. The voice in which I said it was as
hollow and muted as hers. "So that’s the real reason. Because we…
never went all the way, you decided that I was… worshiping you."
"Yes."
"And you couldn’t take any more of it."
"No."
"So you… what did you do then?"
"Then?"
"Yes. What did you do then?"
"I…." Her perfect chin suddenly reared from
its grave of shadow, and I saw her Adam’s apple work in a thin, supple
throat bared from the heavy alpaca collar. "I had to get some
sleep."
"So what did you do to get some sleep? How did you
get some sleep?"
"I… I still haven’t… I’m still sleepless.
This past month, especially this past week…."
"What keeps you awake? Since you already had
decided… was it fear of me, of what I would do?"
"Yes. No. It was fear. Again. It was the fear
again."
"Fear of what, Celine?"
"That I couldn’t… you know, that I couldn’t
keep with the decision." Her "you know" carried a brief
turn of the head in my direction which sent a glinting shudder through her
rich hair. It also carried a catch in her voice. "I knew I couldn’t
have you… but I was afraid you’d come back. Just like this. I was
afraid I couldn’t…"
"That I would talk you back into being with
me."
"Into being with you. Yes. Into being… honored,
adored. And then…"
"And then?"
"And then it would start all over again. The fear.
I was afraid of the fear—of it starting up again. When you love me, you
put so much… worship into it. And that terrifies me. Because I’m…
if you only knew!"
We were going over old ground, digging our heels
through the same infinitely slick and shifty mud of the ocean bottom. But
her voice was starting to crack frequently now: there were hairline
fractures running through every brief sentence she released.
"So… what did you do? You had to sleep."
"I had to sleep."
Within my pockets, I felt my fingers tightening into
fists. It was now that those two seconds at the front door reappeared to
me—Celine’s look of easy recognition which had dissolved almost at
once, but not at once. And I was beginning to see a face on that man who
had brushed me in the dark. "Who was that just now who brought you
home, Celine?"
"I thought if I closed the circle… if I brought
things back to where they were before I met you. That way… if I closed
the circle, it would all be over. None of it would ever begin again."
I had risen to my feet. Yet my voice, if anything, was
lower and duller than ever. "Who was that, Celine?"
And she looked straight at me then with her beautiful
pale eyes—the eyes which ancient Irish poets compared to dewdrops in the
rising sun. "I had to go back to how it was. I had to close off all
the hope. Hope is the most frightening thing in the universe,
Richard."
"Richard." I don’t think my lips even
moved. I repeated—stated flatly, for the record, "It was
Richard."
Then I started for the door. Don’t ask me why—I
haven’t the slightest idea where I intended to go, since anywhere beyond
this apartment was annihilation. I guess I intended to accept my
annihilation, whatever that means. I don’t know. I can only remember
myself unpocketing one hand and gripping the doorknob as you would
remember some dramatic gesture from a play or movie. I have to believe
that I was about to go out the door.
"Are you leav—"
The word was again unfinished. Her voice had again died
on her, this time along the ragged edge of something like a shriek. I
looked back at her and found all that wooden composure gone. The
mesmerized detachment which had spellbound her for… who knows how many
minutes?—that was all gone now without a trace. Her face was a mobile
portrait of anguish, a sculpture in jelly. Her eyes had opened as big as
screams: even though several strands of hair had slipped down over the
left one, I could see its white outline clearly. They glistened, glistened
until they throbbed, despite the shadows. But her lower face was yet more
distorted. Her chin, her jaw kept quivering in such an intricate chaos of
vibrations that her lips had entirely lost their beautiful contours. She
seemed at the same instant to be biting them back and about to unleash
from them some one last word, or some cry that would never end.
Am I leaving? I thought. Isn’t that what
you want? I thought about saying. Instead, I let the knob slide from
my fingers and walked over to her. When I stopped, my free hand was within
a foot or two of her face, yet I made no effort to lift it and touch her
tears. I was far, far above the threshold of understanding that she didn’t
know what she wanted, perhaps would never know. I understood fully, too,
that I could never want anyone but her, and that if she had determined the
Celine I loved to be non-existent, then I wanted nothing, and was dead. I
understood that I might well be dead at this very moment, just waiting for
the blood to stop. But in the unspeakable calm which that understanding
gave to me, a calm which allowed me to stand over Celine without even
trying to touch her, I found that I remained curious. I wanted to take one
last measurement and see if, just maybe, the two of us were not entirely
dead. That was what I wanted, all I wanted. It would perhaps be the last
thing I would ever want.
"There’s just one thing. Why? Why did you push
him away just now when he tried to come inside?"
"Why?"
"Yes. Why?"
She made no effort to mop away the moisture spilling
through her lashes. With her head now feverishly erect, the liquid rounded
the ridges of her cheeks in more or less identical curves, washed over the
two high, broad summits of her upper lip, then soaked her lower lip until
it sparkled. The bath seemed to redefine her face’s wondrous harmony and
to lubricate her tongue for what few words she found. One more breath, and
she would tell me… what? The last thing I would ever hear from her? The
last thing I would ever hear from anyone on earth?
"I… I went to him."
"Yes. You went to him. When was that?"
"That was… I don’t know. Yesterday. It was
yesterday. I went during lunch. To his office… his new office. On the
fourth floor, at the… downtown. I…"
"You saw him?"
"Yes. No. I saw him, but… he didn’t see me. He
was with someone. Someone else. He was with someone else. She was
beautiful, and… and she loved him. Or she wanted him, anyway. You could
tell. And you could tell she had him. He never even looked my way. When I
slipped up to his office, they said he’d stepped out for lunch. I… I
said, ‘With his fiancée?’ They laughed, in that way that… people
laugh. You know. When someone’s sleeping with someone else. I… I must
have given my name when I first walked in. I don’t remember. Either I
did or he saw me leave. He called me that night… last night, that would
be. But I said no. Then he came around tonight, early tonight. Just after
five. I’d just gotten home. I went to the door, and… at first I
thought it was you. Just as I thought just now, when you knocked… oh.
That was cruel. God, that was cruel!"
"So he took you out."
"Yes. Out to supper. He wouldn’t take no for an
answer. And then we came back, and he wanted to come in. He said he’d
missed me. He wanted… you know what he wanted."
"And you, too, Celine. You wanted to close the
circle. Richard and Richard around me like two bookends, the beginning
mistake and the—the end where you know exactly what’s going to happen.
Where you’re left in pieces again, and he steps over them all without
getting any on his shoes."
"Yes." There was amazement in the gaze she
turned on me, amazement whose intensity started to dry and focus her
pupils. "Yes."
"So why? Why didn’t you close the circle?"
"I…." Now she was confused. She shook her
head distractedly. "I couldn’t."
"Why not?"
"Because of her."
"The other woman—the woman who had him?"
"Yes. Do you think I wanted to help him do to her
what he had done to me?"
"Why not? You don’t owe her anything."
"I… I couldn’t. I couldn’t do that to
someone else."
"You’re right. You couldn’t, because she had
him, and you never had him. You couldn’t have made him do
to her what he did to you—"
"No, you’re wrong. I know him. He wouldn’t
leave her for me, but… he wouldn’t stay with her. Once I started him
off, there’d be others. Even if I just had him one night."
"And you think there won’t be others now?"
"I… I don’t know. But I won’t start him off.
She deserves a chance. They both deserve a chance."
"Why? Did you get a chance? Did he give a
chance to you? Do you think they deserve anything?"
She was growing agitated. Her right shoulder, rumpling
the alpaca coat up around her chin, rolled against the wall, and she
reached her feet unsteadily.
"Don’t you deserve a chance at sleep?
That’s not asking much, to be able to sleep. Why not just kill off the
last ounce of hope…"
"No! No! I… I couldn’t do that to anyone…"
"I’m talking about doing it for yourself.
Why not just borrow him for one night?"
"Because he ruined my life! Do you think I want to
ruin someone else’s life the same way?"
"Even if it costs you your sleep?"
She looked up at me with a flash of something like
indignation. "Even if it costs me my life!"
"But Celine!" I grabbed her wrists
just then, my own hands all at once wildly animate, and I shook her back
and forth. "You don’t do things like that! You’re no good! You
don’t sacrifice yourself for other people! You’re worse than anything
I could imagine, or my mother could imagine!" And my hands leapt from
her wrists to her shoulders (so thin within the plush coat), and once more
I shook her and shook her. "You’re no good! Why would someone like
you throw away her only chance to be rid of fear for the sake of a
complete stranger—a person whose name she doesn’t even know? You
can’t do things like that! That’s beyond honorable—that’s noble!
That’s like Christ!"
"No!" she cried, horrified. "No!"
"Why not? Are you afraid? Afraid of all the
choices—all the new chances to screw up?"
"I will!" she wailed. "I always
do!"
"And you don’t want me, either, because you don’t
want to ruin my life, either…"
"No!"
"Because I deserve a chance."
"Yes!"
"So if I take you right now, it’ll ruin your
chance to give me a chance…"
"No… yes!"
"If I just take you, just have you all for myself,
all of you, right now…."
And I devoured her—her lips, her chin, her cheeks,
her eyes. I swept her coat off and flung it across the room in one motion:
in the next, I lifted her and lay her on the sofa. I squeezed her into
that end where we never used to nestle when we watched TV, the end which
thrust itself into the room’s darkest, most doubtful corner. When I saw,
as I looked back up from her bared waist, that the lamplight was in her
eyes, I peeled off my remaining shoe and backhanded it across the room.
The night immediately exploded black around us in a frail tingle of glass;
but as I brought her head up on the sofa’s arm, turning it with my chin,
I could see the glint of her teeth in the pallor misting through the
drapes.
Afterward, we must have slept a while. I remember
fishing around in the dark at the sofa’s far end for her quilt. When I
returned with it, tucking it up over those thin shoulders as smooth as wet
ice (and little less cold), she was awake, or partly so. She said into my
ear, "Rish-aard!" I rolled her over onto my chest,
thinking we would go back to sleep. It was then that she whispered,
"I may not be able to have children. Or not many. The doctor said not
to hope for too much. It was… something that happened to me a while
back, and… I got hurt, and now…. Well, you kept talking about
children, about a big family, and I had a check-up just after your break,
and… so I asked."
As I felt her moist warm breath on my neck and felt her
fine dense hair on my lips, I watched the whole evening, the whole week,
the whole last month reassemble itself in the night above my head. Why
couldn’t she just have told me straight out? Why did she have to whisper
the most important things into the midnight? I said nothing for a minute,
but my palm never stopped running up and down her bare spine. Finally,
when I could tell by her breathing that she was clinging to wakefulness
for an answer, I put some order in my thoughts.
"I’m sorry, Celine. I’m sorry I put you
through that. It doesn’t matter, not in the least. You should have told
me…"
"But it does matter! I want children… I
want to give you children!"
Another passionate non-sequitur to ease around.
"He said… the doctor… that it would be hard. That having a large
family would be a long shot. But… so we’ll be grateful for the one or
two."
"Yes, but… even that might be hard."
"We’ll really work at it!"
Suddenly I had to have her again. I picked her up in my
arms and carried her to her bedroom. When we had made love before, our
appetite had been blended from anger and terror—from sleeplessness and
raw nerves. This time it was the sheer joy of release—of getting the
drawbridge up before the devils on our heels could follow, and watching
them whirl and caper furiously below from our turret in the clouds. We
loved long and deep, and when it ended at last, sleep had already
stretched one wing over us. For me, part of the joy was actually realizing
that a doctor’s visit had been behind much of this week’s hell. That
was something I could grapple and wrestle down. Its facts could be
addressed individually, and its prognosis could be courted with drugs and
treatments. After all, our bodies were young and healthy. We had our whole
lives ahead of us.
But when I woke up the next morning, Saturday morning,
and quietly plumped up my pillow so that I could watch my sweet Celine, my
Celine, sleep away… shoulders up, shoulders down, the tips of her upper
foreteeth just barely visible, a stray wisp of hairs arching over her
upturned nose… I think I began to suspect what hobgoblins lurked in the
hard medical facts. We had not raised the drawbridge quite in time, after
all. Some of these demons would ride on our shoulders forever, or until a
miracle waved them off. Some of them were camped in Celine’s womb. Scar
tissue from an abortion… wasn’t that it, how she "got hurt"?
This was the very first time I ever actually entertained such a thought
about Celine—and it only crossed my mind then because I recollected my
best friend in college grieving to me one night over his sister’s
virtual sterilization by a bad abortion. Somehow, an abortion would make a
lot of pieces fit which had always seemed loose to me before. How could
she have gone crazy over the loss of this Richard? Was Richard, then, a
man to die for—a lying traitor like him? But to lose a child… and, in
losing a child by choice, to discover later that you would lose other
children against your choice…. I also recalled at some point, propped
against my pillow, that curious unfinished remark last night hidden among
Celine’s praise of mothers: how they were always right, how I should
listen to mine. What was it she had said? "Even I was right, maybe,
when I…"—when she what? When she had an abortion? When, as a
would-be mother, she chose to spare her unborn child the misery of having
her for a mother?
I brushed the wayward strands of hair off her nose as
gently as I could. My mother, of course… Celine was right to think that
my mother would stomp her foot and hurl high damnation down upon her if
knowledge of the abortion were ever to come out. But me? How could she
think I would refuse to forgive her? But how could I forgive her if I must
never know?
Or if I told her that I knew and forced my forgiveness
upon her, how could I convince her that I wasn’t offering another
sacrifice to the flawless image, the Perfect Celine in my heart’s
temple? How could I make her accept being forgiven? For that matter, I had
nothing to forgive, unless the sons and daughters whom we would never have…
and I had already faced that loss by taking her as mine. But how could I
ever persuade her to forgive herself? They say that God forgives… what
does he do, then, when someone won’t believe herself worthy of his
offer?
back to Contents
***************************
Common Sense Strikes
Out
In producing the hard copy of this edition, we have
abruptly confronted the embarrassing fact, mere hours before our bundle is
to be delivered to the printer, that we have an even-numbered blank on the
final page’s flip-side! True to our resolution never to let paper go
unused, we have scrambled about for five hundred words of further matter.
Dr. Palaver’s nugatory nuggets, which usually adorn our receding stern,
are not mined in haste (appearances notwithstanding) and are hence
unavailable in this moment of crisis. What to do?
Then we recalled an exchange among certain interested
parties on the subject of our kids’ baseball experience. The topic is
ripe for the time of year, and Praesidium has actually carried at
least one essay about baseball (specifically, about its decadence in the
nineties—what else would you expect from us?) over the years. The matter
of this particular exchange concerns hitting; and, with regard to hitting,
it concerns how to hold the bat. Our office-advocate maintains that a
small space between the hands—say, of an inch or two—provides both
greater bat control and greater bat speed. A simple test of this assertion
(he insists) is as accessible as the nearest walking stick, umbrella, or
shillelagh. Gripping said object securely, work the wrists back and forth
with the hands in various positions: pressed together at the object’s
end, pressed together when "choked up" on the object, and
separated by the recommended one or two inches. The last position clearly
yields both the greatest sense of control and the highest velocity. Of
course, a hitter addressing an incoming pitch uses more than his wrists,
and a much more sophisticated experiment would have to be devised for
comparing the drive of muscular arms to that of wiry, slightly separated
wrists. But there’s no disputing that the swing with more
"arm" in it is also the swing assured of producing more
strikeouts. In other words, a possible slight enhancement of velocity must
be weighed against a certain enhancement of typical inefficiency.
Now, here’s the poser. Given the incontestable
virtues of the "small space" approach, why do Little League
coaches all around this great green land of ours absolutely, categorically
refuse to allow their young charges the practice of it? One this point,
our paternal colleague grows most exercised. He has heard his own son
shouted out from dugout and coach’s box in censure of the "small
space" so often that his blood pressure has suffered escalation, and
we understand that a series of heated phone conversations ensued after one
straw too many touched the camel’s back. Our perceptive father also
visited the library to prepare a more thorough brief. There he consulted
book after book endowed with grainy photographs of yesteryear’s sultans
of the swat. As a matter of fact, Babe Ruth (the proper owner of that
sobriquet) turns out to have been a critical force in rendering the
"small space" unpopular. Before his rainbow homeruns, the
approach was routine among great hitters. Our researcher found
photographic evidence that the following worthies refused to clamp the top
hand down on the bottom hand: Napoleon Lajoie (who recorded the highest
seasonal average ever—.422), Stuffy McGinnis, Fred Snodgrass, Tris
Speaker, Eddie Collins, Ty Cobb, and possibly even Lou Gehrig (Ruth’s
teammate and psychic opposite) and Hank Greenberg. The photographs, our
source warns, can be misleading, and not only because many are simply of
poor quality. If a hitter is shown as his bat crosses the plate, or most
certainly as it wraps around his front shoulder, the upper hand may well
have slipped down on the lower even though it started at the salutary
remove of the "small space". The space’s benefits do not
require that it be preserved throughout the swing. Indeed (our noble
father argues fluently), the upper hand should always be held looser than
the lower so as not to impede the bat’s steering except in the
event of a high inside pitch. The crowning example in the gallery (because
it rests within vivid memory for some of us) is Leon Wagner, who was
harrowing American League pitchers in the late fifties and early sixties
before his incorrigibly errant throws and stunning flamboyance before the
camera led him to employment in another part of Los Angeles. The
three-inch space in Daddy Wags’s grip was much admired at the time.
We suggest that there is food for rumination here even
for those who detest the game of baseball. A clearer case of universal
aversion to a method whose success is empirically indisputable would be
hard to find. The moralist may well ask, What makes people cling to a
habit in the teeth of solid evidence that another way gets better results—what
makes them, indeed, stamp out the other way wherever they find it? Spanish
editorialist Antonio Azorín wrote an essay about a century ago reflecting
upon his rural countrymen’s loathing of trees (they harbor crop-eating
birds) and water (it draws nutrients out of the soil), citing rather
extensive studies on the subject. Think of it: poor dirt-farmers, their
loved ones dying of malnutrition and tuberculosis, who chop down every
tree as though it were a weed and shun aqueducts as though they were a
clever plot of peasant-hating Madrid bureaucrats… people trying to
scratch a living from a dusty steppe who resist every attempt to transform
the dusty steppe! It’s no less incomprehensible than a responsible adult
male who watches children strike out time after time and refuses to allow
them the advantages that procured four thousand hits for Ty Cobb. O
tempora, o mores!
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